Serial killers like Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer have been gone for decades, yet their stories continue to fill our screens and airwaves. From Netflix series and documentaries to true crime podcasts, their names and crimes keep reappearing in new forms. A new study by sociologist Brian Monahan explores why these stories never seem to fade. He argues that their endurance is not just the result of public fascination with violence, but of the media’s ongoing effort to reproduce, repackage, and resell them.

Monahan introduces the concept of “media looping” to explain this process. Drawing on 37 media examples, including documentaries, films, streaming series, and podcasts, he finds that stories about serial killers are continually reactivated and reshaped. From early sensationalist documentaries in the 1980s to recent prestige dramas like Dahmer — Monster: The Jeffrey Dahmer Story (2022), the same figures and themes are reinterpreted for new audiences. The repetition makes old crimes feel current and turns historical events into ongoing cultural touchstones.

The study shows that this process is not accidental. Media looping is both a storytelling pattern and a business strategy. It allows media companies to reuse familiar stories and recognizable figures to keep audiences engaged and generate profit.

But this repetition also affects how people understand violence. Monahan finds that white male killers are often shown as complex or even sympathetic, while victims, many of whom are women or people of color, receive much less attention. This imbalance shifts the focus away from the victims and the social conditions that shape their stories. Viewers also become part of the cycle by listening to true crime podcasts, watching series, and joining online discussions that keep these stories circulating and alive.

Monahan’s research suggests that serial killer stories persist not only because they are newsworthy or extraordinary, but because repetition itself is what makes them extraordinary.serial killer stories persist not only because they are newsworthy or extraordinary, but because repetition itself is what makes them extraordinary. Media industries depend on retelling violence in ways that generate new interest and revenue, turning real tragedies into lasting cultural products. In the end, the timeless serial killer is less a mystery of human psychology and more a reflection of how our media systems recycle familiar stories to hold our attention.

Parenting styles shape the way children gain important knowledge and resources in key developmental years. New research is showing how these parenting styles are influenced by even short-term fluctuations in family income. 

Gabriele Mari explored how unexpected increases and decreases in income influenced parenting styles in high- and low-income families in the United Kingdom. Using data from the UK­ Household­ Longitudinal­ Study from 2009-2022, Mari assessed how income swings placed strain on parents, shaping levels of warmth, harshness, and permissiveness in parenting. 

Mari found that high- and low-income parents react differently to income shifts. Although low-income parents showed less warmth than high-income parents generally, low-income parents were more likely to score higher on warmth scales during periods of income uncertainty.Although low-income parents showed less warmth than high-income parents generally, low-income parents were more likely to score higher on warmth scales during periods of income uncertainty.  Mari reasons that this ability of low-income parents to show warmth despite income shifts could be an adaptation to persistent economic disadvantage. In contrast, high-income parents scored higher on both harshness and permissiveness during periods of instability.

Mothers and fathers also responded differently to income uncertainty. Mothers were less likely than fathers to change parenting styles during periods of economic instability. This finding supports the theory of “inventive mothering,” which describes how mothers shield children from the effects of economic uncertainty by maintaining typical parenting strategies. In line with Mari’s other findings, high-income fathers responded to earned income losses with lower warmth, while low-income fathers showed greater warmth.

Mari’s research highlights how parents respond to and buffer the effects of income uncertainty.  It is important to know that instability in income can undermine stability in parenting, especially as workers in the United States and elsewhere face temporary or gig employment, volatile earnings, and diminishing benefits packages.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and the subsequent military draft, as many as a million Russians have fled their country. Many of these migrants (who are typically younger, more liberal, wealthier, and more educated) have emigrated to nearby countries to escape the war and Russia’s increasingly authoritarian regime. In 2023, researcher Liudmila Listrovaya interviewed 20 Russians who had fled to the Republic of Georgia. Her findings reflect broader tensions in how people navigate deep opposition to their own country’s government alongside a continued love for its people.

Listrovaya found that many interviewees held ambivalent and complicated feelings about the lives they had left behind. All interviewees expressed their love and longing for Russia, and all but one strongly opposed the war and the current government. As one man described, “I love my country, but I hate the state… I miss Russia very much… At the same time I clearly understand that if I return, my taxes will be sponsoring the war.”“I love my country, but I hate the state… I miss Russia very much… At the same time I clearly understand that if I return, my taxes will be sponsoring the war.”

Multiple interviewees also expressed feeling shame for leaving behind relatives who were elderly or had health issues. Simultaneously, however, many people had sharp political conflicts with family members who still lived in Russia. Many interviewees managed these relationships by intentionally avoiding political topics. As one man stated, “if we all bring up the topic of war, there will be arguments, and 100% there will be a conflict. … I just simply don’t start these conversations.”

