religion

When Tanya Marie Luhrmann, a Stanford anthropologist, studies religion, she’s not asking whether God is real. Rather, she wants to know how believing in a higher power affects the lifecourse. Writing in The New York Times, Luhrmann argues that the positive effects of church attendance go beyond simply increasing social capital through community interaction—it can be a psychiatric boon:

What I saw in church as an anthropological observer was that people were encouraged to listen to God in their minds, but only to pay attention to mental experiences that were in accord with what they took to be God’s character, which they took to be good. I saw that people were able to learn to experience God in this way, and that those who were able to experience a loving God vividly were healthier—at least, as judged by a standardized psychiatric scale.

Luhrmann’s work centers around “the way that ideas held in the mind come to seem externally real to people,” and she notes that belief in God is not always beneficial (for instance, some may feel only despair when they search for religious guidance). To that end, Luhrmann uses her essay to encourage more research into the relationships between mental illness and religion. Like many topics that interest social scientists, the challenge here is to move beyond, “Is this good or bad?” to explore, “When and for whom is this good or bad?”

Last week, an anti-Muslim movie produced in the U.S. influenced protests and attacks in Libya, Egypt, and several other countries. In the aftermath of the protests in Egypt, VOA spoke briefly with Said Sadek, Professor of Political Sociology at American University in Cairo.

According to Sadek, it’s important to realize that majority of people (in any religion) are not extremists but are rather caught by extremists that “try to push the silent majority into extremism, and suspicion, and intolerance.”

These extremist groups often single out media products and use them for their own messages. “There are many sites and many films and books against all religions… Why do you all of a sudden [shed] light on a particular film and ignore the others? This has to be a politically motivated process.”

Unfortunately, many members of civil society do not understand how these media products are produced.  As Sadek explains,

There is a misunderstanding in Muslim countries [about] the relationship between government and media. They still believe it’s like in autocratic regimes, the government orders the media to do this or to do that. President Obama did not order that movie about Islam is made. In fact, he is being accused in America that he is pro-Muslim.

As viewers of the ongoing GOP debates already know, religion is a hot topic this voting season. But despite discussion and conjecture regarding a host of religious issues by voters, candidates, and pundits alike, Scott Jaschik points out (this week in Inside Higher Ed) there is little research to turn to in support of their claims.

According to an analysis of US-based and British political science research by associate professor of politics and international studies Steven Kettell, less than two percent of studies in the top 20 research journals in the field focus on religion.

Jaschik notes, “Of the small minority of articles that considered religious issues, the most popular topics are not likely to provide much help to those trying to follow the Republican presidential race this year. The most common topic was religious links to violence and terrorism, and the second most common topic was Islam.”

Although other social sciences, such as anthropology, history, and sociology, give greater attention to religious issues today, “[Kettell] argues that it is time for ‘political scientists to turn the tools of their trade’ to issues of religion.”

We often hear how Facebook, Twitter, and other social media contribute to protests and demonstrations by allowing activists to express their views or coordinate their actions. Social media were a big part of Arab Spring, but they were also a large part of the Reformation, says an article from The Economist. Nearly 500 years ago, Martin Luther went viral by circulating pamphlets, woodcuts, and other social media of that day in order to spread the message of religious reform.

The start of the Reformation is generally explained as a three-step process: 1. Martin Luther gets fed up with members of the Catholic Church asking for money to free souls, 2. Luther pins a list of 95 Theses (in Latin) to the Church door, and 3. The Reformation has begun. But, a closer look reveals Martin Luther spent more time thinking about social media:

The unintentional but rapid spread of the “95 Theses” alerted Luther to the way in which media passed from one person to another could quickly reach a wide audience. “They are printed and circulated far beyond my expectation,” he wrote in March 1518 to a publisher in Nuremberg who had published a German translation of the theses. But writing in scholarly Latin and then translating it into German was not the best way to address the wider public. Luther wrote that he “should have spoken far differently and more distinctly had I known what was going to happen.” For the publication later that month of his “Sermon on Indulgences and Grace”, he switched to German, avoiding regional vocabulary to ensure that his words were intelligible from the Rhineland to Saxony. The pamphlet, an instant hit, is regarded by many as the true starting point of the Reformation.

While it sounds pretty different (imagine communicating through woodcuts!), the media environment Luther circulated in shared some similarities with today. It was a decentralized system in which participants distributed messages through sharing—Luther passed the text of a pamphlet to a friendly printer, who could print the small text in a day or two.  Copies of this first edition, which cost about the same as a chicken, spread through the town they were printed in, being picked up by traveling merchants, preachers, or traders, and spread across the country. Local printers would then reprint their own editions, much like Facebook “shares” or Twitter “retweets.”

