Image by Jordyn Wald.

Is the public losing trust in scientists? No, according to a new survey of over 70,000 respondents around the world. Researchers found instead that most people still trust scientists—and want them involved in solving society’s biggest problems. On a scale from very low to very high, the global average for trust in scientists was somewhat high, with the highest trust levels reported in Switzerland, China, and Denmark. The United States came in slightly above average on trust, while Russia, Kazakhstan, and several neighboring countries showed the lowest levels of trust.

Across the globe, people generally view scientists as competent and acting in the public interest. Nearly 80% believe scientists are qualified to conduct important research, and three-quarters agree that science is the best way to determine what’s true. Support for scientists’ public role is strong as well: most respondents say scientists should communicate with the public, advise politicians, and even advocate for specific policies. Trust was especially high in African countries when it came to public engagement. Still, views aren’t monolithic—trust tends to be higher among women, urban residents, people with higher incomes or education levels, and those who lean politically progressive.

Similarly, there is a gap between what people want science to focus on and what they believe scientists are actually working on. Most participants around the world said they wanted science to prioritize public health, clean energy, and poverty wanted science to prioritize public health, clean energy, and poverty reduction — but that scientists were instead spending too much time on defense and military technology. This gap matters because when people feel that science aligns with their values and priorities, they are more likely to trust it.

Even though average trust levels are high, the study also revealed a warning sign: a small minority of people report deep skepticism toward science. These individuals often believe that scientists are disconnected from everyday concerns or too aligned with political elites. Although there isn’t a hard party line, people who are more skeptical are more likely to hold conservative political views, believe that social hierarchies are needed in society, or think that common sense should outweigh expert knowledge. And while they may be in the minority, researchers caution that even a small group can have an outsized influence, especially if they are highly visible in the media, well-organized, or occupy positions of political power.

“500 Finnish emigrants dancing on the deck of s/s Urania, 1893” by The Maritime Museum of Finland is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

In recent decades, populist radical right-wing (PRR) political parties have seen increasing success in Europe. These parties generally oppose globalization and favor restrictions on immigration. Sometimes, they oppose certain aspects of liberal democracy. Examples include Nigel Farage and his Reform UK party, French politician Marine le Pen and the National Rally party, and Italian prime minister Giorgia Meloni, whose party is called Brothers of Italy.

Given that immigration is a central issue for many of these groups, researchers have studied whether regions with more immigration are more likely to vote for PRR parties. The results have been mixed. In an article published last year in the American Journal of Political Science, a team of researchers based in Sweden, the US, and the UK took a different, but related approach. They asked: how do levels of emigration, the act of moving away from somewhere, affect support for PRR parties?

To answer this question, the authors undertook two different sets of analyses. First, they explored the connection between a place’s level of emigration and support for PRR parties. Across Europe, they found that subnational regions that had more emigration were also more likely to vote for PRR parties.regions that had more emigration were also more likely to vote for PRR parties.

Second, they performed a more in-depth analysis of precincts in Sweden where more detailed data was available. The Swedish case confirmed that more emigration leads to a higher percentage of votes for PRR parties.

According to the researchers, emigration has two impacts on PRR electoral fortunes. The first is that people who don’t move away tend to be different than the ones who moved, including in their political views. The second, more powerful impact is that emigration has effects on the community that cause remaining voters to become more populist. For instance, emigrants are more likely to be of prime working age, which can have a negative effect on the local economy. A general decrease in people’s quality of life can then be exploited by PRR politicians who blame other political parties for the community’s struggles.

This paper highlights the ways in which population shifts can have wide-ranging and often unanticipated social consequences–consequences that, in turn, can shape and reshape politics.

“Ted Cruz (51461230545)” by Matt Johnson is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

While the words of politicians are often reported, the effects of their words are hard to measure. However, a recent study by Nilay Saiya and Stuti Manchanda attempted to measure these effects by examining the likelihood that Christian nationalist statements by U.S. senators breed violence against religious minorities who identified as but weren’t limited to, Muslims, Sikhs, Jews, and Hindus. 