Almost all of the people interviewed were entirely disengaged from political action, including those who had been highly politically active before leaving Russia. Even after moving to Georgia, many emigrants expressed anxiety over the potential of the Russian regime retaliating against them. All but one interviewee avoided posting anything political on social media due to the threat of legal or physical punishment.

Many emigrants expressed disillusionment with the idea that protesting could cause any positive change. One woman described, “Maybe our protest is our departure? … The escape was the only available protest. You can’t write anything on the internet – you return back and they roll you up. Going to protests is useless and physically dangerous.”

At a basic level, these findings highlight how authoritarianism can impact people’s perceptions of their nation, the government, and their own political actions. In fact, most interviewees were entirely disengaged from politics and disillusioned from the hope that anything in Russia might change for the better. More generally, this study reminds us of the deeply complicated feelings many people around the world hold toward their countries today, holding both a love for the people and opposition to the government simultaneously. 

What drives people to take action on climate change? Obviously, concern about climate change matters, but people also have to believe their actions can make a difference. This is true for everyday actions (like recycling, avoiding driving, or buying environmentally sustainable products) and for political actions (such as signing a petition, donating to climate NGOs, or joining a protest). Recent research suggests that people’s perceptions of both the timing of climate change and the concern of those around them also play an important role.

Using survey data from Germany, Ioana Sendroiu and colleagues explored how people’s perceptions about the timing and inevitability of climate change are directly connected with their likelihood of taking action. They found that those who believe the “tipping point” when climate change becomes irreversible is either in the near future or the recent past have a higher tendency to participate in climate action than others. People who think the tipping point lies far away in the future, or that we are well past the tipping point, are less motivated to take action.

The researchers found that people’s beliefs about how others perceive climate change also matter. For people to participate in climate action, they need to think that people around them are concerned enough about climate change that they would also take actionFor people to participate in climate action, they need to think that people around them are concerned enough about climate change that they would also take action – especially for events that require mass participation, like signing petitions or joining protests. However, if people believe others are very concerned about climate change, their own motivation for taking action decreases.

This study shows that just believing climate change is real isn’t enough to motivate people to take action against it. People also need to believe their actions will matter. How people think about the timing of climate change, and how concerned they think others are, are part of this.

Perceived threat plays an important role in police officers’ on-the-job decision making. That makes sense – an officer concerned for their safety is more likely to use force against a civilian. But what if the perceived threat has nothing to do with that civilian? What if it didn’t originate on the job at all?

Samuel Thomas Donahue and Gerard Torrats-Espinosa wanted to understand how a homicide in a police officer’s neighborhood affects their likelihood of using force on civilians in the next week. Their study suggests the answer depends on race – both the race of the officer and the race of the civilian.

Using administrative data from the Chicago Police Department (CPD), police officers’ home addresses from voter registration rolls, and publicly available crime data, Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa created a snapshot of almost 9,000 CPD officers’ neighborhood contexts and workplace conduct between 2012 and 2020. The authors matched officers exposed to a homicide near their homes with other officers who were not exposed to a homicide but otherwise shared the same race, assigned “beat,” and shift day and time. To understand how race might affect police officers’ likelihood of using force, the authors looked at scenarios with varying officer and civilian races.

In almost every case, there was no meaningful change in the likelihood of an officer’s use of force – with one notable exception: when a homicide occurred within 1/8th of a mile of a white police officer’s home, that officer became seven times more likely to use force against a Black civilian in the following weekwhen a homicide occurred within 1/8th of a mile of a white police officer’s home, that officer became seven times more likely to use force against a Black civilian in the following week.. No other combination of officer and civilian race saw a change anywhere close. Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa say this is evidence that white police officers experience anti-Black racial bias when dealing with Black civilians in the aftermath of a neighborhood homicide.

Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa view this effect as an example of racial threat – when prejudices among a dominant group are ignited by perceived threats to their status. The fact that the effect only showed up when white officers came into contact with Black civilians suggests that neighborhood homicides activate racial bias rather than a professionalized police response.

This article also shows how “at home” contexts impact “at work” behavior, and how violence can spread between neighborhoods – and between murders by civilians and violence by police.

China’s post-socialist market reform started around 1978 and came into full force in the 1990s. This reform transitioned China from a planned economy to a market-driven one. Yang Cao, in his 2024 article, investigates the cultural impact of this transition. He asks, in particular: how did this economic transformation reshape cultural values of materialism among Chinese citizens?

