“Housework” by pasukaru76 is marked with CC0 1.0.

Today, researchers estimate that women do twice as much housework as men. While the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor shrank substantially over the second half of the 20th century, it stabilized in the mid-1990s, with women still shouldering a larger amount of housework and childcare. So what do these twentieth-century trends mean for the division of domestic labor in the twenty-first century? Who’s doing the housework and childcare in American households today?

Melissa Milkie and colleagues answer these questions using time diary data from the American Time Use Survey. This survey captures married men and women’s time spent on daily housework and childcare activities and the researchers focused on changes in the data between 2003 and 2023. Overall, the authors found that while married women still do more housework and childcare than married men, the gender gap has gradually narrowed over the twenty-first century. 

The biggest change in housework was found in men’s increased participation and women’s decreased participation in traditionally “feminine” tasks like cooking, cleaning, and laundry. In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease.In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease. 

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated these shifts. In 2020, both men and women increased their housework time. By 2023, women’s average housework time returned to pre-pandemic levels, while men maintained their higher housework involvement. Men’s increased participation in core housework activities like cooking and cleaning since the pandemic marks an important shift in their behavior – signaling greater gender convergence in traditionally feminine tasks. Lastly, the gender gap in childcare also notably shrank slightly between 2003 and 2023. Women average 1.8 hours of childcare per day compared to men’s 1 hour, the smallest gender gap in childcare time recorded in the past 60 years

The authors also explored why these shifts were happening. Married women’s reduced housework time can be attributed to broader population shifts over the 21st century, primarily increased income and education among women. From 2003 to 2023, married men started doing more housework, likely because ideas about gender roles at home changed and partners began expecting a more equal share of chores. The pandemic period, in particular, signals a crucial moment in the twentieth century for changes in men’s unpaid domestic labor, with married men and fathers increasing and maintaining their hours in domestic labor. 

While the pace of change has slowed and women still do more, the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor time is shrinking – primarily driven by married men’s increased time and married women’s decreased time in traditionally feminine housework tasks. This study suggests that the gender gap in domestic labor has not stalled, but rather changed in significant ways as gender roles continue to evolve and adapt in twenty-first-century couples.    

“Gay pride 164 – Marche des fiertés Toulouse 2011.jpg” by Guillaume Paumier is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Over the past decade, the number of adults in the United States who identify as LGBTQ+ has more than doubled. At the same time, the number of terms describing people’s sexualities and gender identities has increased as well, and continues to evolve. Given these changes, how do LGBTQ+ people decide which labels to use when describing or disclosing their identities?

In a new study, researchers Holmes and Ghaziani sought to understand how LGBTQ+ people make sense of the different identity labels available to them. Through interviews with LGBTQ+ adults around Vancouver (most of whom were in their 20s), the researchers found most respondents used more than one label to define their sexuality. Most commonly, these respondents described themselves as both “queer” and either “gay”, “bisexual”, or “pansexual”. Some respondents used a series of labels to define their identity, offering descriptions like “nonbinary, queer, bisexual, gray-sexual, and aromantic.”

Additionally, some LGBTQ+ people in this study reported using different identity labels in different situations to avoid potential confusion or conflict. For example, some people would use better-known terms – such as “gay”, “lesbian”, or “bisexual” – when communicating their identities to older or more conservative people. As one respondent described, “I pretty much just stick to ‘queer’ [in Vancouver], but when I’m in Texas, my dad is – he doesn’t understand, really, so for him, it’s ‘gay’.”“I pretty much just stick to ‘queer’ [in Vancouver], but when I’m in Texas, my dad is – he doesn’t understand, really, so for him, it’s ‘gay’.”

Some respondents also discussed using different labels in interactions with other LGBTQ+ people to avoid potential in-fighting over the legitimacy of their identity. As one person described, “I will use gay, queer, or bisexual depending on who I’m speaking to…When I’m speaking to someone like a lesbian or someone in the queer community, I’ll call myself queer, because I still have that fear that I’m seen as less gay or less deserving of being in that space.”

These findings highlight that how people express their identities often varies across situations. To try to help interactions run smoothly, LGBTQ+ people discussed adjusting the identity labels they used based on their audience. This reflects classic insights from the sociologist Erving Goffman: that identities are not stable internal constructions, but evolve and are negotiated in social interactions.

In the United States, most workers abide by an unspoken taboo against discussing pay with coworkers. This cultural norm is paired with explicit, formalized bans on talking about compensation in some workplaces. However, “pay talk” matters.  If workers know how much they are paid relative to their peers, they can decide whether they are being paid fairly and have more agency to negotiate pay.  But when workers can’t talk about pay, they lose this bargaining leverage, which makes it easier for supervisors to maintain pay inequality. 

