Public support for same-sex marriage has climbed dramatically in recent decades, but how have attitudes toward same-sex parents evolved? In a new study, Wendy D. Manning and Kristen E. Gustafson examined changes in public opinion on same-sex parenting over the past decade, comparing responses from the 2012 and 2022 General Social Survey (GSS). They find that acceptance of same-sex parents has increased dramatically across all demographics, though differences persist depending on political beliefs, religious affiliation, and geographic location.

In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively.In 2012, 46% of Americans agreed that same-sex female couples could parent just as well as heterosexual couples, and 43% said the same for same-sex male couples. By 2022, these numbers had risen sharply to 63% and 61%, respectively. Support increased across all demographic groups (sex, race/ethnicity, education, family background, age, parenthood status), including conservative and highly religious respondents, though at a slower pace and to a lower extent. 

The study found that while approval increased for both, Americans consistently showed greater acceptance of same-sex female parents than same-sex male parents. Regional differences were also persistent, with New England consistently reporting the highest levels of approval in both 2012 and 2022. The largest increase in support occurred in the East South Central region (Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi and Alabama), while the West North Central (Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota and Kansas) and Mountain States (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming) saw the smallest increases.

Even with these shifts in public opinion, Manning and Gustafson highlight a growing contradiction: even as more Americans support same-sex parenting, legal and political attacks on LGBTQ+ families persist. In 2023 alone, over 500 state-level bills targeting LGBTQ+ rights were introduced, some restricting adoption and parenting rights. Therefore, while broad social attitudes may be shifting toward greater inclusion, major structural barriers to family recognition and security remain entrenched in law and policy.

Manning and Gustafson’s findings provide an important update on attitudes toward same-sex parents, but they also raise important questions. If their basic legal rights are still under attack even as public support grows, what does this mean for LGBTQ+ families? 

What happens in a romantic relationship when things turn violent? The common reaction is “just leave him” or “call the police” – but there are often many other ways female victims resist. A recent interview study by Lynette Renner, Carolyn Hartley, and Knute Carter explored the strategies of resistance taken by 150 different victims of intimate partner violence.

The study identified six common strategies that victims used to cope with or respond to abuse. These included seeking formal support, such as staying in a shelter or calling a hotline, or informal support, such as turning to social networks by talking with family or friends. Some pursued legal assistance by contacting the police or filing charges, while others engaged in safety planning behaviors like hiding money or keys in preparation to leave. Acts of resistance, such as fighting back or ending the relationship, were also common, as were placating strategies, where victims tried to keep the peace or avoid the abuser to reduce conflict. Victims often engaged in one or more of these strategies simultaneously.

After reviewing the data, they concluded there were 4 different “types of victims” based on different patterns of use of the above paths:

• High Strategy Users (took all or almost all the above paths)
• Moderate Strategy Resisters (took primarily the resistance path)
• Moderate Strategy Placators (took primarily the placating path)
• Low Strategy Users (least likely to commit to one path, especially safety planning)

In short, women experiencing relationship violence navigate different paths when faced with critical decisions about their safety.women experiencing relationship violence navigate different paths when faced with critical decisions about their safety. To offer meaningful support, advocates, service providers, and policymakers must recognize each survivor’s unique combination of risks, resources, and responses.

Decades of research show that becoming a mother often leads to lower wages and fewer job offers, a phenomenon known as the “motherhood penalty.” Less attention has been given to how access to abortion – and the right to decide whether to carry a pregnancy to term – shapes women’s financial futures. A recent study by sociologists Bethany G. Everett and Catherine J. Taylor fills this gap by examining how abortion access – or its absence – influences women’s economic outcomes over time.

Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent to Adult Health, Everett and Taylor tracked participants over 24 years to analyze the financial effects of growing up under more or less restrictive state abortion policies. Their study found that women who lived in states with more restrictive abortion policies as teenagers were less likely to graduate from college, had lower incomes, and experienced higher levels of financial instability in adulthood.women who lived in states with more restrictive abortion policies as teenagers were less likely to graduate from college, had lower incomes, and experienced higher levels of financial instability in adulthood. For instance, women from states with more restrictive abortion policies were more likely to report falling behind on bills, facing eviction, and accumulating debt compared to those from states with less restrictive abortion policies.

Everett and Taylor also compared the economic trajectories of women who had abortions as teenagers to those who carried pregnancies to term. The researchers used a matching technique to pair women with similar characteristics to estimate how abortion affects socioeconomic outcomes. The results were stark: those who had abortions as teenagers were more likely to graduate from high school and college, had higher incomes, and reported greater financial stability in adulthood.