And, as with collective action in the 21st century, social media could  be dangerous during the Reformation:

In the early years of the Reformation expressing support for Luther’s views, through preaching, recommending a pamphlet or singing a news ballad directed at the pope, was dangerous. By stamping out isolated outbreaks of opposition swiftly, autocratic regimes discourage their opponents from speaking out and linking up. A collective-action problem thus arises when people are dissatisfied, but are unsure how widely their dissatisfaction is shared, as Zeynep Tufekci, a sociologist at the University of North Carolina, has observed in connection with the Arab spring. The dictatorships in Egypt and Tunisia, she argues, survived for as long as they did because although many people deeply disliked those regimes, they could not be sure others felt the same way. Amid the outbreaks of unrest in early 2011, however, social-media websites enabled lots of people to signal their preferences en masse to their peers very quickly, in an “informational cascade” that created momentum for further action.

Something very similar happened in the Reformation. A1523-24 surge in reform-pamphlet popularity (including those written by Luther and many others) served as a collective signaling mechanism of Luther’s support. Luther had been declared a heretic, but, because of his supporters, he was able to escape execution, and the Reformation became established in much of Germany. The power of social media is anything but new.

Media attention around the Republican crop of presidential candidates, as well as a new ad campaign with the tagline “I am a Mormon,” have popularized discussion about the Church of Latter-day Saints. In Utah, however, new data shows Mormonism isn’t as prominent as it once was, especially among men. A report written by sociologists Rick Phillips (University of North Florida) and Ryan Cragun (University of Tampa) and released by Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut found that Utah’s Mormon majority is shrinking. It’s now down to 57 percent, and men account for only 40 percent of those Utah Mormons (down from 47.5 percent two decades ago).

In their paper, the Salt Lake Tribune reports, Phillips and Cragun suggest the reason for this widening gender gap might be that Utah’s men are abandoning their faith at higher rates than women. In the past, Mormon men remained tied to the church rather than lose their social standing in the community, argue Phillips and Cragun, both on the board of the Mormon Social Science Association. “However, declining Mormon majorities [in Utah] may have weakened that link, and Mormon men who lack a strong subjective religious commitment to the church are now free to apostatize without incurring sanctions in other social settings.”

Other scholars in the field, disagree with Phillips and Cragun’s interpretation of the data. David Campbell, a political scientist at the University of Notre Dame, points out to the Salt Lake Tribune this shift isn’t necessarily due to men leaving the church, but could also be a result of more women joining. And Marie Cornwall, sociologist at Brigham Young University and editor of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, has her own criticism of Phillips and Cragun’s conclusions:

They have no way of knowing whether the growing gap reflects migration patterns—professional men and women leave the state to look for jobs and, given the lower rates of professional women, that may mean that men are leaving the state as much as it means that they are leaving the [LDS] Church.

As in so many other cases, the numbers can’t tell the whole story of why the population of Utah’s male Mormons seems to be shrinking.

A common evolutionary theory of religion views the brain as composed of modules and explains religion by a module for supernatural beings.  But, as The Guardian reports, Robert Bellah’s new book takes evolution seriously while challenging this common view as showing a lack of insight into religion as it’s actually lived.

Go back deep into evolutionary time, long before hominids, Bellah invites his readers, because here can be found the basic capacity required for religion to emerge. It is mimesis or imitative action, when animals communicate their intentions, often sexual or aggressive, by standard behaviours. Often such signals seem to be genetically determined, though some animals, like mammals, are freer and more creative. It can then be called play, meant in a straightforward sense of “not work,” work being activity that is necessary for survival.

Such liberated play was found among creatures that didn’t need to work all of the time to survive, and the evolutionary changes that occurred during it weren’t driven by survival pressures.

Mimesis and play are integral pieces of this story of religion because they are precursors to ritual.

…that embodied way of being in the world that enacts, not thinks, understanding. If you have ever played peekaboo with a child, you were together learning about presence and absence. At a more sophisticated level, religions nurture the complex gestures of ritual and practice. Christians perform liturgies, Muslims prostrate themselves in prayer, Buddhists focus attention on breathing. This is the bread and butter of religion. Man can embody truth, reflected WB Yeats, when he cannot rationally know it.

Theoretical exploration and theological propositions accompany the ritual, but they are less fundamental modes of religious understanding.  Indeed, when Plato used the word “theoria,” he was referring to a ritual practice to make a journey to witness a life-changing event rather than theory.