To explore these dynamics, authors Patrick Denice, Jake Rosenfeld, and Shengwei Sun analyzed when and why workers discuss pay, using a survey amongst Americans working primarily in the private sector (for-profit businesses, like retail stores, restaurants, and tech companies) and the government. They find that the likelihood of workers discussing pay together depends on both the official rules of an organization and cultural, interpersonal matters, like workers’ trust in management. 

Most public sector, government employers (which include sites like the Department of Veterans Affairs, public universities, and public hospitals) publicize their pay scales, making it easier for workers to assess their pay relative to their peers. On the other hand, only about 10% of private establishments publicize pay. Not surprisingly, private sector workers in this survey were more likely to discuss pay than government employees, reflecting the importance of interpersonal resources and networks when official information is scarce. Even without formal barriers, cultural norms are powerful in shaping whether or not workers will discuss pay; in organizations where pay discussions are not banned, less than half of workers discussed pay with each other. 

The authors also pointed out instances when these norms and formal rules are broken. In these cases, workers recognized that they may need to violate rules to leverage higher pay. Younger workers were more likely to violate pay talk bans, reflecting a generational shift regarding norms that perpetuate workplace power divisions.Younger workers were more likely to violate pay talk bans, reflecting a generational shift regarding norms that perpetuate workplace power divisions. Workers who planned to ask for a raise within the next year were also likely to violate bans on pay talk, demonstrating how critical career transitions necessitate rule-breaking when formal processes lack helpful information. On the other hand, violations of pay talk bans were less common among workers who reported positive relationships with their managers.

Ultimately, most workers who resist implicit norms and break norms and rules do so in pursuit of fair wages, thus challenging pay inequality and traditional power dynamics at work.

An array of colors arranged in a shape of a thought bubble. Photo by author, Jordyn Wald.

How do Americans define discrimination? Lauren Valentino and Evangeline Warren reveal that it’s not as clear-cut as we might expect. Through interviews and a nationally representative survey, they found that Americans don’t exactly share the same ideas on what “counts” as discrimination—much less racism, sexism, or classism—and these differences aren’t random. 

According to Valentino and Warren, Americans view discrimination through different lenses, depending on whether they’re thinking about racism, sexism, or classism. These lenses guided respondents in deciding whether an act qualified as discrimination:

• Intentionality: Some participants believe that discrimination requires a clear intent to harm. If an act was unintentional, they didn’t view it as discrimination. 
• Unequal treatment or outcomes: Some participants felt that discrimination only occurs when someone is directly targeted and treated unequally. Others saw it through unequal outcomes—where past barriers still limit opportunities for certain groups today, regardless of intent. 
• Power imbalances: Some participants viewed discrimination as tied to structural power imbalances. This means that certain groups have held more power over time, making discrimination a persistent issue rather than isolated incidents.

When it came to types of discrimination, most participants thought racism required intentional actions and targeted unequal treatment. In contrast, sexism and classism were more often seen as unintentional or rooted in unequal outcomes. While all three forms of discrimination were connected to systemic power imbalances, participants linked racism and sexism more closely to historical dynamics, whereas classism was seen as a more contemporary, pervasive issue.

Demographics also determined different definitions. Younger participants and Democrats, for example, were more likely to define discrimination in terms of unequal outcomes, regardless of intent, whereas Republicans and older respondents often emphasized intentionality.Younger participants and Democrats, for example, were more likely to define discrimination in terms of unequal outcomes, regardless of intent, whereas Republicans and older respondents often emphasized intentionality. Women and nonbinary individuals focused on power imbalances and structural inequalities, while men tended to view discrimination as isolated instances of unequal treatment. Black and Hispanic respondents highlighted disparities in outcomes, whereas white participants were more concerned with intent. Additionally, those with lower incomes were more likely to interpret discrimination through the lens of power imbalances compared to wealthier individuals.

In the end, what “counts” as discrimination depends on who you ask and what type of discrimination is under question—but one thing’s clear: Americans aren’t just discussing definitions; they’re grappling with varied and dynamic perspectives on power, fairness, and inequality. 

A line of wind turbines alongside a long bike path. “Eemmeerdijk” by Floris M. Oosterveld is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Which do you value more: the environment or the economy? And do you know how much money your government spends on environmental protection? In a recent paper, two Norwegian scholars tried to find out how a country’s level of environmental spending relates to its residents’ views on whether the environment or the economy is more important. They argue that when countries spend more money protecting the environment, it creates a feedback loop that reduces people’s willingness to prioritize the environment over the economy.

Marthe Holum and Tor Jakobsen looked at data on environmental spending and public opinion across 27 countries from 1995 to 2019. Among those, the country-year with the highest environmental spending was the Netherlands in 2012, which spent 1.59% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on environmental protection in that year. The lowest was Lithuania in 1997, when that country spent 0.13% of their GDP.

