race

Everyone gets quiet, removes their hats, and puts their hand over their hearts to sing. In center field, soldiers hold the American flag. Fighter jets fly over the stadium as the national anthem plays. Sports are not only about the games, they also provide a platform for the presentation and celebration of all manner of collective identities and values–and in the United States, the message is often about nationalism and the military. In new research, Chris Knoester and Evan Davis examine whether Americans  recognize this  messaging or not.

They used data from the National Sports and Society Survey (NSASS) which asked nearly four thousand Americans, “if they felt sports taught a love of country, respect for the military, competition as a way of life, or how to be Americans.” They found that the vast majority of respondents did not believe that sports teaches nationalistic or militaristic values even while most, 84%, overwhelmingly agreed that sport teaches competition as a way of life.  Given that the United States is one of the few countries in the world which plays the national anthem before sporting events and features armed forces in their ceremonies, their results are intriguing, to say the least. the vast majority of respondents did not believe that sports teaches nationalistic or militaristic values

Interestingly, respondents who identified as male, heterosexual, Christian, and Republican were most likely to agree that sports teaches patriotic and militaristic values, with Black and Latinx respondents not far behind. In contrast, Americans who were white and college-educated were less likely to believe that sports taught any values. The authors suggest that this could be due to them viewing sports as truly neutral. 

Over the years, sport sociologists have demonstrated that sport  is a place where many Americans learn patriotic, nationalistic, and militaristic ideals. The fact that most Americans don’t believe this, and that those who do tend to be more conservative, less educated, or not white, raises some very important questions about the role of sport in contemporary American culture.

Bundles of joy? Previous research suggests that having children may not be joyful for all parents, especially those who juggle high expectations with inflexible and demanding workplaces or raising children of color in a racially inhospitable world. However, new research from Jennifer Augustine and Mia Brantley finds that the happiness of parents varies by race and gender and in ways that were not entirely expected, especially in comparison to adults without kids.the happiness of parents varies by race and gender and in ways that were not entirely expected, especially in comparison to adults without kids

The study is based upondata from the General Social Survey, a nationally representative survey of adults in the United States, between 2010 and 2018. Researchers used questions where participants are asked to rate how happy they are and provide information about  their race and if they have children who they live with. This study also took into account what respondents reported for  r items such as income  or church attendence that previous research has shown influences happiness.

Augustine and Brantley found that there is not a difference in happiness between white fathers and nonfathers, but that white mothers are less happy than white women who are not parents. The existence of a “happiness gap” for white women but not white men may result from cultural expectations that  White mothers be totally devoted to their children despite the necessity for most white moms to work outside the home. Conversely, the fact that white dads are not expected to take equal responsibility for caring for kids might help explain why they are about as happy as men without kids.

This analysis also revealed no difference in happiness between black parents and nonparents. In fact, it found that black fathers are actually happier than their peers without children. These findings suggest that fatherhood is an important and meaningful part of life for many black men, whileblack moms might have ways of coping that help them manage the stress of raising children that white moms lack. Black mothers also may not exhibit a “happiness gap” compared to black nonmothers because black motherhood views work and parenting as complementary and emphasizes the importance of communal care for children, providing important support for moms. 

This study only analyzed data up to 2018, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and racial unrest following the murder of George Floyd. Future research will have to examine how changing demands on parents during the pandemic, especially virtual schooling, as well as greater attention to police brutality and racial injustice shaped differences in happiness between black and white parents and nonparents. But what this research clearly demonstrates is whether there is a “happiness gap” between parents and adults without children depends on who is doing the parenting and how they are expected to manage their parenting responsibilities with other aspects of their life.

Although many of us view traffic stops as a minor inconvenience, a ticket on the commute to school can end in traumatic separation for undocumented immigrants and their children. Using interviews and data from The US Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS), Robert Smith and colleagues found that the threat of deportation can jeopardize children’s mental and physical wellbeing. 

Smith and colleagues interviewed undocumented parents who have been pulled over for driving without a license. Parents described stops where the police discovered they were unlicensed and delivered them to ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement) on the side of the road while their children watched. The children in the backseat watching these encounters experienced short and long term emotional harm after police stops and ICE detainment, including nightmares, post traumatic stress disorder and difficulty adjusting to change in family structure. After these arrests, the parents felt that police neglected their children. For example, one mother described how police made her young children walk three miles home unaccompanied on a cold winter night.The children in the backseat watching these encounters experienced short and long term emotional harm after police stops and ICE detainment

Children and parents lived in constant fear that routine trips to school or the doctor would lead to separation after a police stop. This constant fear of separation from parents made it hard for kids to focus in school. One mother reported that her son had to repeat fifth grade because of his anxiety about his mom being deported. Likewise, fear of deportation can also prevent parents from taking their children to routine healthcare visits.  

