crime

Donald Trump recently falsely stated that the murder rate “is the highest it’s been in 47 years.” Scholars of crime have been energetic in countering this claim with evidence that the violent crime in the U.S. peaked in the early 1990s and has steadily declined since. Although recent data suggests murder has increased in certain cities, Trump’s characterization of the murder rate is way off. But the sentiment behind his statement in some ways reflects a fearful popular discourse about crime rates and “tough on crime” public policies. 

Even after accounting for other relevant factors, people in neighborhoods with higher crime rates are slightly more fearful about crime. While crime fears also vary along demographic lines and victimization experiences, scholars have emphasized the robust effects of social environment as drivers of crime fears. Collective efficacy — the perceived social cohesion of a neighborhood and the willingness of neighbors to intervene on others’ behalf — is a strong predictor of lower crime fears, whereas the perceived level of disorder (e.g. vandalism) is associated with greater fear.

• Chris L. Gibson, Jihong Zhao, Nicholas P. Lovrich, and Michael J. Gaffney. 2002. “Social Integration, Individual Perceptions of Collective Efficacy, and Fear of Crime in Three Cities.” Justice Quarterly, 19: 537-564.
• Jihong Zhao, Brian Lawton, and Dennis Longmire. 2015.  “An Examination of the Micro-Level Crime–Fear of Crime Link.” Crime & Delinquency 61(1): 19-44.

Scholars have noted that popular discourse around crime has revolved around talk of “random violence,” which deemphasizes patterns of crime and victimization and focuses on the claim that everyone is equally at risk. This rhetoric maximizes public concern and favors policy strategies that include individual law enforcement tactics (“tough on crime”) as opposed to changes in structural conditions (e.g. neighborhood dynamics, class) that are correlated to crime and victimization.

• Joel Best. 1999. Random Violence: How We Talk about New Crimes and New Victims. University  of California Press.

Research on the relationship between fear of crime and the emergence of “get tough on crime” policies explores whether the origins of the punitive turn in crime control resulted from the general public’s fear of crime rates or political strategies that influence the public’s perceptions of crime. Some scholars have found that, in combination with increased media coverage, political initiatives surrounding crime (and not actual crime rates) fostered increasing public concern about crime and drugs during the 1960s and 80s.

• Katherine Beckett. 1999. Making Crime Pay: Law and Order in Contemporary American Politics. Oxford University Press.

Others have recently challenged this notion, arguing that punitive public sentiment is what motivated policymakers to develop tough on crime policies. Regardless of this “chicken and egg” dilemma, crime issues developed into a key political strategy. This “governing through crime” expands racial divisions rather than increasing security for American citizens. The concentration of mass incarceration in impoverished minority communities is evidence enough that crime as a political strategy has important repercussions for American notions of equality and liberty for all.

• Peter K Enns. 2016. Incarceration Nation: How the United States Became the Most Punitive Democracy in the World. Cambridge University Press.
• Jonathan Simon. 2007. Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear. Oxford University Press.

Russian President Vladimir Putin recently signed a new law that decriminalizes domestic violence. Perpetrators of domestic violence against children and spouses will only face charges if injuries require a hospital visit, and the punishment will take the form of fines rather than jail time. While this is certainly troubling, policies and laws concerning domestic violence in the United States are far from perfect — they are often limited in how much they change the way perpetrators think of domestic violence, even if they sometimes keep abusers from repeating violent behavior.

Often, particularly in the context of welfare policy, a mismatch tends to exist between low-income abused women’s actual needs and the assumptions about those needs that inform policies on domestic violence. While policies and services can help victims to exit abusive relationships and offer protection and material support, they can also come with constraints that make leaving abusers difficult, such as requirements for teen parents to live with a parent, to complete a GED or job training programs, and fear of deportation for immigrants. “One-size fits all” policy approaches, such as those common in state welfare policies, make it hard for victims to make decisions about what works best for their individual situations because their individual experiences get trumped by blanket procedures.