The public statements of all 100 senators were analyzed for ten pro-Christian nationalist statements. This included phrases like “The federal government should declare the United States a Christian nation” and “The federal government should advocate Christian values.” Using the Global Terrorism Database, the authors then constructed an original dataset of Christian-based violence in all 50 states from 1990 to 2018. 

The findings showed a significant association between pro-Christian nationalist sentiments by senators and higher levels of violence against religious minorities in the states they represent. More specifically, they found that states where senators articulated pro-Christian nationalist statements were 1.4 to 1.5 times more likely to experience anti-minority attacks.states where senators articulated pro-Christian nationalist statements were 1.4 to 1.5 times more likely to experience anti-minority attacks. The authors believe this association is because the pro-Christian nationalist rhetoric provides political empowerment to its citizens to act out against other religious groups that are perceived as threats.

This “trickle-down” discourse is an important factor in pinpointing potential catalysts for religious and political violence. The authors stress the gravity of how an increasing number of Americans support the idea that violence is a legitimate tool to reinstate the cultural and political dominance of Christian values. It is a stark reminder that words do matter and overtly religious speech such as Christian Nationalist rhetoric can have dangerous consequences.

An infant’s hand gripping an adult’s finger, in black and white. “Grayscale Photography of Baby Holding Finger” by Pixabay is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Major political events, such as elections, can affect public health towards many areas. Entire segments of a country’s population can be affected, and these political changes have a big effect on our most sensitive and vulnerable citizens — mothers and infants. 

Considering comments of racism and xenophobia associated with Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, researchers Paola Langer, Caitlin Patler and Erin Hamilton examined how infant health was impacted. The researchers looked at over 15 million US birth records between 2012 and 2018 and compared changes in adverse birth outcomes, such as preterm or low birthweight births (which increases the chance of adulthood chronic diseases, like obesity and diabetes) among US and foreign born White, Black, Hispanic and Asian mothers. 

The researchers found that the rates of low birth weight and preterm births for Black, Hispanic, and Asian (specifically Asian Pacific Islanders) US and foreign born mothers increasedrates of low birth weight and preterm births for Black, Hispanic, and Asian (specifically Asian Pacific Islanders) US and foreign born mothers increased after the 2016 election, and the gaps between these groups and White mothers increased. Conversely, White mothers had no change or a slight decrease in adverse birth outcomes.  

The researchers suggest multiple factors that could have contributed to these disparities. Notably, election years can be highly stressful periods for women of color since their wellbeing is often threatened by proposed and enacted policies. In return, physiological responses to stress can impact their infants in utero. 

Since 2016, many people of color have increasingly questioned their safety in the USA as the number of hate crimes has increased in recent years. As for our future, infants’ health is a critical indicator of future population health and societal well being.

A prison watchtower silhouetted against the sky, with barbed wire fencing in the foreground.“prison guard tower” by Rennett Stowe is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Extensive research has examined how prison affects the lives of adults once they leave the system. However, scholars have been limited in their ability to investigate how prison affects the lives of people who are incarcerated consistently or intermittently during their “coming-of-age” period. These long-term prison sentences (10 years or more, although not always continuous) are difficult to study because scholars are often unable to enter prisons to conduct research, leaving a gap in our understanding of a particularly vulnerable population of young people. 

David Knight addressed this issue by conducting research with consistently and intermittently incarcerated African American and Afro-Latino men, as Black men make up roughly half of adult male sentences which last for 5 years or longer. 

The interviewees were with 18 to 34 years olds and were either incarcerated at the time of the interview or had been incarcerated during their teenage and adult years. Knight concluded that young men who were incarcerated early in their lives in both groups understood their identities as deeply connected to prisons. Rather than just thinking about prisons as places, many interviewees understood their experiences even outside of the physical space as defined by their incarceration. They described their lives, from childhood to adulthood, and even after being released, as restricted and deprived in comparison to their peers.

