Two weeks ago, I wrote a Brief Summary of Actor Network Theory. I ended it by saying,
My next post will focus on ANT and AR’s different historical accounts of Western society’s relationship to technology. While Latour claims “We Have Never Been Modern” we at Cyborgology claim “we have always been augmented.” I will summarize both of these arguments to the best of my ability and make the case for AR over ANT.
The historical underpinnings of ANT are cataloged in Laotur’s We Have Never Been Modern and are codified in Reassembling the Social. I will be quoting gratuitously from both.
In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour comments on a debate between the political philosopher Thomas Hobbes and natural philosopher Robert Boyle. Latour describes the debate this way:
After Hobbes has reduced and reunified the Body Politic, along comes the Royal Society to divide everything up again: some gentlemen proclaim the right to have an independent opinion, in a closed space, the laboratory, over which the State has no control. And when these troublemakers find themselves in agreement, it is not on the basis of a mathematical demonstration that everyone would be compelled to accept, but on the basis of experiments observed by the deceptive senses, experiments that remain inexplicable and inconclusive.
Hobbes (and Latour) do not like this separation of terms. Nature and society must be regarded as one thing. For Hobbes, taking nature out of society meant there was no clear authority on the workings of nature. One could only persuade others to agree on the same interpretation of sensory input. For Latour, the problem lies with drawing a hard line between what is social and what is natural. The hallmark of “Modernity”, according to Latour, is the rhetorical separation of nature (things) from society (citizens). Nature and society have never been separate, we just talk about them that way. What we need to start talking about are sociotechnical “hybrids” that bridge the human and nonhuman.
At this point, you may expect Latour to cite Haraway or at least position his own views on hybridity in relation to this prominent author. We have Never Been Modern, was published just two years after the Cyborg Manifesto.But, he engages Haraway in only the most shallow of terms. As Harding notes,
Donna Haraway gets perhaps three or four mentions in the two books to be discussed here. Valuable as her work is, such a tiny citation record is not sufficient to count as engagement with feminist science studies. His work is uninformed by Haraway’s arguments or those of any other feminist science theorist. He specifically discounts the value of what he refers to as “identity politics,”including many of the new social movements which have produced feminist and postcolonial science studies.
Instead, Latour (Reassembling the Social, p. 110) wants us to consider “nature” and “society” as “two collectors that were invented together largely for polemical reasons, in the 17th century.” This invitation to do away with nature and society, has to do with rhetorically and ontologically granting scientists the ability to see “things in themselves.” In other words, Latour believes that, when Enlightenment thinkers set up the “collectors” of nature and society, what they were really doing was limiting us to talking about our perceptions of nonhuman actors; their properties as objects, not their potentiality as subjects.
It is worth noting that there are precious few ANT analyses of information technology. This might be part of a larger problem that I have mentioned before: that Science and Technology studies is better equipped to talk about wooden planes than the Internet. But I also suspect that it is because when we really try to explain what is happening when a teenager deletes all of their Facebook posts every night ANT does not let us get anywhere new.
It is worth noting that Reassembling the Social does not even list “Internet” in the index. Beyond a few tentative steps into assessing ANT’s effectiveness as an Information Systems approach, there is almost no ANT literature that tries to describe what is happening on the Internet. In my summary two weeks ago, I demonstrated how ANT could describe wifi troubles at OWS. That description might have been semantically interesting, but it did not provide any kind of new or useful insight. Collins and Yearley said something similar when criticizing ANT’s ability to provide deep insight: When you strip away ANT’s provocative vocabulary, you are really left with nothing more than an “old-fashioned scientific story…The language changes, but the story remains the same.” I would suspect that an ANT analysis would result in nothing more interesting than the kind of uncritical analysis that Evgeny Morozov rightfully criticized in The New Republic back in October.
It may seem as though Augmented Reality (AR) is doing nothing more than extending ANT into the realm of the digital and the networked, but that is simply not the case. AR does something much different.
First, as the title of the blog suggests—we are deeply rooted in the project that Haraway started and that Latour largely ignores. This is evidenced most clearly in PJ’s piece on Trust and Complexity, the work we presented on the Cyborgology panel at #TtW2011, and Nathan’s piece on Digital Dualism versus Augmented Reality. It is clear that we are saying that technology is social, but not that the categories ought to be thrown out altogether. We are, instead, fascinated by the co-construction of society and technology and the new and complicated relationships they engender.