• Diane Purvin. 2007. “At the Crossroads and in the Crosshairs: Social Welfare Policy and Low-Income Women’s Vulnerability to Domestic Violence.” Social Problems 54(2): 188-210.
• Carol Bohmer, Jennifer Brandt, Denise Bronson and Helen Hartnett. 2002. “Domestic Violence  Law Reforms: Reactions from the Trenches.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare  29(3): 71-87.
• Sharon Hays. 2003. Flat Broke with Children: Women in the Age of Welfare Reform. New York: Oxford University Press.  

When it comes to arresting and prosecuting perpetrators, abusers often think of their punishments as evidence of an unfair legal system rather than consequences for their own actions. And while abusers who are arrested and serve jail time are less likely to commit subsequent acts of domestic violence than those who are arrested but not charged with abuse, the affect of arrest on subsequent domestic violence is often contingent on whether or not someone has something to lose — research finds that being arrested deters people with jobs from subsequent domestic violence, but does not deter those without a “stake in conformity.”

• Keith Guzik. 2008. “The Agencies of Abuse: Intimate Abusers’ Experience of Presumptive Arrest and Prosecution.” Law & Society Review, 42(1), 111-144.
• Lawrence Sherman and Douglas A. Smith. 1992. “Crime, Punishment, and Stake in Conformity: Legal and Informal Control of Domestic Violence.” American Sociological Review 57:680-90.
• John Wooldredge and Amy Thistlethwaite. 2002. “Reconsidering Domestic Violence Recidivism: Conditioned Effects of Legal Controls by Individual and Aggregate Levels of Stake in Conformity.”Journal of Quantitative Criminology 18: 45.

The Trump administration continues to ramp up policies that not only curb the flow of undocumented migrants into the United States, but also bolster an already formidable deportation system. Currently, many “Dreamers” protected by former president Obama’s executive order are worried that president Trump will overturn this crucial immigration policy, which grants residency status to undocumented individuals that came to the United States as children prior to 2012. This unprecedented move could potentially lead to the detention and deportation of nearly 800,000 people. Surprisingly, social science has found that immigration policy in the United States does not typically follow immigration patterns, but more often shaped by economic and political conditions.

Many legal avenues for migration to the United States were dismantled from the late 1950s through 1965, including the elimination of many temporary worker visas and country and hemispheric quotas. This policy shift resulted in an uptick in undocumented migrants from Latin America until the late 1970s, which subsequently tapered off with the passage of the Immigration and Reform Control Act in 1986. Due to this influx of undocumented immigrants, political rhetoric surrounding immigration took a punitive turn, fueling anti-immigrant sentiment and restrictionist policies with strict enforcement practices, especially during the mid 1990s through the 2000s.

• Douglas S. Massey and Karen A. Pren. 2012. “Unintended Consequences of US Immigration Policy: Explaining the Post‐1965 Surge from Latin America.” Population and Development Review 38(1): 1-29.

Deportations of both undocumented and documented immigrants has increased significantly in the past few decades, so much so that under the Obama administration, a record 2 million immigrants were deported by the end of 2013. These unprecedented numbers of deportations typically involved people with no criminal record or those with minor convictions, such as traffic offenses or marijuana possession, and nearly one quarter of the 400,000 deportees in 2012 were parents of U.S. citizens.

• Marie Gottschalk. 2016. Caught: The Prison State and the Lockdown of American Politics. Princeton University Press.

Scholars have demonstrated the parallels between the system of mass deportation and mass incarceration in the United States, both of which disproportionately impact men of color, are rife with punitive rhetoric, and are bolstered by massive government and private expenditures. Tanya Maria Golash-Boza contends that deportation is nested within the current state of global capitalism.  She argues that deportations serve the function of removing surplus labor while keeping undocumented labor populations in the United States compliant and vulnerable. This era of mass deportation and “crimmigration” comes at a significant cost to immigrant communities and families. Unfortunately, if the current political climate of “America First” is any indicator, these social and human costs will only exacerbate in the recent future.

• Tanya Maria Golash-Boza. 2015. Deported: Immigrant Policing, Disposable Labor and Global Capitalism. NYU Press.
• Jacqueline Maria Hagan, Nestor Rodriguez, and Brianna Castro. 2011. Social Effects of Mass Deportations by the United States Government, 2000–10. Ethnic and Racial Studies 34(8): 1374-1391.