• “In prison, you still [get] older year after year. You still turn eighteen…still turn thirty…but it’s the setting that makes you act a different way…Instead of getting your own apartment…a single cell…The first time you may fill out a job application is for a prison job.”

Knight also found that some who were continuously incarcerated described being detained during their youth as a means of ‘protecting’ them from dangers from the ‘outside’, such as violence and addiction.

• “When I look back at my teenage self…it’s a good thing I came to prison, if only for the fact that I can really stop and listen…it would have been bad for me, way worse than it is now.”

Although mortality rates are often lower inside prisons than outside of prisons, Knight’s interviewees describe their experiences as dehumanizing, degrading, and debasing. In other words, we can understand these sentiments as a commentary on the lack of support for marginalized communities, rather than support for what is happening in prisons themselves.

This research highlights that prisons are not just physical spaces, but institutions that profoundly shape identity and future life opportunities. Incarcerated youth, during critical developmental years, are further marginalized from peers who experience key educational, social, and personal milestones. As prisons increasingly become environments where young men and women grow up, it is crucial to continue studying how they shape the transition to adulthood.

“Bamboo Scaffolding in Causeway Bay neighborhood” by gribbly is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

The construction industry is widely recognized as one of the most dangerous industries around the world. In Hong Kong, the scaffolding industry is viewed as particularly dangerous and is particularly stigmatized, in part due to the widespread use of bamboo for scaffolds. Official regulations have increasingly viewed the use of bamboo (rather than steel, the most common alternative) in the scaffolding industry as dangerous and have made efforts to limit and regulate the practice, which has drawn greater scrutiny and stigma to the occupation. In the face of these threats, how do workers learn to manage risk while maintaining respectability?

“Macho” culture has long been part of the answer. Previous research has established that construction workers are often looked down upon by wider society because of the “dirtiness” of their work, and these Hong Kong scaffolders are no exception. Because the bamboo scaffolding trade in Hong Kong is relatively easy to enter and relies on on-the-job training, most apprentice scaffolders are young men who have few career options. Many of the men in the industry have connections to criminal gangs, contributing to scaffolders overall having a reputation for being criminals and ex-convicts. Additionally, the highly visible and public nature of scaffolding work makes bamboo scaffolders especially vulnerable to overt prejudice from the rest of society, with passersby sometimes cursing at and threatening scaffolders as they work.

Researchers Ken Kamoche and Kuok Kei Law sought to identify how bamboo scaffolders in Hong Kong navigated the risks of their work and the social stigma associated with it. Through interviews with a variety of workers and contractors in the bamboo scaffolding industry, Kamoche and Law found that scaffolders managed the danger and stigma of their work by leaning into a particular expression of masculinityscaffolders managed the danger and stigma of their work by leaning into a particular expression of masculinity: the scaffolders (all of whom were men) portrayed themselves as tough, macho men who were unafraid of danger. This was visible in the culture at the construction sites, which featured camaraderie, swearing, and competitive public displays of bravado and risk-taking (such as throwing bamboo poles to other workers, jumping from heights, and failing to follow safety regulations or use personal protective equipment).

As legal regulation and standardization of construction in Hong Kong has grown, and the wider society increasingly sees the bamboo scaffolding industry as a dying trade, scaffolders have struggled to convince others that scaffolders’ informal knowledge of working with bamboo is legitimate. In the midst of the inherent risks of their work, the stigma associated with it, and the precariousness and uncertain future of the industry itself, bamboo scaffolders worked to establish their identities as tough, masculine, and fearless, able to dismiss both the dangers of the job and the prejudice of those around them.

Image by Jordyn Wald.

“Time to BeReal. 2 mins left to capture a BeReal and see what your friends are up to!” This is the daily notification users receive on BeReal, an app designed to promote authenticity by prompting users to share unfiltered photos from both the front and back cameras at a random time every day. BeReal attempts to constrain users to post within a 2-minute window with zero retakes, but many users circumvent these constraints by delaying posts or retaking their photos. The one caveat? If a user chooses to retake photos, they are labeled as “retakes” and your followers can see this label. So, how “real” are users truly being?