Materialism, for Cao, is the belief that success, happiness, and social worth are primarily defined through wealth and consumption. He uses data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) and multilevel statistical models to examine how province-level institutional changes (the density of private enterprises, labor market flexibility, and regional GDP) affect individuals’ values about income, prestige, and work hours.

Cao finds that individuals living in regions that are more deeply penetrated by market forces tend to express stronger materialist values, even after controlling for factors like income, education, and occupationindividuals living in regions that are more deeply penetrated by market forces tend to express stronger materialist values, even after controlling for factors like income, education, and occupation. These people prefer extrinsic rewards like income to intrinsic rewards such as feelings of achievement. Additionally, Cao found that materialist values are more pronounced among younger cohorts and urban residents – that is, those who are both embedded in China’s market economy and more exposed to related cultural messages.

Cao’s research on the case of China helps us understand broadly how market transitions, not just capitalism per se, can contribute to deep cultural change. China’s case helps illuminate how market institutions can generate new cultural values centered on competition, individualism, and consumption, from post-socialist countries to emerging economies. It also suggests the potential social fragmentation that can follow when traditional values are displaced by market-oriented worldviews.

When women have children, they often earn less than women without kids. This is called the motherhood penalty, and it happens for many reasons. Mothers may step out of work for a time, cut back on hours, or pass up promotions to care for children. Employers may also assume that mothers are less committed to their jobs. In any event, the result is that mothers earn less than fathers and less than women without children, even when they have the same skills and education.

A new study by Jennifer Hook and Meiying Li asks whether family-friendly government policies can shrink this earnings gap. They looked at nearly 3 million workers in 26 mostly high-income democracies over a twenty-year period. Their focus was on two kinds of support: childcare spending and paid parental leave. The logic behind the emphasis on these two policies is straightforward – if parents have access to affordable childcare and paid leave, mothers can more effectively balance work and family responsibilities which should help narrow the pay gap between mothers and non-mothers as well as between men and women.

But the results are mixed. On the one hand, short paid leaves (six months or less) and public childcare policies that apply to both mothers and fathers seem to help mothers stay in the workforce without widening the pay gap. Mothers benefit because they can recover from childbirth, care for infants alongside their partners, and then return to work with support systems in place. Childcare spending also makes it easier for both parents to remain employed, rather than forcing women to choose between work and family.

On the other hand, when paid leave extends beyond six months, the story changes. Hook and Li find that in countries with long leave, the gender earnings gap widens – not only for mothers but for all women.in countries with long leave, the gender earnings gap widens – not only for mothers but for all women. Employers may start to see hiring or promoting women of childbearing age as risky, assuming the women will eventually take extended leave. As a result, women may be passed over for promotions, training, or equal pay, regardless of whether they have children. Long-leave policies also affect men: when leave is mostly taken by women, men may face stigma or financial penalties for taking time off, reinforcing the idea that caregiving is women’s work. This limits fathers’ involvement at home and deepens gender inequality both at work and in families.

These findings show that not all family policies work the same way – and that even the most well-meaning policies can have unintended and even negative impacts. Short leave and childcare help women participate in the labor force without penalty. Very long leave, while designed to help families, can unintentionally hurt women’s pay overall by reinforcing stereotypes about who will leave work and who will stay.

The bigger picture is that the motherhood penalty is not just about individual choices, but about how workplaces and policies treat women. Policies that encourage shared caregiving and quick re-entry into the workforce can help close the gap. But if policies signal that only women will step away from work for long stretches of time, they may deepen the very inequality they are meant to solve.

Does climate change make you angry? In a recent study, researchers from the University of Leeds in England used a survey experiment to examine how people react when informed about the threat that climate change poses. They wanted to know whether people would react differently if presented with emotionally neutral information versus information designed to make them feel threatened.

All participants in the study lived in the UK. One group watched a relatively unemotional video about climate change produced by a scientific institute. This video explained atmospheric phenomena using diagrams. The other group watched a video about Welsh villages that could become uninhabitable due to rising sea levels. The second video was produced by an environmental activist group and emphasized the human toll of climate change. The study’s authors asked participants to write how they felt about climate change. The participants who saw the second video were more likely to indicate that they felt threatened.

Participants were asked to rate their level of anger about climate change on a scale of 0 to 100. The paper’s authors also asked people whether they would be willing to do various things in order to fight climate change, such as advocating for policy change, buying an electric car, or eating less meat.

The group who watched the second video, about villages that could be destroyed, were significantly angrier than the group who watched the first video, which was more abstract. The second group was also more likely to say they were willing to do something to fight climate change. Previous studies had found similar results.

