Over the holidays, many people gave back to their communities by donating goods or services to their favorite charitable organizations. This annual “giving season” is a crucial time for many nonprofits, so much so that a 2011 Nonprofit Fundraising Survey reported that half of the surveyed nonprofits received one quarter of their contributions between October and December. Typically, individual households, rather than private corporations or businesses, are the main contributors. In fact, individual giving to the nonprofit sector amounted to $258 billion in 2014.

Research suggests that people with greater education and financial resources, as well as extended social networks, are more likely to give to charities. However, the appearance of increased generosity among people with large social networks may be the result of simply receiving more solicitations for donations or strong ties to religious social networks that promote charitable giving. Likewise, individuals who are more involved in civic organizations and report higher levels of social (i.e. neighbors, co-workers) and racial trust are also more likely to give.

• Pamala Wiepking and Ineke Maas. 2009. Resources That Make You Generous: Effects of Social and Human Resources on Charitable Giving. Social Forces 87(4).
• Arthur Brooks. 2005. Does Social Capital Make You Generous? Social Science Quarterly 86 (1): 1-15.

Religious identification is strongly related to giving to religious charities, as might be expected, but families that increase their religious giving also tend to increase their secular giving. However, some religious denominations are more prone to secular giving than others. People belonging to denominations with centrally-controlled charities (such as Mormons) may be more likely to view their religious donations as a substitution for other secular charities than people who are affiliated with denominations whose charities are less financially structured (such as Baptists). Further, secular and religious causes often compete for our time and resources, and so giving to and volunteering for religious charities can reduce secular giving simply due to time constraints and competing commitments. However, in general, religious and secular giving are complements rather than substitutes for one another.

• Namkee G. Cho and Diana M Dinnitto. 2012. Predictors of Time Volunteering, Religious Giving, and Secular Giving: Implications for Nonprofit Organizations. Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 39 (2): 93-120.
  
• Penny Edgell Becker and Pawan Dhingra. 2001. Religious Involvement and Volunteering: Implications for Civil Society. Sociology of Religion 62: 315-335.
• Jonathan P. Hill and Brandon Vaidyanathan. 2011. Substitution or Symbiosis? Assessing the Relationship between Religious and Secular Giving. Social Forces 90(1): 157-180.

Want to know more about the social science of charitable behavior? Check out this TROT for a summary of research on the psychological and sociological predictors of volunteering.

Originally published Sept. 13, 2016

Earlier this summer, a California judge sentenced Brock Allen Turner to 6 months in jail for the sexual assault of an unconscious 23-year-old woman because the judge believed a harsher punishment would “have a severe impact on him.” After Turner’s father referred to his son’s actions as “20 minutes of action,” the survivor detailed the emotional aftermath of her assault and the revictimization during trial in a powerful impact statement. This sentencing decision and subsequent defending of Turner because of his university status, lack of criminal history, and “positive character” continue to strike public outrage, as he was released from jail after serving 3 months. Feminist scholars have long addressed the pervasiveness of rape culture and help us pinpoint how it reproduces notions that only “bad guys” commit “real rape.”

Police and prosecutors often make decisions to arrest and charge suspects based upon characteristics of “real rape” –  rapes that involve strangers, weapons, and physical force. These depictions of sexual assault suggest only “bad guys” rape and that victims must physically resist and show their injuries to prove it. Empirical studies illustrate that acquaintances perpetrate the vast majority of rapes and include little, if any, physical injury. Still, rape and sexual assault continue to be characterized by under-reporting and high attrition rates.

• Susan Estrich. 1987. Real rape. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Cassia Spohn and Katharine Tellis. 2014. Policing and Prosecuting Sexual Assault: Inside the Criminal Justice System. Lynne Reiner Publishers: Boulder, CO.

Some men convicted of rape deny their actions by portraying the victim as the true sexual aggressor and themselves as the victim. In one study, men argued that the victim said no when she really meant yes, initiated the sexual contact, and even enjoyed the sexual contact once she relaxed. Other men acknowledged their actions as rape but provided excuses, citing drugs and alcohol, emotional problems, and a brief lapse in judgement from their otherwise “nice guy” persona as the true source of the victim’s rape.

• Diana Scully and Joseph Marolla. 1984. “Convicted Rapists’ Vocabulary of Motive: Excuses and Justifications.” Social Problems 31(5): 530-544.

Perhaps one reason myths of the pathological rapist persist within the criminal justice system is the expectation that women and girls should accept sexual violence and aggression from men as normal in their everyday interactions. In a recent study, adolescent girls often described their experiences of harassment and sexual violence with men and boys as normal “because they do it to everyone.”