Through a series of interviews with BeReal users, Annika Pinch and colleagues set out to understand how young adults perceive and define their own authenticity on BeReal over time, as well as how they assess the authenticity of others on the app. BeReal was initially understood by participants as a refreshing alternative to highly curated social media platforms, encouraging authenticity through its posting constraints. However, over time, participants began to observe a shift toward performative behaviors, mirroring patterns seen on other platforms. 

For example, participants would actively resist BeReal’s constraints of posting within a 2-minute window by delaying posts to capture more interesting moments in their day. Ignoring the app’s initial notification and delaying posting became more socially acceptable. Even so, participants still grappled with how to evaluate the authenticity of others. Some viewed retakes or delayed posts as inauthentic, while others believed curated posts could still reflect genuine self-expression. As one participant said, “I hate her BeReals. I’m like, You’re defeating the whole purpose of the platform’ and it annoys me to see it… she’s unaware that we can see that she’s retaken it nine times.”‘You’re defeating the whole purpose of the platform’ and it annoys me to see it… she’s unaware that we can see that she’s retaken it nine times.” 

Authenticity on BeReal is shaped by both platform constraints and social norms that emerge among users. Pinch and her colleagues found that while social media apps can push for authenticity through strict platform design, eventually, these features will clash with users’ need for control of how they present themselves online. For sociologists, this study offers another example of the enduring relevance of Erving Goffman’s insights on the presentation of self and impression management. 

A small pile of piles next to a stack of money, by Kaboompics.com is licensed under Pexels License

Over the past two decades, insurance coverage for gender affirming healthcare has rapidly expanded. Gender affirming care includes surgical, hormonal, or other care that enables patients to physically present as the gender they identify with. For example, genital modification, facial feminization surgery, chest reconstruction, hormone replacement therapy, voice modification, and more. However, insurance generally only covers care that is “medically necessary” (allowing the individual to be perceived as a certain gender), rather than “cosmetic” (enhancing attractiveness). So how do insurers decide what care is medically necessary?

To study this process, Tara Gonsalves examined national health insurance plans published between 2002 and 2022. The plans detail which gender-affirming care procedures are considered medically necessary vs. cosmetic, along with the insurer’s reasoning for that decision. Individuals who undergo a procedure defined as cosmetic—and subsequently denied coverage—can submit an appeal to a review board to argue that the procedure was medically necessary. Gonsalves also examined 225 of these appeals that were filed between 2009 and 2019.

Starting in 2009, no appeals were approved. But, 6 years later more appeals were approved than denied—signaling a substantial shift in what counted as “medically necessary.” Gonsalves found that, in order to distinguish between medically necessary and cosmetic procedures, insurers started defining which parts of the body are gendered and what features are masculine or feminine.insurers started defining which parts of the body are gendered and what features are masculine or feminine.

However, Gonsalves also found that the decision-making processes for appeals relied heavily on stereotypes of an ideal male or female body. For example, in a case involving facial feminization procedures, a reviewer described “softer” noses, prominent cheekbones, and narrower chins as feminine features. Reviewers tended to judge individuals against the ideal of a white, thin body, ignoring differences across age, weight, race, and other variations. 

Expanding insurance coverage has made care more affordable and accessible for transgender individuals. The increasing visibility of transgender and nonbinary individuals can challenge the male/female gender binary. At this same time, this study highlights how using gendered stereotypes as the justification for gender affirming care is also reaffirming societal gender norms. 

Three social media message bubbles with blurred graphics. Image by author, Jordyn Wald.

Racist talk among conservatives has long been divided by scholars into two main types: forms of which are “overt” (open and direct) and those which are more “covert” (hidden, subtle, or coded). However, Marcus Brooks finds that since George Floyd’s murder in 2020, a new form of race talk may be emerging in conservative online spaces. It is what he calls “color-blind nationalism.”