In a recent opinion column in the Star Tribune, John Rash points to the absence of religion as a major theme in shows on the national television networks.

The absence is all the more surprising considering that 80% of Americans reported to Gallup that religion plays a ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ important role in their lives.

And as Rash reminds readers, religion continues to maintain a very visible presence in other popular culture:

Topping the bestseller list is “Heaven is for Real,” about a boy witnessing the afterlife following a near-death experience.
The hottest Broadway show is “The Book of Mormon,” a satire (and grudging admiration) of the faith from the creators of “South Park.”
The highest-grossing R-rated film ever isn’t a gross-out comedy, Quentin Tarantino-style nihilistic violence, or even a sexual coming-of-age story, but “The Passion of the Christ.”

To help understand the absence, Rash turns to academia. Professor Jeanne Halgren Kilde, director of religious studies at the University of Minnesota, explains that even though network television rarely features explicitly religious themes, it is engaging in many of the same debates.

“Questions about good and evil, justice, personal destiny, love, about relationships — these are the narratives we see on TV that are the same questions religion has been asking, and answering, forever. So TV becomes in some senses a kind of superseding of what had been the religious context of discussing, to a more secular context of answering these questions.”

And, while the major religions are rarely a central theme in popular television, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of shows with spiritual and paranormal themes.

Hitting its peak around 2006, this trend inverted media maven Marshall McLuhan’s famous dictum: This time, the message was the mediums — as well as the psychics, ghost hunters and clairvoyant crimefighters who populated prime-time in shows like “Medium,” “Supernatural” and “Ghost Whisperer.”

Penny Edgell, professor of sociology at the University of Minnesota provides context to the rise.

“Network prime time is responding to a trend,” said Penny Edgell “And thus it’s perpetuating and popularizing that trend of people thinking about spiritual things, but drawing on a different kind of repertoire that’s more about relationships and flexible personal contacts that might shape your own life that don’t have anything to do with a doctrine or a church. There’s a lot of the supernatural on TV, but not a lot of organized religion. And that mirrors trends in how people are thinking about their spirituality; it mirrors a rise of a discourse that emphasized spirituality of something that’s distinct from, but not always in opposition to, organized religion.”

Rash does make note of one of the few shows where religion is discussed – America’s longest running cartoon, The Simpsons.

Even the Catholic Church’s official newspaper, Osservatore Ramono, honed in on Homer, saying he “finds in God his last refuge, even though he sometimes gets His name sensationally wrong.”

Whether or not the misadventures of America’s favorite animated family is the appropriate venue for a national discussion of religion remains up for debate.

Nearly one in five Americans think President Obama is a Muslim, according to ABC News:

The new poll from the nonpartisan Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life found that 18 percent of those surveyed wrongly identified Obama as Muslim, up from 11 percent in March 2009. At the same time, the number of Americans who knew correctly that Obama is Christian has declined from 48 percent in March 2009 to 34 percent today. But 43 percent of Americans now say they don’t know what Obama’s religion is at all.

The finding has even prompted a response from the White House.

“The president is, obviously, he’s Christian. He prays every day,” White House spokesman Bill Burton said today aboard Air Force One.
“He communicates with his religious advisor every single day,” Burton said. “There’s a group of pastors that he takes counsel from on a regular basis. His faith is very important to him, but it’s not something that’s a topic of conversation every single day.”

Burton said the president has talked “extensively” about his faith in the past and “you can bet he’ll talk about his faith again.” But “making sure Americans know what a devout Christian he is” is not the president’s top priority.

Despite such statements, sociologists have reason to doubt such misperceptions can be so easily overcome.

“I think the reality is that false beliefs spread like gossip more than actual information,” said Andrew Perrin, an associate professor of sociology at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

Perrin’s research has shown that a false perception can spread quickly if people’s friends and neighbors also have heard or believe a similar idea.

“False beliefs propagate when people think others believe them and when they have a supportive source that wants them to hold it,” Perrin said.

Perrin has found that even direct denials of the false information do not always solve the problem.

“In my own research, when [people] get reliable information that discounts these beliefs, they tend to cling to those beliefs more,” Perrin said.

God is really popular in the U.S., reports the Vancouver Sun:

He gets more Oscar shout-outs than Meryl Streep, is name-checked by every other American Idol contestant and is presumed to have a vested interest in who wins hockey games.