Everett and Taylor’s research shows that limited access to abortion is linked to long-term declines in education and economic stability. As the fight over abortion continues, their findings make clear that restricting abortion access isn’t just a threat to people’s health and autonomy – it can also impose hardship and deepen economic inequality.

As average temperatures rise around the world, more and more people are being exposed to heat waves. From 2000-2016, the number of people exposed to extreme and unusual temperatures grew by 125 million. And while temperature doesn’t discriminate, people do. In a recent paper published in the journal Demography, a team of authors found that in India people from marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat at work than people from dominant caste groups. They call this “thermal injustice.”

Caste is a complex social phenomenon found in many countries around the world which sorts people into social groups based on their ancestry. Researchers have long known that a person’s caste can influence many social opportunities and outcomes, such as what types of jobs they can get, how much money they can make, where they live, how long they live, and the quality of health care available to them. Now we can add risk of exposure to heat waves to the list.

The authors combined heat data from satellite imagery with data from a large survey. They focused on the heat waves that hit India during the summers of 2019 and 2022. While India is a large country with many climates, the temperature in Delhi, the national capital, reached 49°C (120°F) in May 2022. The authors found that people from more marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat stress.The authors found that people from more marginalized caste groups were more likely to be exposed to heat stress. This association was still present after they controlled for age, gender, education and economic status.

The likelihood of being exposed to extreme heat can depend on many social factors, including your job. If you spend your days in an air-conditioned office, for example, you will be cooler than someone who works on a construction site. But the bottom line is that while the influence of caste on India’s job market may be decreasing, most people who do physical labor outdoors come from marginalized caste groups. Thus, as heat-related public health initiatives in India are developed, caste and thermal injustice should be front and center.

“Housework” by pasukaru76 is marked with CC0 1.0.

Today, researchers estimate that women do twice as much housework as men. While the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor shrank substantially over the second half of the 20th century, it stabilized in the mid-1990s, with women still shouldering a larger amount of housework and childcare. So what do these twentieth-century trends mean for the division of domestic labor in the twenty-first century? Who’s doing the housework and childcare in American households today?

Melissa Milkie and colleagues answer these questions using time diary data from the American Time Use Survey. This survey captures married men and women’s time spent on daily housework and childcare activities and the researchers focused on changes in the data between 2003 and 2023. Overall, the authors found that while married women still do more housework and childcare than married men, the gender gap has gradually narrowed over the twenty-first century. 

The biggest change in housework was found in men’s increased participation and women’s decreased participation in traditionally “feminine” tasks like cooking, cleaning, and laundry. In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease.In 2003, married women spent 4.2 times as many hours on these core housework tasks as married men, but today that ratio has dropped to 2.5 times – a 40% decrease. 

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated these shifts. In 2020, both men and women increased their housework time. By 2023, women’s average housework time returned to pre-pandemic levels, while men maintained their higher housework involvement. Men’s increased participation in core housework activities like cooking and cleaning since the pandemic marks an important shift in their behavior – signaling greater gender convergence in traditionally feminine tasks. Lastly, the gender gap in childcare also notably shrank slightly between 2003 and 2023. Women average 1.8 hours of childcare per day compared to men’s 1 hour, the smallest gender gap in childcare time recorded in the past 60 years

The authors also explored why these shifts were happening. Married women’s reduced housework time can be attributed to broader population shifts over the 21st century, primarily increased income and education among women. From 2003 to 2023, married men started doing more housework, likely because ideas about gender roles at home changed and partners began expecting a more equal share of chores. The pandemic period, in particular, signals a crucial moment in the twentieth century for changes in men’s unpaid domestic labor, with married men and fathers increasing and maintaining their hours in domestic labor. 

While the pace of change has slowed and women still do more, the gender gap in unpaid domestic labor time is shrinking – primarily driven by married men’s increased time and married women’s decreased time in traditionally feminine housework tasks. This study suggests that the gender gap in domestic labor has not stalled, but rather changed in significant ways as gender roles continue to evolve and adapt in twenty-first-century couples.    

“Gay pride 164 – Marche des fiertés Toulouse 2011.jpg” by Guillaume Paumier is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Over the past decade, the number of adults in the United States who identify as LGBTQ+ has more than doubled. At the same time, the number of terms describing people’s sexualities and gender identities has increased as well, and continues to evolve. Given these changes, how do LGBTQ+ people decide which labels to use when describing or disclosing their identities?

In a new study, researchers Holmes and Ghaziani sought to understand how LGBTQ+ people make sense of the different identity labels available to them. Through interviews with LGBTQ+ adults around Vancouver (most of whom were in their 20s), the researchers found most respondents used more than one label to define their sexuality. Most commonly, these respondents described themselves as both “queer” and either “gay”, “bisexual”, or “pansexual”. Some respondents used a series of labels to define their identity, offering descriptions like “nonbinary, queer, bisexual, gray-sexual, and aromantic.”