The selling of Mexico’s nationalized oil company has caused gas shortages and rising gas prices, sparking nationwide protest. In the midst of  “El Gasonlinazo,” unlikely heroes have stepped forward to fight for affordable gasoline — Mexican drug cartels. The cartels are threatening to burn gas stations, specifically those run by foreign companies, and they have started stealing oil and selling it back to Mexican citizens for a lower cost. They claim that it is a disservice to the people of Mexico to make them pay such high prices for gas, especially when many do not even make a living wage.

It is not unusual for individuals or groups with a negative image to present themselves in the best way possible through “impression management,” and drug cartels are no exception. Past research shows that developing an image of being helpful to the community helps cartels and gangs to garner legitimacy and respect. In Mexico, there is a long tradition of rebel groups acting in the name of the community, for example, the Zapatistas portrayed themselves as liberators, rather than criminals, in their fight against globalization. 

• Erving Goffman. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor Books
• John Hagedorn. 2008. A World of Gangs: Armed Young Men and Gangsta Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Markus S. Schulz. 1998. “Collective Action Across Borders: Opportunity Structures, Network Capacities, and Communicative Praxis in the Age of Advanced Globalization.” Sociological Perspectives 41(3): 587-616.

The Niger Delta experienced a similar situation when Chinese oil companies bought entry into the land. Citizens of Nigeria banded together to form rebel groups, using kidnappings and other violent measures as forms of resistance. Oil is a vital resource, which is why citizens of under-developed nations are willing to look to non-traditional groups for help fighting the interests of foreign companies and international elites.

• Cyril I. Obi. 2008. “Enter the Dragon? Chinese Oil Companies & Resistance in the Niger Delta.” Review of African Political Economy 117: 417-434.
• Uwafiokun Idemudia and Uwem E. Ite. 2006. “Demystifying the Niger Delta Conflict: Towards an Integrated Explanation.” Review of African Political Economy 109:391-406.

Barack Obama issued 78 pardons and 153 commutations before leaving office, including commuting the sentence of Chelsea Manning. While commutations shorten the sentences of incarcerated individuals, but do not alter their criminal record, pardons remove the conviction from the individual’s record. Obama’s latest string of clemency decisions brings his administration’s total to 1,324, the majority of which were commutations.

Research on federal executive clemency shows that rates of clemency are highest when Democratic presidents are in power, when crime rates are lower, and during periods of war. Legal research also highlights variation between states, with certain governors utilizing clemency measures more than others, though not necessarily along party lines. While executive clemency was once a practice commonly employed by U.S. presidents, its use has declined in recent decades. This decreased use of executive clemency has coincided with a sharp increase in arrests, both of which have contributed to the substantial rise in incarcerated individuals across the U.S. 

• Bruce Western. 2006. “Punishment and Inequality in America.” Russell Sage Foundation.
• Margaret Colgate Love. 2010. “The Twilight of Pardon Power.” The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 100(3): 1169–1212.
• William M.Landes and Richard A. Posner. 2009. “The Economics of Presidential Pardons and Commutations.” The Journal of Legal Studies 38(1): 61–88.
• Rachel E. Barkow . 2009. “The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency.” Federal Sentencing Reporter 21(3): 153–59.

Scholarship also hints at who is likely to receive a commutation or pardon. Analyses of death sentences shows that women, youth, the elderly, and those who have spent a significant amount of time on death row are more likely to have their death sentences commuted. Additionally, death penalty commutations are more common among governors who are not returning to office (lame duck) and when the death row population is particularly old. However, even though female prisoners are more likely to receive clemency, recent qualitative investigations of commutation hearings suggest that women encounter a systemic gender bias when applying for a pardon or commutation.

• Laura M. Argys and H. Naci Mocan. 2004. “Who Shall Live and Who Shall Die? An Analysis of Prisoners on Death Row in the United States.” The Journal of Legal Studies 33(2): 255–82.
• Carol Jacobsen and Lora Bex Lempert 2013. “Institutional Disparities: Considerations of Gender in the Commutation Process for Incarcerated Women.” Signs 39(1): 265–89.

