Perceived threat plays an important role in police officers’ on-the-job decision making. That makes sense – an officer concerned for their safety is more likely to use force against a civilian. But what if the perceived threat has nothing to do with that civilian? What if it didn’t originate on the job at all?

Samuel Thomas Donahue and Gerard Torrats-Espinosa wanted to understand how a homicide in a police officer’s neighborhood affects their likelihood of using force on civilians in the next week. Their study suggests the answer depends on race – both the race of the officer and the race of the civilian.

Using administrative data from the Chicago Police Department (CPD), police officers’ home addresses from voter registration rolls, and publicly available crime data, Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa created a snapshot of almost 9,000 CPD officers’ neighborhood contexts and workplace conduct between 2012 and 2020. The authors matched officers exposed to a homicide near their homes with other officers who were not exposed to a homicide but otherwise shared the same race, assigned “beat,” and shift day and time. To understand how race might affect police officers’ likelihood of using force, the authors looked at scenarios with varying officer and civilian races.

In almost every case, there was no meaningful change in the likelihood of an officer’s use of force – with one notable exception: when a homicide occurred within 1/8th of a mile of a white police officer’s home, that officer became seven times more likely to use force against a Black civilian in the following weekwhen a homicide occurred within 1/8th of a mile of a white police officer’s home, that officer became seven times more likely to use force against a Black civilian in the following week.. No other combination of officer and civilian race saw a change anywhere close. Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa say this is evidence that white police officers experience anti-Black racial bias when dealing with Black civilians in the aftermath of a neighborhood homicide.

Donahue and Torrats-Espinosa view this effect as an example of racial threat – when prejudices among a dominant group are ignited by perceived threats to their status. The fact that the effect only showed up when white officers came into contact with Black civilians suggests that neighborhood homicides activate racial bias rather than a professionalized police response.

This article also shows how “at home” contexts impact “at work” behavior, and how violence can spread between neighborhoods – and between murders by civilians and violence by police.

China’s post-socialist market reform started around 1978 and came into full force in the 1990s. This reform transitioned China from a planned economy to a market-driven one. Yang Cao, in his 2024 article, investigates the cultural impact of this transition. He asks, in particular: how did this economic transformation reshape cultural values of materialism among Chinese citizens?

Materialism, for Cao, is the belief that success, happiness, and social worth are primarily defined through wealth and consumption. He uses data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) and multilevel statistical models to examine how province-level institutional changes (the density of private enterprises, labor market flexibility, and regional GDP) affect individuals’ values about income, prestige, and work hours.

Cao finds that individuals living in regions that are more deeply penetrated by market forces tend to express stronger materialist values, even after controlling for factors like income, education, and occupationindividuals living in regions that are more deeply penetrated by market forces tend to express stronger materialist values, even after controlling for factors like income, education, and occupation. These people prefer extrinsic rewards like income to intrinsic rewards such as feelings of achievement. Additionally, Cao found that materialist values are more pronounced among younger cohorts and urban residents – that is, those who are both embedded in China’s market economy and more exposed to related cultural messages.

Cao’s research on the case of China helps us understand broadly how market transitions, not just capitalism per se, can contribute to deep cultural change. China’s case helps illuminate how market institutions can generate new cultural values centered on competition, individualism, and consumption, from post-socialist countries to emerging economies. It also suggests the potential social fragmentation that can follow when traditional values are displaced by market-oriented worldviews.

When women have children, they often earn less than women without kids. This is called the motherhood penalty, and it happens for many reasons. Mothers may step out of work for a time, cut back on hours, or pass up promotions to care for children. Employers may also assume that mothers are less committed to their jobs. In any event, the result is that mothers earn less than fathers and less than women without children, even when they have the same skills and education.

A new study by Jennifer Hook and Meiying Li asks whether family-friendly government policies can shrink this earnings gap. They looked at nearly 3 million workers in 26 mostly high-income democracies over a twenty-year period. Their focus was on two kinds of support: childcare spending and paid parental leave. The logic behind the emphasis on these two policies is straightforward – if parents have access to affordable childcare and paid leave, mothers can more effectively balance work and family responsibilities which should help narrow the pay gap between mothers and non-mothers as well as between men and women.

But the results are mixed. On the one hand, short paid leaves (six months or less) and public childcare policies that apply to both mothers and fathers seem to help mothers stay in the workforce without widening the pay gap. Mothers benefit because they can recover from childbirth, care for infants alongside their partners, and then return to work with support systems in place. Childcare spending also makes it easier for both parents to remain employed, rather than forcing women to choose between work and family.