• C.J. Pascoe. 2007. Dude You’re a Fag: Masculinity and Sexuality in High School. Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Heather R. Hlavka. 2014. “Normalizing Sexual Violence: Young Women Account for Harassment and Abuse.” Gender & Society 28(3): 337-358.

For more on rape culture and its consequences, see this TROT on the revictimization of rape victims, this piece on pop music and rape culture, and these stats on rape and sexual assault in the U.S.

For many people, the holiday season is a time to spend with family. However, for individuals who practice polyamory, the holidays can be difficult to navigate, from having to attend several gatherings, to explaining multiple partners to family members. The term polyamory is generally used to describe consensual, emotionally intimate relationships between more than two people, though it is not the only type of non-monogamy. While poly relationships have certainly existed for some time, media outlets recently started featuring articles on the topic, including helpful terms and describing how poly relationships deal with jealousy.

Social scientists are particularly interested in the fluid nature of poly relationships and how those practicing polyamory define their identities and behaviors. Many people who practice polyamory emphasize love, intimacy, and friendship. Contrary to many monogamous folks, non-sexual relationships like friendships sometimes become more important than sexual relationships for poly folks. Likewise, some people who practice polyamory distinctly differentiate poly from casual sex or swinging, while others consider any non-monogamous behavior to be part of polyamory.

• Christian Klesse. 2006. “Polyamory and Its ‘Others’: Contesting the Terms of Non-Monogamy.” Sexualities 9(5): 565–83.
• Elisabeth Sheff. 2014. The Polyamorists Next Door: Inside Multiple-Partner Relationships and Families. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Some scholars and practitioners consider polyamory a sexual orientation or identity, while others argue polyamory should be viewed as a “strategy of sexual expression.” For instance, poly relationships are one way for bisexual women to visibly express their sexual identity to others. While polyamorous relationships are a way for both men and women to explore their sexuality, for women this often means the ability to embrace multiple partners and high sex drives, defying sexual double standards that stigmatize women for having many sexual partners.

• Margaret Robinson. 2013. “Polyamory and Monogamy as Strategic Identities.” Journal of Bisexuality 13(1): 21–38.
• Christian Klesse. 2005. “Bisexual Women, Non-Monogamy and Differentialist Anti-Promiscuity Discourses.” Sexualities 8(4): 445–64.
• Elisabeth Sheff. 2005. “Polyamorous Women, Sexual Subjectivity and Power.” Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 34(3): 251–83.

From climate change to stem cell research, public discourse in the United States is highly divided about the legitimacy and authority of science. Depending on your views, it’s easy to dismiss the other side as uninformed or uneducated, but sociologists know that views about science are more complicated than that.

Despite common misconceptions that climate change skepticism is linked to education, trust in science has only a small correlation with educational attainment or scientific literacy.

• Nick Allum, Patrick Sturgis, Dimitra Tabourazi, and Ian Brunton-Smith. 2008. “Science Knowledge and Attitudes across Cultures: A Meta-Analysis.” Public Understanding of Science 17: 35–54.

Rather, distrust of science is closely linked to political and religious affiliations. Conservatives have the lowest level of trust in science; this holds true even among highly educated conservatives. As for religious folks, studies find that it is not necessarily that religious people completely distrust the scientific method, but rather they reject science’s influence on issues they see as a moral concern.

• Gordon Gauchat. 2012. “Politicization of Science in the Public Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010.” American Sociological Review 77(2): 167-187.
• John Evans. 2011. “Epistemological and Moral Conflict Between Religion and Science.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 50(4): 707-727.

However, research cautions against thinking about trust in science as simply a liberal versus conservative binary. A recent study offers a more complicated analysis, arguing that a third perspective defies this binary. This group, labeled “postseculars,” have more complicated views — they often trust science in certain domains, but distrust it in others, reflecting a much more complicated picture of how cleavages in social, political, and economic attitudes influence public opinion of scientific authority.

• Shiri Noy and Timothy L. O’Brien. 2016. “A Nation Divided: Science, Religion, and Public Opinion in the United States.” Socius 2:1-15.

The recent U.S. presidential election has everyone thinking about the role of media and religion in political life. From fake news to mainstream media spectacle, both the left and the right have been criticizing American journalism. White evangelical Christians also overwhelmingly broke for Trump, despite concern that he was not particularly pious himself. The intersection of politics, media, and religion is clear, but what can research tell us about how they interact?  Some of the best work suggests we can learn a lot by making an unexpected comparison: the role of religion and politics in the media in the United States and Africa.

First, political leaders across the globe use religious media in similar ways. Religious programming and discourse in the media creates new ways for people to use religion to signal their social status. Politicians in both the U.S. and countries like Nigeria have harnessed the power of these shows and their large audience numbers as a tool to publicly cultivate their spiritual image by integrating administrative goals with images of divine will.