In order to conduct the study, Brooks analyzed comments from conservative spaces on TikTok, YouTube, and Twitter. He focused on two main cases: conservative views on Critical Race Theory (CRT) and reactions to the rebranding of products like Aunt Jemima pancake mix in response to concerns about racial stereotypes. 

Brooks finds that in these online spaces conservatives talk about race and about Black Americans in particular, in a way that pushes back against woke culture and promotes traditional American values. Some characteristic tropes or themes of this new racial talk include:

• Ingroup and Outgroup Boundaries: Conservatives try to bring Black Americans into their “ingroup” by framing liberals and Democrats as the corrupt “outgroup” – positioning themselves as the protectors of historical truth. For example, one commenter claims, “the Left has been whitewashing their racist past” and “blaming Republicans for their sins.” 
• Shared Threat and Racial Protection: Conservatives position themselves as protecting Black Americans from the liberal “victimhood” messaging. For example, claiming liberals “teach black children they’re inherently victims” and asks, “u want children thinking they’re victims?” They suggest instead the focus should be on values like self-discipline, responsibility, and hard work.
• Unity Through Shared American Values: Conservatives focus on creating a shared American identity based on values like family, patriotism, and independence, rather than race. For example, a Black commentator defends Aunt Jemima, urging the “woke crowd” to “Leave Auntie Jemima alone” and using hashtags like “#DemocratsDividingAnd DestroyingAmerica.” Another commenter called for Aunt Jemima’s return, suggesting that the left is out of touch.

Brooks’s study explores how this “colorblind nationalism,” with its emphasis on unity and shared values, may be reshaping debates about race and racism and their focal role in the broader culture wars that continue to wrack the nation.

A father and his three children wearing surfing wetsuits, running on a beach. Photo by Kampus Production under Pexels license.

Gendered work and family patterns among couples in the financial elite may be contributing to our widening socioeconomic divide. The unexpected recent growth in traditional arrangements, in which men work while women stay at home, offers clues as to why. That’s according to new research by Dr. Jill Yavorsky and her colleagues. 

The researchers analyzed longitudinal survey data from the Survey of Consumer Finances, which measures trends in household finances and labor dynamics across 108,854 different-gender, married households. By capturing both income and wealth over three decades, this data provides more nuance into the different sub-group dynamics among the most wealthy. 

The financial elite consist of three groups: the top 1% “super-rich”; the top 10% “rich”; and the top 20% “upper-middle-class”. These categories are based on both income and net worth. In addition to a “traditional” division of labor, the authors identify a “neo-traditional” division of labor if the husband works full-time and the wife works part-time. In a “dual-earner” household, both partners work full- or part-time.

The authors find that super-rich couples were more likely to engage in traditional divisions of labor, in which female partners oversee the home and domestic duties while the male partner works. Examining net worth, measured as all assets minus debts, revealed a larger gap between super-rich (53%) and rich couples’ (27%) traditional household arrangements. Looking at both wealth and income is critical to understanding the intergenerational transmission of status hierarchies. 

IDespite women’s increased workforce participation and the rise of dual-earner households across the bottom 99% over the last three decades, the prevalence of traditional labor arrangements among the top 1% remains unchanged. Understanding why these arrangements remain so common among the super-rich could provide a clearer picture of the cultural dimensions of wealth inequality. Moreover, trends in elite family formation, including the growth in family size and the moral prestige of being a “good parent,” may make traditional labor arrangements the logical choice for families in the top 1%.[the growth in family size and the moral prestige of being a “good parent,” may make traditional labor arrangements the logical choice for families in the top 1%. In contrast, pressures to maintain status may lead both partners in rich or upper-middle-class couples into full-time employment. 

By tracing the gender dynamics at the top, this research helps us make sense of the recent developments in gender norms, including the “tradwife” movement. Considered against the backdrop of widening socioeconomic inequality and reversals in reproductive rights, these findings show the enduring cultural influence of the super-rich.