 Many parents reported that they were stopped by police due to racial profiling.  Researchers found that a majority of people deported after a traffic stop were booked under “No conviction,” meaning that they were not convicted of any crime or driving violation. Instead, many were targeted for stops on account of their racial appearance. Smith and colleagues found that some law enforcement agencies would even work cooperatively with ICE to scout out undocumented people through traffic stops. 

The authors argue that New York’s newly implemented Drivers License Access and Privacy Act, commonly known as the Greenlight law, could prevent these harms to children. The law allows undocumented immigrants in New York to obtain drivers licenses and prevents the DMV from reporting them to ICE. However, the government’s implementation of the Greenlight law has been inconsistent, weakening its effects. In the small number of counties where Greenlight licenses are offered, lack of funding restricts the amount of licenses that the DMV can administer per day. Some DMV offices refuse to offer services in Spanish and make Greenlight applicants, but not standard license applicants, wait outside in the cold. 

The researchers suggest that universal implementation of the Greenlight law and more thoughtful policing of Latinx communities could eliminate the harm to children and families that comes from police stops, ICE detainment, and family separation. Other solutions include expanding busing to communities with large immigrant populations. This would ensure that children have a safe ride to school and parents would not have to risk deportation by driving unlicensed. These efforts could address the reality that short and routine car trips put some immigrant families at risk of police contact and the harm and separation that can follow. 

With the increasing visibility of transgender people in media, law, and social life, many suggest that the United States reached a  “transgender tipping point” in the past decade. The term suggests a big recent increase in people identifying as transgender, yet there has been surprisingly little research into whether and how the likelihood of identifying as transgender has changed over time.  

In a recent American Journal of Sociology article, Danya Lagos put the “transgender tipping point” idea to the test. They analyzed how many people, born between 1935 to 2001, identified as transgender or gender nonconforming. In addition, Lagos looked at the influence of social demographic factors (age, race, sex assigned at birth, and educational attainment) on the likelihood of identifying as transgender. The results of the study confirmed that there has been a big increase in people identifying as transgender and gender nonconforming since 1984, and that there have been big changes in the social demographic factors that predict trans identity across different birth cohorts.

For cohorts born from 1995 to 2001, for example, white people are somewhat more likely than people of other races to identify as trans, yet the reverse was the case for older cohorts born from 1945 to 1984. For every cohort born from 1935 to 1984, people assigned male at birth are more likely to identify as trans than those assigned female at birth. But this too has changed in recent years, as sex assignment at birth no longer predicts trans identity for those born from 1985-2001. Higher educational attainment is more consistently linked to lower rates of transgender identification throughout all age cohorts. Many believe that exposure to gender theory in higher education leads to more fluidity in gender expression, but the results of this study suggest otherwise.

In short, although the number of people identifying as trans has definitely increased, there hasn’t been any singular “transgender tipping point.” Instead, it’s more complicated than that.  The effect of other social identities and statuses, including race, sex assignment, and education, actively evolves and shifts as each birth cohort grows up in a changing social world. And just as society has changed throughout the years, so too has the prevalence and predictors of trans identity.although the number of people identifying as trans has definitely increased, there hasn’t been any singular “transgender tipping point.”

American fine dining is innovative, prestigious, and world-renowned. But a recent study by Gillian Gualtieri reveals that inequality also shapes the industry: only some forms of cuisine are labeled as “ethnic” and excluded from the status and rewards of the fine-dining designation. 

Gualtieri conducted 120 interviews with renowned chefs in New York City and the San Francisco Bay Area, two of the most popular restaurant cities in the United States. She also analyzed over one thousand Michelin restaurant reviews from these cities. Her basic finding was that restaurants that are considered “ethnic” are held to different standards. restaurants that are considered “ethnic” are held to different standards

Gualtieri identified three descriptors routinely used in to assess restaurants: technique, creativity, and authenticity. These criteria are used inconsistently by both chefs and critics. Restaurants considered general fine dining establishments, including those featuring Italian, vegan, or contemporary food, are more likely to receive recognition for technique and creativity.

On the other hand, restaurants that are typically thought of as “ethnic,” such as Indian, Thai, or Greek establishments, are more frequently judged for their perceived authenticity. This means that ratings of ethnic restaurants are more heavily dependent on “what other people’s perception of the cuisine is… a stereotype of what that cuisine is,” according to one chef at a Chinese restaurant.