• Ebenezer Obadare. 2006. “Pentecostal Presidency? The Lagos-Ibadan ‘Theocratic Class’ & the Muslim ‘Other’.” Review of African Political Economy 33(110): 665-678
• Stephen Ellis and Gerrie Ter Haar. 2007. “Religion and Politics: Taking African Epistemologies Seriously.” Journal of Modern African Studies 45(3): 385-401
• David Scott Domke and Kevin M. Coe. 2008. The God Strategy: How Religion Became a Political Weapon in America. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Second, religious leaders also use secular media outlets in similar ways. The political economy of the media both in Africa and the U.S. means that secular media organizations are willing to broadcast religious programs because they garner large audience numbers. Additionally, religious leaders embed themselves in the elite, administrative networks that run secular media outlets, political groups, and academic organizations to disseminate their messaging to both religious and non-religious audiences. This also means that religious media personalities are firmly ensconced in today’s globalized media and public culture that is characterized by a focus on media icons, spectacle, and a penchant for dramatization.

• Tamar Gordon and Mary Hancock. 2005. “‘The Crusade is the Vision’: Branding Charisma in Global Pentecostal Ministry.“ Material Religion 1(3): 386-404.
• Marleen De Witte. 2011. Business of the Spirit: Ghanaian Broadcast Media and the Commercial Exploitation of Pentecostalism. Journal of African Media Studies 3(2): 189-204.
• Michael Lindsay. 2008. Faith in the Halls of Power: How Evangelicals Joined the American Elite. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Studying media as a central category across different international cases provides fresh perspectives on religion, citizenship, authority, and political engagement.

• Rosalind Hackett, Anne Mélice, Steven Van Wolputte and Katrien Pype. 2014. “Interview: Rosalind Hackett Reflects on Religious Media in Africa.” Social Compass 16(1): 67-72.
• Stewart Hoover. 2011. “Media and the Imagination of Religion in Contemporary Global Culture.” European Journal of Cultural Studies 14(6): 610-625.

A major point of discussion after the 2016 U.S. election has been the fact that while many polls predicted a win for Hillary Clinton, she ultimately lost the electoral college. Numerous estimates showed a commanding lead for the Democratic candidate, but they were decidedly off when it came to calling the results on election night. People were quick to blame the pollsters for misinterpreting the results or collecting bad data, but social scientists point to methodological issues that plague almost every poll and survey that can help explain some of what happened in November. 

Often, issues with sample distribution are part of the problem. A common method within polling circles is “Random Digit Dialing” (RDD), where researchers make a list of potential phone numbers and take a random sample from that set. Next, they call those numbers and ask people to take their survey by phone. This method can create a coverage bias, which can exclude some groups or people from being part of the respondent pool — not everyone has a phone or is able to stop and take a survey via phone in the middle of the day. This means that any conclusions drawn from that sample cannot be used to make conclusions about the general population because it is not truly representative. To correct for this, some researchers use address-based sampling (ABS) to make a respondent pool by sending mail invites to randomly selecting home addresses. Sometimes, this method can elicit a higher response rate than RDD, but the research shows that both RDD and ABS tend to over-represent non-Hispanic whites and people with college educations. In short, it is difficult to get a representative sample. 

• Andy Peytchev, Lisa R. Carley-Baxter, and Michele C. Black. 2011. “Multiple Sources of Nonobservation Error in Telephone Surveys: Coverage and Nonresponse.” Sociological Research Methods 40(1): 138-168.
• Michael W. Link, Michael P. Battaglia, Martin R. Frankel, Larry Osborn and Ali H. Mokdad. 2008. “A Comparison of Address-Based Sampling (ABS) Versus Random-Digit Dialing (RDD) for General Population Surveys.” Public Opinion Quarterly 72(1): 6-27.

Another common set of problems with polling is with respondents themselves. Social desirability bias occurs when participants provide answers that they feel are more socially acceptable, even if they are not necessarily their true beliefs. Krumpal provides an overview of the various forces that drive social desirability bias and the impacts it can have on both survey results and the ways that researchers interpret the data. Another prominent issue is panel conditioning, which happens when a survey respondent is asked the same questions repeatedly overtime. Respondents will often change their answer each time, revealing how fleeting survey responses can be.

• Ivar Krumpal. “Determinants of Social Desirability Bias in Sensitive Surveys: A Literature Review.” 2013. Quality & Quantity 47(4): 2025-2047.
• John Robert Warren and Andrew Halpern-Manners. 2008. “Panel Conditioning in Longitudinal Social Science Surveys.” Sociological Methods & Research 41(4): 491-534.