On the other hand, when paid leave extends beyond six months, the story changes. Hook and Li find that in countries with long leave, the gender earnings gap widens – not only for mothers but for all women.in countries with long leave, the gender earnings gap widens – not only for mothers but for all women. Employers may start to see hiring or promoting women of childbearing age as risky, assuming the women will eventually take extended leave. As a result, women may be passed over for promotions, training, or equal pay, regardless of whether they have children. Long-leave policies also affect men: when leave is mostly taken by women, men may face stigma or financial penalties for taking time off, reinforcing the idea that caregiving is women’s work. This limits fathers’ involvement at home and deepens gender inequality both at work and in families.

These findings show that not all family policies work the same way – and that even the most well-meaning policies can have unintended and even negative impacts. Short leave and childcare help women participate in the labor force without penalty. Very long leave, while designed to help families, can unintentionally hurt women’s pay overall by reinforcing stereotypes about who will leave work and who will stay.

The bigger picture is that the motherhood penalty is not just about individual choices, but about how workplaces and policies treat women. Policies that encourage shared caregiving and quick re-entry into the workforce can help close the gap. But if policies signal that only women will step away from work for long stretches of time, they may deepen the very inequality they are meant to solve.

Does climate change make you angry? In a recent study, researchers from the University of Leeds in England used a survey experiment to examine how people react when informed about the threat that climate change poses. They wanted to know whether people would react differently if presented with emotionally neutral information versus information designed to make them feel threatened.

All participants in the study lived in the UK. One group watched a relatively unemotional video about climate change produced by a scientific institute. This video explained atmospheric phenomena using diagrams. The other group watched a video about Welsh villages that could become uninhabitable due to rising sea levels. The second video was produced by an environmental activist group and emphasized the human toll of climate change. The study’s authors asked participants to write how they felt about climate change. The participants who saw the second video were more likely to indicate that they felt threatened.

Participants were asked to rate their level of anger about climate change on a scale of 0 to 100. The paper’s authors also asked people whether they would be willing to do various things in order to fight climate change, such as advocating for policy change, buying an electric car, or eating less meat.

The group who watched the second video, about villages that could be destroyed, were significantly angrier than the group who watched the first video, which was more abstract. The second group was also more likely to say they were willing to do something to fight climate change. Previous studies had found similar results.

The researchers also wanted to know if and how people’s attitudes about authoritarianism would affect their anger levels and willingness to act. To measure authoritarian attitudes, the authors used a scale that asked people to rate their level of agreement with a long list of statements, including “it is important … to maintain traditional values and ways of thinking,” and “strong force is necessary against threatening groups.” Overall, people with more authoritarian attitudes were less angry and less willing to act. When exposed to the threatening video, in fact, these people instead showed an increase in authoritarian attitudes rather than increasing their anger or willingness to act. The authors hypothesize that when exposed to threatening information about climate change, people with authoritarian attitudes become angrier at “non-conforming groups” rather than people in positions of power.when exposed to threatening information about climate change, people with authoritarian attitudes become angrier at “non-conforming groups” rather than people in positions of power. For example, the more authoritarian respondents were more likely to support harsher penalties for criminals.

This research shows that people’s pre-existing attitudes can have a big impact – not only on how they interpret new information, but also on what they might choose to do in response.

With U.S. immigration raids and detentions on the rise, more people are navigating a complex and hostile immigration court system. In a new study, Mirian Martinez-Aranda interviewed 55 formerly detained immigrants in southern California to understand how detainees navigate this system and seek justice. Her interviews, conducted with immigrants detained just before the latest wave of enforcement (2015-2018), are as revealing as they are disconcerting.

Detained immigrants in the United States face systemic barriers to justice. For example, U.S. immigration law does not guarantee the right to legal counsel or representation in immigration court. Most immigrants cannot afford legal counsel, and the resources that are available are overburdened and often unreliable. The paperwork and legal jargon bound up in the immigration court system are also complicated, which puts immigrants who do not speak English at an extreme disadvantage. As one interviewee described,

“We did not have the knowledge to fill out paperwork … Even requests to make a doctor’s appointment had to be in English. They [ICE staff] have dictionaries but won’t lend them. A few of us have dictionaries, so we work together to try to translate phrases to ask for what was needed. But it was very difficult.”

These barriers can delay and deny justice while undermining due process protections.  Martinez-Aranda interviewed one man whose time in detention was extended by a year because of the time it took to find an interpreter, since he was unable to communicate his case for asylum without one.