This finding is based on a study by University of Toronto sociologist Scott Schieman:

The vast majority of Americans believe God is directly concerned with their personal affairs, with most assuming a divine reason for everything from job promotions to speeding tickets.

“In American culture — much less so in Canada — there’s a really constant flow of God-talk that references these small, personal interactions. It’s almost like a self-absorbed view of divine will,” says study author Scott Schieman, a professor of sociology at the University of Toronto.

“The extent that it’s so visible, almost saturating the culture at times, makes me think it’s not just metaphor or symbolism; many, many people believe these processes are real.”

Eight in 10 Americans say they depend on God for decision-making guidance.  Seven in 10 believe that when good or bad things happen, the occurrences are part of God’s plan.  And six in 10 believe God has set the course of their lives.

This might have drawbacks in the realm of personal efficacy, says Schieman:

Schieman find[s] that a third of Americans agree with the rather defeatist statement: “There’s no sense in planning a lot because ultimately my fate is in God’s hands….If you feel like, ‘No matter what I do, it’s all going to work out a particular way,’ what does that do for your motivation?” says Schieman, who suggests the 32 per cent of people who behave this way do so because it relieves anxiety in desperate circumstances, shifting the pressure skyward.

In contrast:

Schieman says the idea of God as “a personal friend” can lend itself to positive effects, such as fostering an increased sense of social support, well-being and purpose.

To read more about Schieman’s study, you can also check him out the New York Times.

This week, the Christian Century reviewed sociologist Christian Smith’s new book on religion and spirituality in “emerging adulthood”:

Souls in Transition, the impressive second installment of findings—and the first longitudinal sounding—from the massive National Study of Youth and Religion, is about [18- to 23-year-olds], the most religiously disengaged cohort in the U.S. Principal investigator Christian Smith, assisted by Patricia Snell, returned to young people originally interviewed in 2003 to see how their religious lives had changed.

Smith, a professor of sociology and director of the Center for the Study of Religion and Society at the University of Notre Dame, is a gutsy sociologist who does not mind tipping sacred cows or poking around in areas that theologians like to claim for themselves such as religious formation. His earlier book (with Melinda Lundquist Denton), Soul Searching: The Religious and Spiritual Lives of American Teenagers, reported the first wave of NSYR findings. In 2007 Mark Oestreicher, then president of Youth Specialties, called Soul Searching one of the ten most influential youth ministry books—a first for a secular book on the sociology of religion.

Some findings:

Souls in Transition is a denser and in some ways more sobering volume [than Smith’s previous book] that represents a field-shaping contribution to the growing literature on emerging adults (young people roughly between the ages of 18 and 30). As developmental tasks once associated with the teen years reach into the twenties and thirties, ministry with emerging adults shows signs of becoming the new youth ministry of 21st-century congregations. Compared to people in other age groups, emerging adults are less likely to attend religious services weekly, pray daily or affiliate strongly with a religious tradition (a fact consistent with their tendency to resist institutional affiliations generally). Yet on some measures (thinking about the afterlife, taking the Bible literally, self-identifying as liberals) they reflect the adult population as a whole.

The big story in Souls in Transition is continuity: highly devoted emerging adults almost always start out as highly devoted teenagers, and religiously disinterested youth are unlikely to become interested as they grow older. (Most teenagers in the NSYR who committed to God did so before age 14.) When religious change occurs in emerging adulthood, it tends to be in the negative direction. What makes the faith of some young people more durable than that of others seems to be the presence of formative religious influences in their lives while they are teenagers (especially religious parents, but also other faithful adults), teenagers’ personal embrace of faith, a lack of religious doubts, multiple religious experiences, and personal faith practices, especially prayer and Bible reading.

Another intriguing argument:

Smith saves his most intriguing analysis for a discussion of the implicit cultural influences of mainline Protestantism and American evangelicalism (for example, a Muslim girl describes her “personal relationship with God”). Drawing on sociologist N. Jay Demerath’s thesis that “liberal Protestantism’s core values—individualism, pluralism, emancipation, tolerance, free critical inquiry, and the authority of personal experience—have come to so permeate the broader American culture” that these values no longer need liberal Protestantism to survive, Smith makes a fascinating move: he argues that young people are not more involved in American religious life because they don’t have to be. The values of America’s dominant religious outlook for the past century are now carried forward by American culture itself. Smith contends that many emerging adults have bought into an implicit “mainline-liberal Protestant” perspective on American culture and “would be quite comfortable with the kind of liberal faith described by the Yale theologian H. Richard Niebuhr in 1937 as being about ‘a God without wrath [who] brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.'”