The alarmingly high rates of suicide among transgender people have received national attention, prompting larger questions about health-harming behaviors among the transgender population. When one’s gender expression strays from cultural expectations, how does it influence discrimination and health?

Using data from the National Transgender Discrimination Survey, Lisa R. Miller and Eric Anthony Grollman examine this relationship. Survey respondents answered a number of questions about how their gender is perceived by others, what types of discrimination they have faced, and whether they have attempted suicide and/or abused alcohol or drugs. Miller and Grollman find that transgender adults report substantially higher rates of health-harming behaviors than cisgender (that is, non-transgender) adults report in other surveys.

A staggering 44% of transgender respondents said they had attempted suicide. Those who thought others saw them as transgender were significantly more likely to have attempted suicide than those who “passed” (were perceived to be cisgender) and reported higher rates of discrimination. Taken together, Miller and Grollman suggest that transgender adults perceived as gender nonconforming face more types of both daily and major discriminations; this may increase self-harming behavior.

Being transgender, the authors write, does not necessarily lead to health-harming behaviors; rather, being visible as transgender (or gender nonconforming) increases health-harming behaviors. It seems to be the social responses to gender nonconformity that negatively impact transgender health and wellbeing.

Many factors predict rates of gun ownership, including race, education and income levels, political-party affiliation, and local crime rates. But what about legislation and statements from local politicians and media? Do these factors also influence gun sales? University of Washington professor (and current Robert Wood Johnson Foundation Scholar in Health Policy at the University of Michigan) Rene D. Flores’ research explores the relationship between the two.

Flores tests whether an increase in anti-immigration ordinances or arguments predicts an increase in gun sales within twenty-four Pennsylvania counties. Using administrative data from the countries themselves, he shows how proposed anti-immigrant laws, such as increased deportation power or English-only mandates, predicts an increased sale of handguns. Even after controlling for other factors that predict gun ownership, proposed anti-immigrant ordinances and rates of gun sales track each other closely. Flores also finds a similar link between anti-immigrant-ordinances and subsequent handgun purchases in South Carolina.

Flores suggests the relationship springs from the rhetoric used by politicians and media outlets that describes immigrants as criminal, violent, and dangerous. When immigrants or other populations are portrayed negatively in this way, social anxiety can catch fire in native populations. He tests this claim by examining how, after anti-immigrant ordinances are proposed in Pennsylvania counties, local media run more stories linking immigrants to crime and violence. He suggests that these stories either cause or reflect a change in local attitudes toward immigration—one that results in increased anti-immigration sentiment and gun sales. In short, anti-immigration legislation and rhetoric can shape public attitudes, and social anxiety can predict the likelihood that locals “lock and load.”

Since 9/11, Arab Americans have experienced various forms of harassment and repression in the U.S., including deportations, FBI questioning, citizen surveillance, and harassment as well as insults, threats, and physical attacks we might now categorize as hate crimes. Sociologists Wayne Santoro and Marian Azab are interested in how these experiences impact Arab Americans’ political activism, with a particular focus on protests.

Using Michigan as their case study, Santoro and Azab focus on two main questions. First, to what extent are documented levels of repression associated with increases in public demonstrations and meetings between Detroit-area Arab Americans and authorities about ethnic-based grievances? And second, which Arab Americans are more likely to be involved in activism and civic engagement?

To answer the first, Santoro and Azab examined archives of the Detroit Free Press from 1999-2010. They found a clear temporal relationship between increases in repressive treatment against Arab Americans and patterns of protest and organizing in the community. Such activism peaked in the year after 9/11, with a general increase in protest in the following years.

If the fact that protests peaked post-9/11 within the Arab-American community is unsurprising, the second question—who participated in these protests—provides new information. To examine the effects of repression on an individual level, Santoro and Azab used the Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) to look at a sample of 1,016 people of Arab or Chaldean descent living in the Detroit area in 2003. They examined the impact of experiencing repression due to race, ethnicity, or religion on the respondent’s participation in a protest, march, or demonstration about any social or political issue within the last twelve months. The results indicated that individuals who identify weakly with their Arab identity are more likely to protest after experiencing repression.

The results indicate that repression does not just mobilize those who are already activists. Rather, repression mobilizes individuals with low levels of identity who are especially shocked by their experiences with oppression.

Stories of domestic violence and child abuse committed by athletes like Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson prompt public belief that violent crimes are a widespread epidemic in American professional football, thus inspiring the nickname “National Felon League.” In fact, a national survey indicates 69% of Americans believe domestic violence is a serious problem in the league. NFL officials have responded by developing policies to address domestic violence and sexual assault. Despite numerous news articles highlighting these crimes, however, few researchers have actually researched whether NFL players are more likely to commit crimes than people in the general population.