Martinez-Aranda found that to cope with these barriers, detained immigrants cobbled together resources from whatever sources they could find. Some received support from relatives, advocacy groups, and other detainees who had gained more familiarity with the legal system. Some sought assistance from lawyers, although they were difficult to contact and would sometimes cheat or abandon their clients. As one interviewee stated, “I was detained a long time, and I saw many people get taken advantage [of] by attorneys that took the money and never came back.”“I was detained a long time, and I saw many people get taken advantage [of] by attorneys that took the money and never came back.” Still other detainees were forced to represent themselves, which is usually unsuccessful. Together, these strategies invariably complicated or delayed cases.

The U.S. immigration court system systematically obstructs immigrants in a way that Martinez-Aranda describes as “legal violence.” These barriers to justice are heightened for those who are already the most marginalized: people with low education, low incomes, little knowledge of English, and little community support. The recent crackdowns on immigration enforcement further overburden the court system, increasing the number of people who are detained and face deportation with no guarantee of justice.

Public support for same-sex marriage has climbed dramatically in recent decades, but how have attitudes toward same-sex parents evolved? In a new study, Wendy D. Manning and Kristen E. Gustafson examined changes in public opinion on same-sex parenting over the past decade, comparing responses from the 2012 and 2022 General Social Survey (GSS). They find that acceptance of same-sex parents has increased dramatically across all demographics, though differences persist depending on political beliefs, religious affiliation, and geographic location.

In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively.In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively. Support increased across all demographic groups (sex, race/ethnicity, education, family background, age, parenthood status), including conservative and highly religious respondents, though at a slower pace and to a lower extent. 

The study found that while approval increased for both, Americans consistently showed greater acceptance of same-sex female parents than same-sex male parents. Regional differences were also persistent, with New England consistently reporting the highest levels of approval in both 2012 and 2022. The largest increase in support occurred in the East South Central region (Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama), while the West North Central (Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and Kansas) and Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) saw the smallest increases.

Even with these shifts in public opinion, Manning and Gustafson highlight a growing contradiction: even as more Americans support same-sex parenting, legal and political attacks on LGBTQ+ families persist. In 2023 alone, over 500 state-level bills targeting LGBTQ+ rights were introduced, some restricting adoption and parenting rights. Therefore, while broad social attitudes may be shifting toward greater inclusion, major structural barriers to family recognition and security remain entrenched in law and policy.

Manning and Gustafson’s findings provide an important update on attitudes toward same-sex parents, but they also raise important questions. If their basic legal rights are still under attack even as public support grows, what does this mean for LGBTQ+ families? 

What happens in a romantic relationship when things turn violent? The common reaction is “just leave him” or “call the police” – but there are often many other ways female victims resist. A recent interview study by Lynette Renner, Carolyn Hartley, and Knute Carter explored the strategies of resistance taken by 150 different victims of intimate partner violence.

The study identified six common strategies that victims used to cope with or respond to abuse. These included seeking formal support, such as staying in a shelter or calling a hotline, or informal support, such as turning to social networks by talking with family or friends. Some pursued legal assistance by contacting the police or filing charges, while others engaged in safety planning behaviors like hiding money or keys in preparation to leave. Acts of resistance, such as fighting back or ending the relationship, were also common, as were placating strategies, where victims tried to keep the peace or avoid the abuser to reduce conflict. Victims often engaged in one or more of these strategies simultaneously.

After reviewing the data, they concluded there were 4 different “types of victims” based on different patterns of use of the above paths:

• High Strategy Users (took all or almost all the above paths)
• Moderate Strategy Resisters (took primarily the resistance path)
• Moderate Strategy Placators (took primarily the placating path)
• Low Strategy Users (least likely to commit to one path, especially safety planning)

In short, women experiencing relationship violence navigate different paths when faced with critical decisions about their safety.women experiencing relationship violence navigate different paths when faced with critical decisions about their safety. To offer meaningful support, advocates, service providers, and policymakers must recognize each survivor’s unique combination of risks, resources, and responses.

Decades of research show that becoming a mother often leads to lower wages and fewer job offers, a phenomenon known as the “motherhood penalty.” Less attention has been given to how access to abortion – and the right to decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term – shapes women’s financial futures. A recent study by sociologists Bethany G. Everett and Catherine J. Taylor fills this gap by examining how abortion access – or its absence – influences women’s economic outcomes over time.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, Everett and Taylor tracked participants over 24 years to analyze the financial effects of growing up under more or less restrictive state abortion policies. Their study found that women who lived in states with more restrictive abortion policies as teenagers were less likely to graduate from college, had lower incomes, and experienced higher levels of financial instability in adulthood.women who lived in states with more restrictive abortion policies as teenagers were less likely to graduate from college, had lower incomes, and experienced higher levels of financial instability in adulthood. For instance, women from states with more restrictive abortion policies were more likely to report falling behind on bills, facing eviction, and accumulating debt compared to those from states with less restrictive abortion policies.