Originally published Sept. 13, 2016

Earlier this summer, a California judge sentenced Brock Allen Turner to 6 months in jail for the sexual assault of an unconscious 23-year-old woman because the judge believed a harsher punishment would “have a severe impact on him.” After Turner’s father referred to his son’s actions as “20 minutes of action,” the survivor detailed the emotional aftermath of her assault and the revictimization during trial in a powerful impact statement. This sentencing decision and subsequent defending of Turner because of his university status, lack of criminal history, and “positive character” continue to strike public outrage, as he was released from jail after serving 3 months. Feminist scholars have long addressed the pervasiveness of rape culture and help us pinpoint how it reproduces notions that only “bad guys” commit “real rape.”

Police and prosecutors often make decisions to arrest and charge suspects based upon characteristics of “real rape” –  rapes that involve strangers, weapons, and physical force. These depictions of sexual assault suggest only “bad guys” rape and that victims must physically resist and show their injuries to prove it. Empirical studies illustrate that acquaintances perpetrate the vast majority of rapes and include little, if any, physical injury. Still, rape and sexual assault continue to be characterized by under-reporting and high attrition rates.

• Susan Estrich. 1987. Real rape. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Cassia Spohn and Katharine Tellis. 2014. Policing and Prosecuting Sexual Assault: Inside the Criminal Justice System. Lynne Reiner Publishers: Boulder, CO.

Some men convicted of rape deny their actions by portraying the victim as the true sexual aggressor and themselves as the victim. In one study, men argued that the victim said no when she really meant yes, initiated the sexual contact, and even enjoyed the sexual contact once she relaxed. Other men acknowledged their actions as rape but provided excuses, citing drugs and alcohol, emotional problems, and a brief lapse in judgement from their otherwise “nice guy” persona as the true source of the victim’s rape.

• Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla. 1984. “Convicted Rapists’ Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and Justifications.” Social Problems 31(5): 530-544.

Perhaps one reason myths of the pathological rapist persist within the criminal justice system is the expectation that women and girls should accept sexual violence and aggression from men as normal in their everyday interactions. In a recent study, adolescent girls often described their experiences of harassment and sexual violence with men and boys as normal “because they do it to everyone.”

• C.J. Pascoe. 2007. Dude You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Heather R. Hlavka. 2014. “Normalizing Sexual Violence: Young Women Account for Harassment and Abuse.” Gender & Society 28(3): 337-358.

For more on rape culture and its consequences, see this TROT on the revictimization of rape victims, this piece on pop music and rape culture, and these stats on rape and sexual assault in the U.S.

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments for Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, a case concerning allegations of racial bias in jury deliberations. Many states prohibit hearing juror testimony following the conclusion of a trial; however, following the deliberations of Peña-Rodriguez’s case, two jurors signed affidavits attesting to racial bias by a fellow juror. They allege that the juror referred to an alibi witness as discreditable because he was “an illegal,” and asserted that the defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican.” After initially being struck down by both the trial judge and the Colorado Supreme Court, Peña-Rodriguez is now making his case to the highest court, a task which research suggests may prove extremely challenging.

In her book The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander illustrates why challenging racial bias in juries is so difficult. Despite the passage of laws such as Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits prosecutors from discriminating on the basis of race when selecting juries, both prosecutors and defense attorneys are allowed peremptory strikes, or the ability to strike potential jurors for just about any reason they choose. Challenging instances of racial bias is even more difficult following the Supreme Court decision in Purkett v. Elm, which ruled that even if there is a pattern of striking a particular racial group by a prosecutor, providing any race-neutral reason (the prosecutor in this case used hair length) is enough to justify that the decision is not based on race.

• Nijole V. Benokaritis. 1982. Racial Exclusion in Juries. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 18(1), 29-47.
• Hiroshi Fukurai. Edgar W. Butler, & Richard Krooth. 1991. Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection. Journal of Black Studies, 22(2), 196-215.