The researchers then combined this spending data with surveys that asked people whether they thought growing the economy or protecting the environment should be a greater priority. They found that, in countries with higher levels of environmental spending, their public was less likely to support prioritizing the environment over the economy.in countries with higher levels of environmental spending, their public was less likely to support prioritizing the environment over the economy. This effect was especially impacted by people who expressed relatively less trust in government. The authors suggest that people may be less likely to support prioritizing the environment when their government’s spending exceeds their desired threshold. This interpretation corresponds with the “thermostatic” model of public opinion, which predicts that people’s opinions on government spending will move in the opposite direction of actual spending – or, in this case, whether they believe the current climate policies are already “too hot” or “too cold.”

Abraj Al Bait Towers in Mecca with Crowd by jimmy papaziad is licensed under CC BY 2.0 in pexels.

Conversations in American public life can often further negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslim communities as repressive, misogynistic, and patriarchal. In an interview-based study with 80 men and women American Muslims, Eman Abdelhadi and Anna Fox highlight the diversity of gender beliefs in this group, emphasizing that American Muslims make sense of gender while facing negative stereotypes and blatant Islamophobia. For many American Muslims, navigating external Islamophobic perceptions becomes part of how they understand gender in their own lives. 

Most American Muslims interviewed in this study showed two different positions; the first gender ideology group was critical of stereotypes of Islam as inherently repressive and patriarchal. This group believes that Islamic doctrines and history reflect that men and women have naturally different social roles and capacities. They may interpret Islamic doctrine and practices as appreciative of natural differences in the skills of men and women. Generally, however, this group did not believe that the gender differences reflected in Islamic doctrines and practices translate into gender inequality, challenging mainstream perceptions of Islam as repressive.

The second group responded to stereotypes differently. These respondents tended to highlight narratives of repressive gender relations and practices in their Muslim communities. Yet, this group focused their critiques of patriarchy on their Muslim communities, while implicitly assuming or explicitly stating that Western and secular society is fundamentally gender egalitarian. In contrast to the first group, who did not see the separation of men and women in Islamic doctrine as an obstacle to equality, this second group evaluated the gender divides in Islamic doctrine and practice as inherently negative. At the same time, these respondents faced a dilemma, acknowledging that condemning their communities as patriarchal could contribute to or confirm negative stereotypes of Islam. 

Abdelhadi and Fox explain that anti‑Muslim bias affects Muslim Americans’ daily lives. It shapes how they act in their communities and even changes how they think about gender, because outside ideas slip into their own views.

“500 Finnish emigrants dancing on the deck of s/s Urania, 1893” by The Maritime Museum of Finland is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

In recent decades, populist radical right-wing (PRR) political parties have seen increasing success in Europe. These parties generally oppose globalization and favor restrictions on immigration. Sometimes, they oppose certain aspects of liberal democracy. Examples include Nigel Farage and his Reform UK party, French politician Marine le Pen and the National Rally party, and Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, whose party is called Brothers of Italy.

Given that immigration is a central issue for many of these groups, researchers have studied whether regions with more immigration are more likely to vote for PRR parties. The results have been mixed. In an article published last year in the American Journal of Political Science, a team of researchers based in Sweden, the US, and the UK took a different, but related approach. They asked: how do levels of emigration, the act of moving away from somewhere, affect support for PRR parties?

To answer this question, the authors undertook two different sets of analyses. First, they explored the connection between a place’s level of emigration and support for PRR parties. Across Europe, they found that subnational regions that had more emigration were also more likely to vote for PRR parties.regions that had more emigration were also more likely to vote for PRR parties.

Second, they performed a more in-depth analysis of precincts in Sweden where more detailed data was available. The Swedish case confirmed that more emigration leads to a higher percentage of votes for PRR parties.

According to the researchers, emigration has two impacts on PRR electoral fortunes. The first is that people who don’t move away tend to be different than the ones who moved, including in their political views. The second, more powerful impact is that emigration has effects on the community that cause remaining voters to become more populist. For instance, emigrants are more likely to be of prime working age, which can have a negative effect on the local economy. A general decrease in people’s quality of life can then be exploited by PRR politicians who blame other political parties for the community’s struggles.

This paper highlights the ways in which population shifts can have wide-ranging and often unanticipated social consequences–consequences that, in turn, can shape and reshape politics.

“Ted Cruz (51461230545)” by Matt Johnson is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

While the words of politicians are often reported, the effects of their words are hard to measure. However, a recent study by Nilay Saiya and Stuti Manchanda attempted to measure these effects by examining the likelihood that Christian nationalist statements by U.S. senators breed violence against religious minorities who identified as but weren’t limited to, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, and Hindus. 

The public statements of all 100 senators were analyzed for ten pro-Christian nationalist statements. This included phrases like “The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation” and “The federal government should advocate Christian values.” Using the Global Terrorism Database, the authors then constructed an original dataset of Christian-based violence in all 50 states from 1990 to 2018. 