Second, as our subject matter shows, we are deeply committed to understanding this co-constructed world in terms of social justice, equality, and the emancipatory potentials of various socio-technical assemblages. This is seen in our continuing coverage of augmented revolution (both in the past as well as the present), Jenny Davis’ work on the gendering of Siri, and Dave Paul Strohecker’s posts on prosthetics and depictions of disability in the media. My work in gender and online cooking shows, mobile information systems in the developing world, augmented warfare, and the changing landscape of surveillance and sousveillance have also been motivated by topics that ANT shows little interest in.
Finally, in a reflexive turn, I want to acknowledge how we situate ourselves in relation to our interlocutors (i.e., versus Latour’s relationship to his subjects). The authors of Cyborgology have always tried to situate ourselves within our work. It is very personal work, in that we study cases we love, and we suspect that we love them because they are important in some way. We are developing a social theory of technology, using the very technology we aim to describe. Latour is totally absent from his own work, and it is by design. In his book Aramis: or, The Love of Technology Latour goes so far as to fictionalize and novelize his analysis so that he becomes but a character in a larger story. ANT says everything is connected in a seamless web, but when it comes to the author himself, he is always out of reach. Within that same book, he writes:
“You see, my friend, how precise and sophisticated our informants are,” Norbert commented as he reorganized his notecards. “They talk about Oedipus and about proximate causes . . . They know everything. They’re doing our sociology for us, and doing it better than we can; it’s not worth the trouble to do more. You see? Our job is a cinch. We just follow the players. They all agree, in the end, about the death of Aramis. They blame each other, of course, but they speak with one voice: the proximate cause of death is of no interest-it’s just a final blow, a last straw, a ripe fruit, a mere consequence.”
The larger project of Cyborgology has been to do the exact opposite. To say that information and communication technologies, broadly defined, have been under-theorized. The informants have much to tell us, but they do not provide the level of sophisticated analysis we need to fully understand what is going on here. We are bringing to bear, over a hundred years of social and political theory in hopes of better understanding how our information systems affect our social lives. In so doing, we believe that we can make both far better.
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Comments 23
Evgeny Morozov — December 15, 2011
I'd like to clarify that I don't think my critique of Internet intellectuals applies to Latour or ANT, to whom I take a VERY sympathetic view. I also used to think that big names in ANT have been shying away from the Internet for way too long but that's beginning to change (Latour's most recent paper is actually on social networking and data-mining ). ANT may not have articulated an interesting approach to the Internet (yet) but it's also the only theoretical I feel comfortable with using in my own work. (It may just be that the notion of the Internet is simply too big and too clumsy to begin with.) Personally, I think ANT theories would have been much more successful in popularizing its approach and convincing others to take it on if they focused on the Internet rather than on climate change, but that's a debate about tactics.
Now, my two cents about the substances of this post (and I apologies if I come out as a doctrinaire Latourian here!): you've been looking in the wrong places. We Have Never Been Modern is an early polemic and Reassembling the Social is more like a textbook about ANT than an attempt to merge ANT with political theory. To understand why Latour doesn't much engage with Harraway, look up his review of one of her books; he thinks she's modern, amodern, and postmodern at once - and he clearly believes it's two qualities too many (he also explicitly chides her for terrible writing - and for good reasons). And for why he doesn't really operate with categories that are common in modern sociology, you've got to read his papers on Gabriel Tarde. For the most part, he's doing exactly what he preaches - at minimum, we should grant him that!
By the way, if you want to see how ANT can co-exist with political theory and political philosophy, look at Latour's Politics of Nature and his (and Isabelle Stengers') writings on cosmopolitics, ecology, and modernization. Also check the work of Latour's student Noortje Marres (see, say, the most recent piece in Economy and Society; "Materials and devices of the public: an introduction"; she also has a book on climate change and object-oriented political theory out soon). All of this is part of a project that is much more ambitious and radical (for my money) that is traditional sociology but we probably disagree here.
Then, there are occasional gems that are completely overlooked. For my money, one little paper by Latour (google "What if We Talked Politics a Little") is the best critique of the open government movement anyone has ever written yet - including that Lessig piece - even though Latour never mentions open government or the Internet. So I wouldn't necessarily discard the value of ANT based on just two books that never aimed to solve the normative deficit problem. That piece by Collins and Yearley that you quote is from the early 1990s - lots of work on solving that gap has been done since then...