Additionally, some LGBTQ+ people in this study reported using different identity labels in different situations to avoid potential confusion or conflict. For example, some people would use better-known terms – such as “gay”, “lesbian”, or “bisexual” – when communicating their identities to older or more conservative people. As one respondent described, “I pretty much just stick to ‘queer’ [in Vancouver], but when I’m in Texas, my dad is – he doesn’t understand, really, so for him, it’s ‘gay’.”“I pretty much just stick to ‘queer’ [in Vancouver], but when I’m in Texas, my dad is – he doesn’t understand, really, so for him, it’s ‘gay’.”

Some respondents also discussed using different labels in interactions with other LGBTQ+ people to avoid potential in-fighting over the legitimacy of their identity. As one person described, “I will use gay, queer, or bisexual depending on who I’m speaking to…When I’m speaking to someone like a lesbian or someone in the queer community, I’ll call myself queer, because I still have that fear that I’m seen as less gay or less deserving of being in that space.”

These findings highlight that how people express their identities often varies across situations. To try to help interactions run smoothly, LGBTQ+ people discussed adjusting the identity labels they used based on their audience. This reflects classic insights from the sociologist Erving Goffman: that identities are not stable internal constructions, but evolve and are negotiated in social interactions.

In the United States, most workers abide by an unspoken taboo against discussing pay with coworkers. This cultural norm is paired with explicit, formalized bans on talking about compensation in some workplaces. However, “pay talk” matters.  If workers know how much they are paid relative to their peers, they can decide whether they are being paid fairly and have more agency to negotiate pay.  But when workers can’t talk about pay, they lose this bargaining leverage, which makes it easier for supervisors to maintain pay inequality. 

To explore these dynamics, authors Patrick Denice, Jake Rosenfeld, and Shengwei Sun analyzed when and why workers discuss pay, using a survey amongst Americans working primarily in the private sector (for-profit businesses, like retail stores, restaurants, and tech companies) and the government. They find that the likelihood of workers discussing pay together depends on both the official rules of an organization and cultural, interpersonal matters, like workers’ trust in management. 

Most public sector, government employers (which include sites like the Department of Veterans Affairs, public universities, and public hospitals) publicize their pay scales, making it easier for workers to assess their pay relative to their peers. On the other hand, only about 10% of private establishments publicize pay. Not surprisingly, private sector workers in this survey were more likely to discuss pay than government employees, reflecting the importance of interpersonal resources and networks when official information is scarce. Even without formal barriers, cultural norms are powerful in shaping whether or not workers will discuss pay; in organizations where pay discussions are not banned, less than half of workers discussed pay with each other. 

The authors also pointed out instances when these norms and formal rules are broken. In these cases, workers recognized that they may need to violate rules to leverage higher pay. Younger workers were more likely to violate pay talk bans, reflecting a generational shift regarding norms that perpetuate workplace power divisions.Younger workers were more likely to violate pay talk bans, reflecting a generational shift regarding norms that perpetuate workplace power divisions. Workers who planned to ask for a raise within the next year were also likely to violate bans on pay talk, demonstrating how critical career transitions necessitate rule-breaking when formal processes lack helpful information. On the other hand, violations of pay talk bans were less common among workers who reported positive relationships with their managers.

Ultimately, most workers who resist implicit norms and break norms and rules do so in pursuit of fair wages, thus challenging pay inequality and traditional power dynamics at work.

An array of colors arranged in a shape of a thought bubble. Photo by author, Jordyn Wald.

How do Americans define discrimination? Lauren Valentino and Evangeline Warren reveal that it’s not as clear-cut as we might expect. Through interviews and a nationally representative survey, they found that Americans don’t exactly share the same ideas on what “counts” as discrimination—much less racism, sexism, or classism—and these differences aren’t random. 

According to Valentino and Warren, Americans view discrimination through different lenses, depending on whether they’re thinking about racism, sexism, or classism. These lenses guided respondents in deciding whether an act qualified as discrimination:

• Intentionality: Some participants believe that discrimination requires a clear intent to harm. If an act was unintentional, they didn’t view it as discrimination. 
• Unequal treatment or outcomes: Some participants felt that discrimination only occurs when someone is directly targeted and treated unequally. Others saw it through unequal outcomes—where past barriers still limit opportunities for certain groups today, regardless of intent. 
• Power imbalances: Some participants viewed discrimination as tied to structural power imbalances. This means that certain groups have held more power over time, making discrimination a persistent issue rather than isolated incidents.