This differential evaluation leads to Gualtieri’s second finding: restaurants designated as “ethnic” are less likely to hold high Michelin star ratings, one of the primary markers of prestige and value in the field of fine dining. Gualterri argues that ethnic restaurants are less likely to receive fine dining awards because they are overwhelmingly evaluated by their authenticity, rather than their creativity or technique. 

Another consequence of the emphasis on ethnic restaurant’s authenticity is competition for low prices. “People seem to think if they pay a lot for ethnic food, they’re being ripped off because it’s not supposed to be expensive,” a chef told Gulaterri. In other words, being designated as an ethnic restaurant not only lowers the chances of receiving prestigious awards and recognition, it also forces ethnic restaurants to charge less than their peers. Together, this places ethnic restaurants in precarious positions where they struggle to stay afloat.

Court fines and fees  are hardly new, however, their use has increased in recent years. New research from Ilya Slavinski and Becky Pettit suggests that law enforcement agencies have resurrected these “legal financial obligations”  as an additional tool of punishment that targets and constrains the same groups of people that have been historically disadvantaged by incarceration. Court fines and fees target and constrain the same groups of people that have been historically disadvantaged by incarceration

Slavinski and Pettit analyzed data from 254 counties in Texas, a large, diverse state that collected over $1 billion in legal financial obligations in 2016. 

Slavinski and Pettit found that Texas jurisdictions with high Republican voter affiliation issued monetary sanctions at a much higher rate than less conservative regions. This finding parallels prior research that links party identification with incarceration rates. Similarly, they noticed that heavy use of fines and fees was not associated with higher crime rates. This is consistent with research showing that some  “tough on crime” policies are more closely tied to politics, race, and class than they are to crime control. 

The researchers also found that legal fines and fees were disproportionately  administered in predominantly Black and Latinx areas. This builds on previous research that has linked incarceration rates to perceptions of “racial threat.”  

Slavinski and Pettit suggest that legal financial obligations are often used in combination with jail and prison time, rather than serving as an alternative to incarceration. This means that after people leave incarceration, they continue to be watched by authorities to ensure that they pay their legal financial obligations. By coupling prison sentences and legal fees in this way, the state has used legal debt to extend the surveillance and control of historically marginalized populations. 

Parents with high levels of education and income spend a lot of money raising their children. They shuttle their kids between violin lessons and soccer practice, fill playrooms with toys designed to aid kids’ development, and squeeze in weekend visits to museums and exhibits. Low-income parents’ money, in contrast, is more tightly stretched, and tends to go towards necessities like bills and food. Can anything be done about these differences and inequalities? New research from Margot Jackson and Daniel Schneider suggests a potential solution, one that involves increased public investment for all kids.

Jackson and Schneider created and analyzed a new data set that links state-level investments in children and families with information on household spending on children over a period of fifteen years. Examples of state-level spending include things like public education, welfare, and Medicaid. Household spending includes purchases of educational books or toys or recreational equipment. They find that when public investment increases, inequality in parental spending on children decreases.

There are two reasons for these promising results. One is that low-income families have more money to spend on their children when public support helps families meet their basic needs. In other words, when income and healthcare are supplemented, families have more money available to invest in their children’s education and development.when public support helps families meet their basic needs…[they] have more money available to invest in their children’s education and development

At the same time, when there is more universal public investment in resources like schools, high-income parents spend less on their children, more confident in the resources their children are already receiving. In short, increased public investments allow low-income parents to spend more, and high-income parents to spend less.

Those of us who care about inequalities in parental spending on children know that early inequalities set the stage for a lifetime of differences in the opportunities and experiences available to people in their formative years. It can be difficult to imagine how these gaps can be narrowed. This research shows that these inequalities are not fixed or inevitable, and that more public spending on children can help equalize the playing field.  

Over the past two years, hundreds of K-12 education hours were lost to COVID-19 and we are beginning to see the academic impact. But what about the emotional, social, and mental health impacts? In new research, Kate Watson and colleagues show some of the challenges students faced during the COVID-19 school closures by analyzing a nationwide survey of school social workers.

While teachers may concentrate on the academic achievement of students, school social workers focus on the emotional, social, and “other” sides of education. 

Above and beyond lost classroom and learning time, COVID-19 school closings meant that children were unable to spend time with friends, attend extracurricular activities, and participate in many traditional school activities for months — and school social workers noticed. 

In the survey, school social workers identified that 76% of students needed mental health services, 62% needed food, and 62% needed tutoring. Typically, these services would be coordinated and provided by the school social worker – such as placing daily food inside of backpacks of students in need of dinner after school.  However, forced to stay at arm’s length, school social workers were severely limited in aiding their students’ basic needs.forced to stay at arm’s length, school social workers were severely limited in aiding their students’ basic needs

School social workers also shared the levels of student participation and engagement through virtual education. Strikingly, more than 80% of participants reported extremely low levels of student participation.  In other words, students generally showed an extremely low level of engagement during “zooming”. Notably, students of color and students who live in poverty were even less likely to be engaged – widening inequities.