And then, of course, there is this very recent talk by John Law, who also argues that the crisis of normativity in ANT is completely overblown (google "Knowledge Places: or Putting STS in Its Place")
Evgeny
nathanjurgenson — December 15, 2011
Dave, you have done a convincing job here of laying out that ATN and more sociological, cultural, feminist, etc take on different problems (with augmented reality certainly being in the latter camp).
i think this is the first half of the analysis.
the work now is thinking about exactly *why* ATN does a bad job talking about, say, domination? or why it is not as fruitfully applied to social media? can the theory be usefully applied to new areas? what might be gained, if anything, by that? OR, is there something fundamental about the logic of theory that better suits it for certain types of topics and not others? what are those fundamental precepts.
well done!
Evgeny Morozov — December 15, 2011
>>>>"the work now is thinking about exactly *why* ANT does a bad job talking about, say, domination? "
I think the answer here is pretty obvious: ANT doesn't want to talk about domination as it doesn't want use the vocabulary of modern sociology -- it finds that vocabulary to be problematic and based on bad metaphysics.
The questions then are a) what does ANT offer in its place b) is it any good c) will ANT deliver better vocabulary/tools to think with? d) assuming c) is "yes", what are the costs of sticking to bad metaphysics/vocabulary in the meantime?...
David Banks — December 15, 2011
Thanks for the thoughtful comment Evgeny. I knew I'd be leaving myself open to criticism with the pieces I selected, and I'll follow up on some of the things you've suggested here. While I'm not necessarily looking to merge ANT with political theory, I'm more concerned with ANT's ability to challenge power. I haven't seen any evidence that it gives us the tools to critically question why or how power is arranged. I will read and/or re-read what you've mentioned above and look see if my judgement is outdated. Thank you again.
-db
Evgeny Morozov — December 15, 2011
>>>> "I haven’t seen any evidence that it gives us the tools to critically question why or how power is arranged."
do you have the same problem with Foucault or Deleuze? Latour does talk about power quite a bit in his writings, as he's often asked this very question, to which his response usually is: well, power is something to be explained and accounted for before one can even think of questioning it. Which kind of makes sense (at least to me), especially if you combine it with a close study of the role that materiality plays in politics (hence his concept of "dingpolitik").
PJ Patella-Rey — December 15, 2011
@Evgeny: Actually, I'd argue the more important question is: Who benefits when we shy away from addressing immediate practical problems because we are concerned about arcane metaphysical issues?
Sal Restivo — December 15, 2011
May I take the liberty of adding my voice here by drawing attention to my review of Politics of Nature, "Politics of Latour;" and my essay "Bruno Latour: The Once and Future Philosopher." Both can be accessed at salrestivo.org Latour has progressively left the planet earth and increasing inhabits a world of metaphysics in which it doesn't matter whether, for example, there is a politically relevant referent for "democracy" or not. The social in its more profound sense is not accessible to Latour, witness his telling preference for Tarde over Durkheim.
Joshua Comer — December 15, 2011
I am particularly invested in the contradictions in Latour’s idea of irreducibility (to quote Irreductions, “nothing is more complex, multiple, real, palpable, or interesting than anything else”), affirming and mapping the world as it stands, because that choice is his most consistent yet least tenable stance and it determines his ontology and politics. In terms of media, it designates a trend toward ideas of emergence and complexity in media with which I take issue.
To get at this via what has been discussed above, irreducibility for Latour depends on effacing a distinction between culture and nature as well as human and nonhuman. Latour collapses epistemology into ontology with this gesture. By this I mean that ANT does not endeavor to supplant an understanding of science as a practice which simply describes nature with an awareness of its social character, but rather does away with explanation to focus on the configuration of realities, following and nourishing connections while remaining indifferent to their social, political, or material character. This is ANT’s supposed strength – it permits us for instance to show that scientific work does not descend from any particular privileged relationship to the world, be that disciplinary insights or the font of genius. But it is also a fatal weakness.
To paraphrase Ray Brassier on Latour, an epistemology without metaphysics offers a labored explanation of nothing, and a metaphysics deprived of epistemology is blind speculation. The way things exhibit meaning has not been taken as directly constitutive of reality as it is with Latour since Aristotle, whose essentialism Latour drifts toward with his increasing use of an idea of “plasma” (it seems Sal has a good handle on this otherworldly transformation, so I’ll set my schoolboy thoughts aside). Latour leaves his meaningful world flat, making reality a system of simple and proliferating metaphors, a diversifying product of semantic resonance.