The findings showed a significant association between pro-Christian nationalist sentiments by senators and higher levels of violence against religious minorities in the states they represent. More specifically, they found that states where senators articulated pro-Christian nationalist statements were 1.4 to 1.5 times more likely to experience anti-minority attacks.states where senators articulated pro-Christian nationalist statements were 1.4 to 1.5 times more likely to experience anti-minority attacks. The authors believe this association is because the pro-Christian nationalist rhetoric provides political empowerment to its citizens to act out against other religious groups that are perceived as threats.

This “trickle-down” discourse is an important factor in pinpointing potential catalysts for religious and political violence. The authors stress the gravity of how an increasing number of Americans support the idea that violence is a legitimate tool to reinstate the cultural and political dominance of Christian values. It is a stark reminder that words do matter and overtly religious speech such as Christian Nationalist rhetoric can have dangerous consequences.

An infant’s hand gripping an adult’s finger, in black and white. “Grayscale Photography of Baby Holding Finger” by Pixabay is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Major political events, such as elections, can affect public health towards many areas. Entire segments of a country’s population can be affected, and these political changes have a big effect on our most sensitive and vulnerable citizens — mothers and infants. 

Considering comments of racism and xenophobia associated with Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, researchers Paola Langer, Caitlin Patler and Erin Hamilton examined how infant health was impacted. The researchers looked at over 15 million US birth records between 2012 and 2018 and compared changes in adverse birth outcomes, such as preterm or low birthweight births (which increases the chance of adulthood chronic diseases, like obesity and diabetes) among US and foreign born White, Black, Hispanic and Asian mothers. 

The researchers found that the rates of low birth weight and preterm births for Black, Hispanic, and Asian (specifically Asian Pacific Islanders) US and foreign born mothers increasedrates of low birth weight and preterm births for Black, Hispanic, and Asian (specifically Asian Pacific Islanders) US and foreign born mothers increased after the 2016 election, and the gaps between these groups and White mothers increased. Conversely, White mothers had no change or a slight decrease in adverse birth outcomes.  

The researchers suggest multiple factors that could have contributed to these disparities. Notably, election years can be highly stressful periods for women of color since their wellbeing is often threatened by proposed and enacted policies. In return, physiological responses to stress can impact their infants in utero. 

Since 2016, many people of color have increasingly questioned their safety in the USA as the number of hate crimes has increased in recent years. As for our future, infants’ health is a critical indicator of future population health and societal well being.

A prison watchtower silhouetted against the sky, with barbed wire fencing in the foreground.“prison guard tower” by Rennett Stowe is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Extensive research has examined how prison affects the lives of adults once they leave the system. However, scholars have been limited in their ability to investigate how prison affects the lives of people who are incarcerated consistently or intermittently during their “coming-of-age” period. These long-term prison sentences (10 years or more, although not always continuous) are difficult to study because scholars are often unable to enter prisons to conduct research, leaving a gap in our understanding of a particularly vulnerable population of young people. 

David Knight addressed this issue by conducting research with consistently and intermittently incarcerated African American and Afro-Latino men, as Black men make up roughly half of adult male sentences which last for 5 years or longer. 

The interviewees were with 18 to 34 years olds and were either incarcerated at the time of the interview or had been incarcerated during their teenage and adult years. Knight concluded that young men who were incarcerated early in their lives in both groups understood their identities as deeply connected to prisons. Rather than just thinking about prisons as places, many interviewees understood their experiences even outside of the physical space as defined by their incarceration. They described their lives, from childhood to adulthood, and even after being released, as restricted and deprived in comparison to their peers.

• “In prison, you still [get] older year after year. You still turn eighteen…still turn thirty…but it’s the setting that makes you act a different way…Instead of getting your own apartment…a single cell…The first time you may fill out a job application is for a prison job.”

Knight also found that some who were continuously incarcerated described being detained during their youth as a means of ‘protecting’ them from dangers from the ‘outside’, such as violence and addiction.

• “When I look back at my teenage self…it’s a good thing I came to prison, if only for the fact that I can really stop and listen…it would have been bad for me, way worse than it is now.”

Although mortality rates are often lower inside prisons than outside of prisons, Knight’s interviewees describe their experiences as dehumanizing, degrading, and debasing. In other words, we can understand these sentiments as a commentary on the lack of support for marginalized communities, rather than support for what is happening in prisons themselves.

This research highlights that prisons are not just physical spaces, but institutions that profoundly shape identity and future life opportunities. Incarcerated youth, during critical developmental years, are further marginalized from peers who experience key educational, social, and personal milestones. As prisons increasingly become environments where young men and women grow up, it is crucial to continue studying how they shape the transition to adulthood.