When it came to types of discrimination, most participants thought racism required intentional actions and targeted unequal treatment. In contrast, sexism and classism were more often seen as unintentional or rooted in unequal outcomes. While all three forms of discrimination were connected to systemic power imbalances, participants linked racism and sexism more closely to historical dynamics, whereas classism was seen as a more contemporary, pervasive issue.

Demographics also determined different definitions. Younger participants and Democrats, for example, were more likely to define discrimination in terms of unequal outcomes, regardless of intent, whereas Republicans and older respondents often emphasized intentionality.Younger participants and Democrats, for example, were more likely to define discrimination in terms of unequal outcomes, regardless of intent, whereas Republicans and older respondents often emphasized intentionality. Women and nonbinary individuals focused on power imbalances and structural inequalities, while men tended to view discrimination as isolated instances of unequal treatment. Black and Hispanic respondents highlighted disparities in outcomes, whereas white participants were more concerned with intent. Additionally, those with lower incomes were more likely to interpret discrimination through the lens of power imbalances compared to wealthier individuals.

In the end, what “counts” as discrimination depends on who you ask and what type of discrimination is under question—but one thing’s clear: Americans aren’t just discussing definitions; they’re grappling with varied and dynamic perspectives on power, fairness, and inequality. 

A line of wind turbines alongside a long bike path. “Eemmeerdijk” by Floris M. Oosterveld is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

Which do you value more: the environment or the economy? And do you know how much money your government spends on environmental protection? In a recent paper, two Norwegian scholars tried to find out how a country’s level of environmental spending relates to its residents’ views on whether the environment or the economy is more important. They argue that when countries spend more money protecting the environment, it creates a feedback loop that reduces people’s willingness to prioritize the environment over the economy.

Marthe Holum and Tor Jakobsen looked at data on environmental spending and public opinion across 27 countries from 1995 to 2019. Among those, the country-year with the highest environmental spending was the Netherlands in 2012, which spent 1.59% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on environmental protection in that year. The lowest was Lithuania in 1997, when that country spent 0.13% of their GDP.

The researchers then combined this spending data with surveys that asked people whether they thought growing the economy or protecting the environment should be a greater priority. They found that, in countries with higher levels of environmental spending, their public was less likely to support prioritizing the environment over the economy.in countries with higher levels of environmental spending, their public was less likely to support prioritizing the environment over the economy. This effect was especially impacted by people who expressed relatively less trust in government. The authors suggest that people may be less likely to support prioritizing the environment when their government’s spending exceeds their desired threshold. This interpretation corresponds with the “thermostatic” model of public opinion, which predicts that people’s opinions on government spending will move in the opposite direction of actual spending – or, in this case, whether they believe the current climate policies are already “too hot” or “too cold.”

Abraj Al Bait Towers in Mecca with Crowd by jimmy papaziad is licensed under CC BY 2.0 in pexels.

Conversations in American public life can often further negative stereotypes of Islam and Muslim communities as repressive, misogynistic, and patriarchal. In an interview-based study with 80 men and women American Muslims, Eman Abdelhadi and Anna Fox highlight the diversity of gender beliefs in this group, emphasizing that American Muslims make sense of gender while facing negative stereotypes and blatant Islamophobia. For many American Muslims, navigating external Islamophobic perceptions becomes part of how they understand gender in their own lives. 

Most American Muslims interviewed in this study showed two different positions; the first gender ideology group was critical of stereotypes of Islam as inherently repressive and patriarchal. This group believes that Islamic doctrines and history reflect that men and women have naturally different social roles and capacities. They may interpret Islamic doctrine and practices as appreciative of natural differences in the skills of men and women. Generally, however, this group did not believe that the gender differences reflected in Islamic doctrines and practices translate into gender inequality, challenging mainstream perceptions of Islam as repressive.

The second group responded to stereotypes differently. These respondents tended to highlight narratives of repressive gender relations and practices in their Muslim communities. Yet, this group focused their critiques of patriarchy on their Muslim communities, while implicitly assuming or explicitly stating that Western and secular society is fundamentally gender egalitarian. In contrast to the first group, who did not see the separation of men and women in Islamic doctrine as an obstacle to equality, this second group evaluated the gender divides in Islamic doctrine and practice as inherently negative. At the same time, these respondents faced a dilemma, acknowledging that condemning their communities as patriarchal could contribute to or confirm negative stereotypes of Islam. 

Abdelhadi and Fox explain that anti‑Muslim bias affects Muslim Americans’ daily lives. It shapes how they act in their communities and even changes how they think about gender, because outside ideas slip into their own views.