The consequences of Latour’s construction of a level semantic ground with at best a vanishing regard for questions of syntax is a complete blindness to the constraining and enabling reductions of mediation, conceptual or technological, leaving entirely inconsequential or (increasingly) mysterious what Latour calls “the rare conduits in which the social circulates,” a problem which David brings to mind for me in his post.
Replqwtil — December 16, 2011
Great post David! I just picked up Reassembling the Social after your last post, and I have to say that I am enjoying it immensely. It definitely seems to be following the tradition of authors such as Foulcault, and even Baudrillard. (them again, I see Baudrillard in everything...) Very strong criticisms form both you and PJ in the post and comments. I'm looking forward to reading more!
jeremy — December 16, 2011
hmmm, i'd probably fail this blog post if you turned it in as an essay, sorry. the prior one doesn't help either. you don't seem to really understand what actor network theory is or does and thus you are butchering it at best and reducing it to some conflation of network analysis theory and postmodern theory. it isn't either.
it is way, strongly allied with semiotics, of treating things at ontologically the same, and the reason we do that is precisely to make power or other relationships (the network) appear, because keeping them ontological different hides the power (relationships/network) in the differences.
the cyborg manifesto was first published in 1985 as an essay. that separates it from we have never been modern by 7 years or so.
go read griemas
Brent Voelker — December 18, 2011
I am not Latourian in the sense of being a devotee. In general, I endeavor to avoid commitment to any particular approach or domain of inquiry, as commitment to the "things we love" can constrain our thinking and our ability to critique (that is, our ability to clarify our metaphors and concepts, to evaluate the relations between their logical grounds and what is actually going on in the world). Nevertheless, there is a good deal in Latour that is useful. I agree with Evgeny's reply to your post: We Have Never Been Modern is not about Actor Network Theory at all. Rather, it is intended as a critique - a Foucauldian or, maybe better,Nietzschean genealogy - of the Nature/Society dichotomy in Western thinking. It does very little to explain or employ ANT. For that, you don't need to go any further than Science in Action, which deserves careful study however incomplete it might be.
You are right to criticize ANT as lacking, really, a serious account of power. Langdon Winner lumps Latour in with social constructivists ("On Opening the Black Box and Finding it Empty") primarily for that reason. But Latour is no social constructivist, and that is the point of Science in Action and ANT in general: although it does not account well for the differential power of various persons within a network (or an assemblage), what it does attempt to do is to better explain the politics of artifacts. The politics embedded in things encodes social power structures and reinforces them, even as the politics of people can transform those things - the very properties and not just our knowledge of things we might otherwise take to be fixed, concrete, and natural, like electrons, viruses, immune systems, or speed bumps. That we take them to be fixed and natural lies at the root of their social power. This sounds to some like social construction but adds the element of embedded politics that reflects back onto the network.
It is true that Latour's ANT is cartoonish and overly intentional; politics in the real world is far more subtle and more deeply psychological than his account would suggest. But Latour has been reformed and extended usefully, notably by Isabelle Stengers (The Invention of Modern Science) and Andrew Feenberg (Questioning Technology). I see no reason why ANT can't be applied to the study of information technologies. There certainly is a great deal of politics embedded in the smart phone, texting, social networking - we could go on. It might be that Latour does not treat these because he just isn't that interested in those particular domains of inquiry. In this post-industrial (mis)information age, we often conflate technology and IT, as though a loaf of bread were somehow natural and not a technology worthy of study. I once asked Mike Fortun why Foucault did so much with discourse and so little with things (which don't much participate in discourse). He replied that perhaps Foucault had enough to do just working out his piece; we can't all do everything. That certainly doesn't make Foucault useless; far from it! Foucault and Latour do what they do; it is up to us to extend them.
Latour may ignore Haraway for personal - perhaps egotistical - reasons as much as intellectual ones. Like the Pasteur he "discovered," (see The Pasteurization of France or, for a more brief tutorial, "Give Me a Laboratory and I Will Raise the World" in the Science Studies Reader) one driving force behind Latour's project is to make himself, and not Haraway or anyone else, an obligatory point of passage for scholars in his field.
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