The researchers also wanted to know if and how people’s attitudes about authoritarianism would affect their anger levels and willingness to act. To measure authoritarian attitudes, the authors used a scale that asked people to rate their level of agreement with a long list of statements, including “it is important … to maintain traditional values and ways of thinking,” and “strong force is necessary against threatening groups.” Overall, people with more authoritarian attitudes were less angry and less willing to act. When exposed to the threatening video, in fact, these people instead showed an increase in authoritarian attitudes rather than increasing their anger or willingness to act. The authors hypothesize that when exposed to threatening information about climate change, people with authoritarian attitudes become angrier at “non-conforming groups” rather than people in positions of power.when exposed to threatening information about climate change, people with authoritarian attitudes become angrier at “non-conforming groups” rather than people in positions of power. For example, the more authoritarian respondents were more likely to support harsher penalties for criminals.

This research shows that people’s pre-existing attitudes can have a big impact – not only on how they interpret new information, but also on what they might choose to do in response.

With U.S. immigration raids and detentions on the rise, more people are navigating a complex and hostile immigration court system. In a new study, Mirian Martinez-Aranda interviewed 55 formerly detained immigrants in southern California to understand how detainees navigate this system and seek justice. Her interviews, conducted with immigrants detained just before the latest wave of enforcement (2015-2018), are as revealing as they are disconcerting.

Detained immigrants in the United States face systemic barriers to justice. For example, U.S. immigration law does not guarantee the right to legal counsel or representation in immigration court. Most immigrants cannot afford legal counsel, and the resources that are available are overburdened and often unreliable. The paperwork and legal jargon bound up in the immigration court system are also complicated, which puts immigrants who do not speak English at an extreme disadvantage. As one interviewee described,

“We did not have the knowledge to fill out paperwork … Even requests to make a doctor’s appointment had to be in English. They [ICE staff] have dictionaries but won’t lend them. A few of us have dictionaries, so we work together to try to translate phrases to ask for what was needed. But it was very difficult.”

These barriers can delay and deny justice while undermining due process protections.  Martinez-Aranda interviewed one man whose time in detention was extended by a year because of the time it took to find an interpreter, since he was unable to communicate his case for asylum without one.

Martinez-Aranda found that to cope with these barriers, detained immigrants cobbled together resources from whatever sources they could find. Some received support from relatives, advocacy groups, and other detainees who had gained more familiarity with the legal system. Some sought assistance from lawyers, although they were difficult to contact and would sometimes cheat or abandon their clients. As one interviewee stated, “I was detained a long time, and I saw many people get taken advantage [of] by attorneys that took the money and never came back.”“I was detained a long time, and I saw many people get taken advantage [of] by attorneys that took the money and never came back.” Still other detainees were forced to represent themselves, which is usually unsuccessful. Together, these strategies invariably complicated or delayed cases.

The U.S. immigration court system systematically obstructs immigrants in a way that Martinez-Aranda describes as “legal violence.” These barriers to justice are heightened for those who are already the most marginalized: people with low education, low incomes, little knowledge of English, and little community support. The recent crackdowns on immigration enforcement further overburden the court system, increasing the number of people who are detained and face deportation with no guarantee of justice.

Public support for same-sex marriage has climbed dramatically in recent decades, but how have attitudes toward same-sex parents evolved? In a new study, Wendy D. Manning and Kristen E. Gustafson examined changes in public opinion on same-sex parenting over the past decade, comparing responses from the 2012 and 2022 General Social Survey (GSS). They find that acceptance of same-sex parents has increased dramatically across all demographics, though differences persist depending on political beliefs, religious affiliation, and geographic location.

In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively.In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively. Support increased across all demographic groups (sex, race/ethnicity, education, family background, age, parenthood status), including conservative and highly religious respondents, though at a slower pace and to a lower extent. 

The study found that while approval increased for both, Americans consistently showed greater acceptance of same-sex female parents than same-sex male parents. Regional differences were also persistent, with New England consistently reporting the highest levels of approval in both 2012 and 2022. The largest increase in support occurred in the East South Central region (Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama), while the West North Central (Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and Kansas) and Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) saw the smallest increases.

Even with these shifts in public opinion, Manning and Gustafson highlight a growing contradiction: even as more Americans support same-sex parenting, legal and political attacks on LGBTQ+ families persist. In 2023 alone, over 500 state-level bills targeting LGBTQ+ rights were introduced, some restricting adoption and parenting rights. Therefore, while broad social attitudes may be shifting toward greater inclusion, major structural barriers to family recognition and security remain entrenched in law and policy.

Manning and Gustafson’s findings provide an important update on attitudes toward same-sex parents, but they also raise important questions. If their basic legal rights are still under attack even as public support grows, what does this mean for LGBTQ+ families?