Moreover, it is not just legal precedents that solidify racial bias, but also the initial selection process itself that is discriminatory. Potential jurors are drawn from registered voters or Department of Motor Vehicle lists, which contain fewer minorities. Forty-seven states also restrict the rights of felons to serve on juries, which disproportionately limits the presence people of color. Most states and the federal government place a lifetime exclusion for felonies, which automatically bans nearly 30 percent of adult black men from jury service.

• Brian C. Kalt. 2003. Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service. American University Law Review, 53, 1-149.
• Darren Wheelock. 2005. Collateral Consequences and Racial Inequality: Felon Status Restrictions as a System of Disadvantage. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 21(1), 82-90.

In short, jury selection is not only inherently racially biased, but many Supreme Court decisions appear to support a system of racial discrimination rather than dismantle it. As a result, legal precedents such as the rules of evidence may bolster, or at the very least shield, racial bias within jury deliberations.

Protests broke out throughout Tulsa, Oklahoma the night an unarmed black man, Terence Crutcher, was shot and killed by a white female police officer, Betty Shelby. Police killings have surged in mainstream media since the 2014 shooting deaths of young black men like Michael Brown and Eric Garner, shootings that have overwhelmingly involved male law enforcement officials. As a result, female police officers and the likelihood that they will use unnecessary force have largely been excluded from the conversation.

Findings in this area, however, are mixed. Some report that there are no significant differences between use of force by men and women when making arrests, except for the fact that use of force encounters for women were slightly less likely to employ a weapon and produce injury. Others, however, noted that female police officers are less likely to use force and suggest that a greater female presence may reduce violent interactions with citizens.

• Peter B. Hoffman and Edward R. Hickey. 2005. “Use of Force by Female Police Officers.” Journal of Criminal Justice 33(2): 145-151.
• Amie M. Schuck and Cara Rabe-Hemp. 2005. “Women Police: The Use of Force by and Against Female Officers.” Women & Criminal Justice 16(4): 91-117.

The last several decades have witnessed a rise in female officers in law enforcement agencies. Consequently, social scientists have addressed the gendered assumptions about women’s competence in handling tasks traditionally considered masculine. Institutional norms in policing often require a great deal of “emotional labor” that differ based on an officer’s gender. Women officers are expected to display little outward signs of emotion in their interactions with citizens, and yet are commonly still assigned policing tasks that tend to be devalued as feminized and judged as appropriate for women officers, such as administrative duties and community policing. 

• Susan Ehrlich Martin. 1999. “Police Force or Police Service? Gender and Emotional Labor.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 561: 111-126.
• Christina DeJong. 2004. “Gender Differences in Officer Attitude and Behavior: Providing Comfort to Citizens.” Women & Criminal Justice 15(3-4): 1-32.

Some research suggests that female officers are more likely to be victimized themselves. One study finds that female police officers are not at an increased risk of experiencing victimization during police-citizen interactions, but that incidents involving interpersonal violence along with alcohol and/or drugs increases risks for women on the job.

• Cara E. Rabe-Hemp and Amie M. Schuck. 2007. “Violence Against Police Officers: Are Female Officers at Greater Risk?” Police Quarterly 10(4): 411-428.

With police use of force and mass shootings occupying the center of the public’s discourse on public safety, single incident homicides and suicides, which comprise the majority of gun violence, fly relatively under the radar. Social science sheds light on the rates and distribution of gun violence, as well as the most effective strategies to reduce it.  

In 2012, there were over 32,000 deaths by firearms in the United States, which is a significantly higher rate compared to similar countries like Great Britain. Although homicides commitment with firearms are declining overall (though the suicide firearm rate is increasing), the risks for homicide violence vary among demographic groups. In terms of homicide, young African American males and females are at increased risk of firearm homicide compared to other racial groups, but this gap declines with age.

• Garen J. Wintemute. 2015. “The Epidemiology of Firearm Violence in the Twenty-First Century United States.” Annual Review of Public Health 36(5): 5-19.

Research shows that targeted gun seizures can lead to reductions in gun crimes. Additionally, background checks, of both those who have criminal records and those deemed “high risk,” are shown to decrease gun violence and arrests. Gun buyback programs – when the government offers to buy privately owned firearms — have been shown to have no effect on gun homicide or suicide rates.