Wanda Leal, Marc Gertz, and Alex Piquero contrast the arrest rates of NFL players with those of the general public from 2000 to 2013. Using data compiled by the San Diego Union – Tribune and USA Today, the authors looked at the arrest rates of 1,952 NFL players to the national arrest rates for males between the ages of 20 and 39 as reported in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (UCR). They found that NFL players had significantly lower rates of property, public order, and total arrests than other young men, but higher rates of violent arrests (a statistically significant phenomenon in 6 of the 14 years they measured, particularly from 2004 to 2008).

Leal, Gertz, and Piquero’s preliminary study does not appear to support the theory that NFL players are especially likely to be arrested, as the general population had higher arrest rates in three of the four measured crime indices. Nevertheless, the study also provides some support for those concerned about violence crime committed by professional football players.

Women around the world leave their homes in economically disadvantaged, politically unstable countries in search of better income every day. One might assume that the act of venturing out—independent of husbands, fathers, and brothers—represents a break with traditional gender norms and unequal power dynamics between men and women. However, this is not always the case. In fact, Filipino women who travel overseas to do domestic work often frame their choice to leave in the opposite way—as an extension of their duties as wives, mothers, and daughters.

In 139 interviews with Filipino migrant domestic workers, Anju Mary Paul finds that these female migrants present their aspirations for work overseas as an extension of their duties as caregiving women in traditional Filipino households. Paul argues that the decision to migrate almost always begins with the individual woman who then presents the idea to family members for approval, anticipating potential resistance. In Paul’s interviews, family members opposed to migration may argue that working overseas does not follow traditional gender roles. For instance, parents argued it was not their daughter’s duty to work, but her husband’s. Other relatives criticized mothers for “abandoning their children.” In response, women often used the same gendered scripts: Mothers framed migration as the best way to be good mothers by providing money for their children’s education and well-being. Daughters emphasized their responsibility to care for parents and support younger siblings. And married women presented their potential earnings as a supplement their husbands’ incomes.

As exceptional as the Filipino females in this study may be, their case reminds us that even activities and choices that appear liberating for women can reflect and reproduce traditional gender norms and roles.

Higher education, whether it’s taking a few classes or earning a four-year degree, decreases the likelihood of individuals developing depression. Shawn Bauldry investigates whether college is a one-size-fits-all prescription, finding that higher education offers more protection from depression for people with lower incomes than it does for those already financially well-off.

Using nationally representative survey data that tracks individuals’ health from adolescents to adulthood (Add Health), Bauldry measures responses that indicate mental depression for individuals who have completed a bachelor’s degree, finished some college, or have not attended college and who are from either advantaged or disadvantaged backgrounds. The analysis controls for other factors like race, gender, and substance use. The results show that obtaining a college degree and attending some college provide similar levels of protection against depression across social strata, but these effects are magnified among those from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Bauldry explains the difference in effects with an idea called “resource substitution.” According to this theory, higher education can compensate for preexisting disadvantages by providing the means to access more health, social, and economic resources. Compared to peers from similarly disadvantaged circumstances, those who attend college have better outcomes in the job market, resulting in more financial stability and greater access to health and mental health resources. Additionally, finishing college (or even making it to college) may provide a sense of self-mastery that aids in overcoming the obstacles of a poor background.

Public sector jobs, like those in the military, education, and prisons, have long been seen as increasing racial equality; they’re often service-oriented and secure, providing seniority, benefits, and paths to promotion. But as “new governance,” described by George Wilson, Vincent J. Roscigno, and Huffman’s new Social Problems research, and privatization make the public sector look more like the private sector, racial wage parity erodes. In exploring their findings, the authors challenge scholarship on institutions and inequality that has assumed that, over time, “social change and associated structural transformations will reduce… inequalities”—that organizational and bureaucratic forces will lead, inevitably, to drops in racism and discrimination.

Using two datasets, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID2012) and the Integrated Public Use Data Series (IPUMS), Wilson, Roscigno, and Huffamn compare wage discrepancies between black and white employees across time and “new governance,” controlling for factors such as work ethic, education, physical health, gender, age, and unionization. The authors show that, with privatization, wage discrepancies by race grow within and beyond the public sector; this change is not explained by other variables.With privatization, wage discrepancies by race grow within and beyond the public sector.

New governance means both private and public sectors operate, increasingly, under business models, complete with managerial discretion and market principles. Thus, public jobs start to look more like private ones and rather than continuing a legacy of increased equality, both sectors see more inequality over time.