Schools have long been about more than just academic learning. Today, while COVID-19 appears to be on the retreat, society must take stock of the lessons learned and implement changes to better prepare schools and the holistic well being of children. The perspectives of school social workers, as advocates for children’s emotional, social, and holistic well being, can show us how much our society relies on schools – beyond just the academics.

After the wave of Black Lives Matter protests in the summer of 2020, the idea of being actively anti-racist, as opposed to simply “not racist” or “color-blind,” has gained popular attention. But does the general public agree that there is a distinction between being “not racist” and being “anti-racist”? According to a new paper by three sociologists, Samuel Perry, Joshua Grubbs, and Kenneth Frantz, the answer is no.

Perry, Grubbs, and Frantz begin from the claim that the language of “anti-racism” has increased in prominence over the last decade. They point to the proliferation of educational curricula incorporating this language, as well as a number of best-selling books. Data from Google shows that the use of terms related to anti-racism in books has spiked since 2013. And Google searches for “antiracist” peaked in the summer of 2020. Against this backdrop, the sociologists use survey data to explore which groups of Americans are most likely to identify as “anti-racist.” 

Unsurprisingly, the research team found that among the people surveyed, the strongest correlation for identifying as “anti-racist” is holding progressive views on racial issues.

Other findings were more surprising. For example,  the second-strongest correlation among all survey respondents with identifying as “anti-racist” was identifying as “color-blind.” In other words, many Americans identify as both “anti-racist” and “color-blind.” This discovery is intriguing because in recent years sociologists have tended to emphasize the more conservative effects of colorblindness rather than its more liberal or change-oriented dimensions.many Americans identify as both “anti-racist” and “color-blind”

The authors suggest that this is because both the terms “anti-racist” and “color-blind” read to whites as being liberal views on race, but not radical. This is in contrast to the academic discourse (and even some popular books) about these terms.

In addition, researchers also found that Black and Hispanic people were significantly less likely than white people to identify as “anti-racist.”  One reason for this may be that books, curricula, and other campaigns advocating for “anti-racism” are often targeted at white audiences. It also does not necessarily mean that white people more often behave in an anti-racist manner. People in general are likely to identify as “anti-racist,” regardless of their views on race. This includes those who would, for example, not confront a friend who made a racist comment.

This research reminds us that people’s conceptions of race are complicated and ever-changing. The way scholars understand race does not always line up with the general public.

We usually think about gentrification as the replacement of poor, non-white residents with white and affluent newcomersin city neighborhoods. According to this narrative, property values rise alongside an influx in amenities catering to a wealthy, whiter community. But an immersive new study from Alfredo Huante complicates that by showing how a changing working-class, Latinx neighborhood in LA grapples with affluent Latinx arrivals.

Using the case study of Los Angeles’ Boyle Heights barrio, Huante examines a process he calls “gente-fication.” During “gente-fication” educated, higher-income, and lighter-skinned Latinx move to historically working-class barrios. Instead of a process of “gentrification” where the “gentry,” or the elite and noble classes move to a neighborhood, “gente” describes a distinct process in which new, wealthier arrivals share  existing residents’ racial or ethnic background. Huante’s research moves beyond the black-white conflict usually associated with gentrification to emphasize tensions within the same racial and ethnic group that are present in the processes of neighborhood change in Boyle Heights. Huante draws on in-depth interviews with long-term barrio residents, community activists, and real estate agents, in addition to data from social media and neighborhood meetings.During “gente-fication” educated, higher-income, and lighter-skinned Latinx move to historically working-class barrios

Despite the fact that the majority of Boyle Heights’ residents are Latinx and working class, barrio residents disagree about whether gente-fication is a threat to the neighborhood. Long-term White residents and Latinx media figures argue that new wealthy Latinx residents will stimulate economic growth and foster racial diversity. Because gente-fiers are Latinx, not white, they also feel like their arrival prevents the cultural erasure usually brought about by gentrification. On the other hand, local activists opposing gentrification claim the new class of Latinx newcomers are still displacing and replacing long-term working-class Latinx residents who are also darker-skinned.

While it seems like this process of gentefication preserves the racial and ethnic character of a neighborhood, Huante’s emphasis on class inequalities within racial and ethnic groups reminds us that the complexities of intra-ethnic dynamics on the ground have a much different story to tell.