• Lawrence Sherman and Dennis Rogan. 1995. “Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: Hot Spots Patrol in Kansas City.” Justice Quarterly 12(4): 673-693.
• Daniel Webster and Garen J. Wintemute. 2015. “Effects of Policies Designed to Keep Firearms from High-Risk Individuals.” Annual Review of Public Health 36: 21–37.
• Richard Rosenfeld. 1995. “Gun Buybacks: Crime Control or Community Mobilization.” In M.R Plotkin (Ed.), Under Fire: Gun Buybacks, Exchanges and Amnesty Programs. Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum: 1-28.

Research also indicates that homicidal gun victimization clusters within small groups that are concentrated in particular neighborhoods. Intervention in these networks has been linked to both reduced shooting behavior, as well as reduced firearm victimization. For example, the Violence Reduction Strategy, pioneered in Boston, is a procedural justice initiative that brings gang members together with community members and law enforcement officials for hour long meetings of focused deterrence.

• Andrew V. Papachristos, Anthony A. Braga, Eric Piza, and Leigh S. Grossman. 2015. “The Company You Keep? The Spillover Effects of Gang Membership on Individual Gunshot Victimization in a Co-Offending Network.” Criminology 53(3): 624-649.
• David S. Kirk and Andrew V. Papachristos. 2011. “Cultural Mechanisms and the Persistence of Neighborhood Violence.” American Journal of Sociology 116(4): 1190-1233.
• Andrew V. Papachristos and David S. Kirk. 2015. “Changing The Street Dynamic: Evaluating Chicago’s Group Violence Reduction Strategy.“ Criminology & Public Policy 14(3): 525-558.

In lieu of the recent fatal police shootings in cities such as Tulsa, Charlotte, and most recently, El Cajon, California, communities are coming together to demand changes in law enforcement interactions. Of particular concern is police surveillance and the subsequent criminalization of minor offenses. “Problem-oriented policing” – which focuses on a community’s “hot spots” and requires police to be more proactive in identifying where crime might happen, as opposed to just reacting after a crime takes place – has been offered as a possible solution. But does problem-oriented policing actually reduce crime? Social science research helps us sort out the potential benefits and pitfalls to problem-oriented policing.

The research record is mixed. Studies evaluating problem-oriented policing programs in Jersey City and Los Angeles showed reductions in serious crimes, such as property crime, robbery, and drug selling, as well nuisance crimes associated with homelessness. Others, however, show no signs of decrease in the number of reported crime rates. Scholars suggest that problem-oriented policing may only have an impact in areas of severe crime and distrust of law enforcement.  

• Anthony A. Braga, David L. Weisburd, Elin J. Waring, Lorraine Green Mazerolle, William Spelman, and Francis Gajewski. 1999. “Problem‐oriented Policing in Violent Crime Places: A Randomized Controlled Experiment.” Criminology 37(3): 541-580.
• Richard Berk and John McDonald. 2010. “Policing the Homeless: An Evaluation of Efforts to Reduce Homeless-related Crime.” Criminology and Public Policy, 9 (4): 813-840.
• David Weisburd, Nancy A. Morris, and Justin Ready. 2008. “Risk-Focused Policing at Places: An Experimental Evaluation.” Justice Quarterly 25(1): 163-200.

Additional concerns with problem-oriented policing is its effect on marginalized communities. Both observed environmental cues and implicit racial and ethnic biases affect people’s perception of neighborhood disorder. As such, neighborhoods with high concentrations of racial/ethnic minorities are perceived as having more disorder, and consequently viewed as more dangerous and violent. Residents living in neighborhoods marked by perceived disorder are themselves labeled as threats by law enforcement, perpetuating and reproducing urban inequality and cultural stereotypes.

• Robert Sampson and Stephen W. Raudenbush. 2004. “Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood Stigma and the Social Construction of ‘Broken Windows.’” Social Psychology Quarterly 67(4): 319-342.
• George Kelling and Catherine Coles. 1996. Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. New York: Free Press.