In American Sociological Review, Jennifer Sykes, Katrin Križ, Kathryn Edin, and Sarah Halpern-Meekin argue that for low-income families, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is not seen as a stigmatizing “welfare” handout akin to Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), but a measure that allows a sense of dignity because it is earned.

Based on in-depth interviews with 115 working parents, the authors find that EITC can help families stay afloat financially—or simply splurge a little. Sometimes the credit is used for necessities, such as paying bills. Other times parents put it toward gifts or other child-centered consumption—think cartoon-themed bedroom accessories, new shoes, dinner out, or an overnight trip. This “fun money” helps take the edge off a sense of precarity. And however it’s spent, the arrival of the money is meaningful: as the authors note, “For most [interviewees], it was by far the largest single check they receive in a given year.”

The authors argue that because of the positive feelings the credit engenders among recipients, the benefit is bigger than a dollar value. The EITC allows low-income recipients to practice what the authors call “incorporative consumption.” In other words, getting and spending the credit however they see fit affords low-income recipients a sense of citizenship and belonging that typically eludes those who live paycheck-to-paycheck in the contemporary U.S.

Even though people tend to think of pizza, beer, and the “Freshman 15” when they think of college students’ health, attending college seems to promote healthy behaviors that decrease the likelihood of obesity. Healthy habits developed during the college years tend to last a longtime. Furthermore, people with a college education tend to have better resources and habits for preventing obesity. But if college can curb the chances of obesity, does the timing of a higher education matter?

Researchers Miech, Shanahan, Boardman, and Bauldry test whether completing a college degree before or after getting married or having children impacts obesity outcomes. They report that, overall, having children or marrying before attending college are strong predictors for obesity; those who attend college first are less likely to become obese.

The researchers use nationally representative survey data that follows the same people from adolescence to young adulthood. First, they categorize the Body Mass Indices (BMI) of the survey respondents who went to college as either “Obese” or “Not obese.” Then they compare whether respondents were obese during adolescence versus adulthood to account for respondents who were already obese before making a life course transition. Finally, they compare both sets of BMIs for those who were married or had children before going to college with those who attended college first.

As predicted, respondents who married before completing college had 65% higher odds of becoming obese than those who went to college first. Additionally, those who had children before college were more likely to become obese than those who waited until after completing a degree. Interestingly, the order of events mostly impacts black males, which skews the results and makes the association look more predictive across race and gender. The researchers find that the sequencing effects of college and marriage and parenthood are the strongest for black males.

Young adults who have formed their health habits in college seem less prone to change diet and exercise during marriage and parenthood. The authors give several possible explanations, including the notion that transitioning to the new role of “spouse” or “parent” can make young people more likely to eat regular meals, exercise less, and quit smoking—all of which contribute to weight gain.

The homicide rate has been steadily, albeit slowly, declining in the United States and Western Europe for several decades. Researchers have pointed to various social and economic factors that account for variations in the homicide trends, including “decommodification”: the extent to which individuals are protected from market forces. In particular, Robert Merton’s strain/anomie theory predicts that the murder rate is dependent on the extent to which cultural expectation and social structure are in balance. Here, a society in which social life is heavily dictated by economic pressures would likely have a higher prevalence of criminal activity.

Following this theory, social welfare support, an attempt to buffer individuals from the economic turmoil of the market, could function to decrease the prevalence of crime. Patricia L. McCall and Jonathan R. Brauer empirically examine this possibility using homicide (one of the most reliable measures of criminal activity—underreporting is a less pressing issue than in other types of crime) and economic data from 29 European countries from 1994 to 2009.

McCall and Brauer find that levels of welfare support within a country (measured by an index that incorporates total welfare expenditure per capita, health care, and unemployment support) is associated with a decrease in the homicide rate, controlling for numerous other economic indicators and the age structure of the country. Further, the researchers find that the effects of these changes are not apparent right away. The effect of increased social welfare support has a 2-3 year lag, meaning that an increase in welfare spending in 1990 would not be reflected in lower homicide rates until 1992-1993.  McCall and Brauer caution that welfare spending is not a solution to a nation’s homicide problem, but increased social support won’t hurt.

McCall and Brauer’s analysis suggests that protecting individuals from the forces of the market via robust a robust social welfare net may not only decrease the extent of inequality in a nation, but also the prevalence of homicide. This finding highlights how the anti-austerity measures many European nations have implemented have not only changed economic conditions, but also the social conditions of many citizens. While McCall and Brauer caution that welfare spending is not a solution to a nation’s homicide problem, increased social support won’t hurt.