Everett and Taylor also compared the economic trajectories of women who had abortions as teenagers to those who carried pregnancies to term. The researchers used a matching technique to pair women with similar characteristics to estimate how abortion affects socioeconomic outcomes. The results were stark: those who had abortions as teenagers were more likely to graduate from high school and college, had higher incomes, and reported greater financial stability in adulthood.

Everett and Taylor’s research shows that limited access to abortion is linked to long-term declines in education and economic stability. As the fight over abortion continues, their findings make clear that restricting abortion access isn’t just a threat to people’s health and autonomy – it can also impose hardship and deepen economic inequality.

As average temperatures rise around the world, more and more people are being exposed to heat waves. From 2000-2016, the number of people exposed to extreme and unusual temperatures grew by 125 million. And while temperature doesn’t discriminate, people do. In a recent paper published in the journal Demography, a team of authors found that in India people from marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat at work than people from dominant caste groups. They call this “thermal injustice.”

Caste is a complex social phenomenon found in many countries around the world which sorts people into social groups based on their ancestry. Researchers have long known that a person’s caste can influence many social opportunities and outcomes, such as what types of jobs they can get, how much money they can make, where they live, how long they live, and the quality of health care available to them. Now we can add risk of exposure to heat waves to the list.

The authors combined heat data from satellite imagery with data from a large survey. They focused on the heat waves that hit India during the summers of 2019 and 2022. While India is a large country with many climates, the temperature in Delhi, the national capital, reached 49°C (120°F) in May 2022. The authors found that people from more marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat stress.The authors found that people from more marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat stress. This association was still present after they controlled for age, gender, education and economic status.

The likelihood of being exposed to extreme heat can depend on many social factors, including your job. If you spend your days in an air-conditioned office, for example, you will be cooler than someone who works on a construction site. But the bottom line is that while the influence of caste on India’s job market may be decreasing, most people who do physical labor outdoors come from marginalized caste groups. Thus, as heat-related public health initiatives in India are developed, caste and thermal injustice should be front and center.

“Housework” by pasukaru76 is marked with CC0 1.0.

Today, researchers estimate that women do twice as much housework as men. While the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor shrank substantially over the second half of the 20th century, it stabilized in the mid-1990s, with women still shouldering a larger amount of housework and childcare. So what do these twentieth-century trends mean for the division of domestic labor in the twenty-first century? Who’s doing the housework and childcare in American households today?

Melissa Milkie and colleagues answer these questions using time diary data from the American Time Use Survey. This survey captures married men and women’s time spent on daily housework and childcare activities and the researchers focused on changes in the data between 2003 and 2023. Overall, the authors found that while married women still do more housework and childcare than married men, the gender gap has gradually narrowed over the twenty-first century. 

The biggest change in housework was found in men’s increased participation and women’s decreased participation in traditionally “feminine” tasks like cooking, cleaning, and laundry. In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease.In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease. 

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated these shifts. In 2020, both men and women increased their housework time. By 2023, women’s average housework time returned to pre-pandemic levels, while men maintained their higher housework involvement. Men’s increased participation in core housework activities like cooking and cleaning since the pandemic marks an important shift in their behavior – signaling greater gender convergence in traditionally feminine tasks. Lastly, the gender gap in childcare also notably shrank slightly between 2003 and 2023. Women average 1.8 hours of childcare per day compared to men’s 1 hour, the smallest gender gap in childcare time recorded in the past 60 years

The authors also explored why these shifts were happening. Married women’s reduced housework time can be attributed to broader population shifts over the 21st century, primarily increased income and education among women. From 2003 to 2023, married men started doing more housework, likely because ideas about gender roles at home changed and partners began expecting a more equal share of chores. The pandemic period, in particular, signals a crucial moment in the twentieth century for changes in men’s unpaid domestic labor, with married men and fathers increasing and maintaining their hours in domestic labor. 

While the pace of change has slowed and women still do more, the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor time is shrinking – primarily driven by married men’s increased time and married women’s decreased time in traditionally feminine housework tasks. This study suggests that the gender gap in domestic labor has not stalled, but rather changed in significant ways as gender roles continue to evolve and adapt in twenty-first-century couples.