Employees under strict attendance policies face a difficult choice when they are “technically” physically able to be present at work, but may not feel healthy enough to perform their job well. Debating whether or not to call in for the day, employees ask themselves not only if they feel sick, but if they seem sick enough to convince their superiors and coworkers. Talcott Parsons’ classic work on “the sick role” helps us understand why. Sickness inhibits a person’s ability to perform as others expect them to. However, people in the sick role are excused if their symptoms seem to be beyond their control and if they try to get better. Whether or not a person is really sick, taking on the sick role requires those around them to be convinced, granting the sickness legitimacy. Social science research shows how the ease of attaining the legitimated sick role differs depending on gender and class.

• Talcott Parsons. 1975. “The Sick Role and the Role of the Physician Reconsidered.” Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, Health and Society 53(3): 257-278.

More recent and critical research shows why taking the plunge and calling into work can be so difficult. First, a person has to ascertain whether they are truly sick by analyzing how their body feels, and whether or not certain symptoms constitute true illness in the eyes of others. The dripping nose and general malaise of a cold, for example, is never pleasant. Perhaps as children we might think it truly disrupts our daily routines. As we grow older, however, we learn what sociologists of health call illness behavior, which is how an individual interprets specific bodily symptoms (like those of a cold) and reacts to them. Adults learn that the proper reaction to a cold is taking some over-the-counter medicine and heading into work with a box of tissues. This means that learning to interpret the way your body feels is in large part a social process.

• J.T. Young. 2004 “Illness Behaviour: A Selective Review and Synthesis.” Sociology of Health & Illness 26(1): 1-31.
• David Mechanic. 1995. “Sociological Dimensions of Illness Behavior.” Social Science and Medicine 41(9): 1207-16.

Many working-class jobs perpetuate “toughing it out” illness behavior; employees often attribute moral value to being “hard working” and going into work no matter what. This comes with a set of beliefs about what constitutes real illness and what is mere laziness. Research finds that this kind of labor market shapes working mothers’ illness behavior. After developing a worker identity, working mothers often recognize physical symptoms as relatively unimportant compared to building a good reputation with their superiors and defending themselves from job insecurity. The economy, then, is at play when they assess how they physically feel. They then encourage their children to “tough out” common health problems. This learned behavior does not end when a child leaves home either – they are socialized into this practice and are likely to continue “toughing it out” when they are adults.

• Sarah Cunningham-Burley, Kathryn Backett-Milburn, and Debbie Kemmer. 2006. “Constructing Health and Sickness in the Context of Motherhood and Paid Work.” Sociology of Health & Illness 28(4): 385-409.
• Maria Carla Barnes, Rhiannon Buck, Gareth Williams, Katie Webb, and Mansel Aylward. 2008. “Beliefs About Common Health Problems and Work: A Qualitative Study.” Social Science & Medicine 67(4): 657-665.
• Claus D. Hansen and Johan H. Andersen. 2008. “Going Ill to Work.” Social Science & Medicine 67(6): 956-964.

The political consensus around free trade has taken a dramatic turn over the past year, with both Republicans and Democrats claiming to be critics after decades of largely agreeing on a pro-free trade agenda. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) passed with bipartisan support in the 1990s, but now Donald Trump attacks it as the “worst deal in history.” Trump’s critique of free trade as costing jobs and benefiting other countries contributed to his support among working class voters as his message tapped into dissatisfaction and economic dislocation. But to what extent have free trade agreements led to the loss of U.S. jobs and boosted the national economies of countries like Mexico or China? And how have these agreements impacted workers in the U.S. and corporate profits?

NAFTA was not a deal driven by the interests of Mexican companies and workers, but supported by U.S. investors to enable the movement of capital and finance by removing barriers to investment. This accelerated the multi-decade long process of eliminating economic regulations and increasing privatization. Most of the benefits from NAFTA have gone to large corporations and U.S. based companies. Meanwhile, smaller firms and Mexican companies have experienced increased competitive pressures and dwindling profits. Research has also shown that NAFTA contributed to increased income inequality and less class mobility in Mexico. Free trade has also weakened the power of national governments and strengthened the influence of international institutions like the IMF and World Bank.

• Nitsan Chorev. 2007. Remaking U.S. Trade Policy: From Protectionism to Globalization. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
• Malcolm Fairbrother. 2014. “Economists, Ccapitalists, and the Making of Globalization: North American Free Trade in Comparative-Historical Perspective.” American Journal of Sociology 119(5): 1324–1379.
• Emilio A. Parrado. 2005. “Economic Restructuring and Intra-Generational Class Mobility in Mexico.” Social Forces 84(2): 733–757.

NAFTA enabled corporations to move more freely between borders, but made it harder for people to move across borders. This has meant less cyclical migration between U.S. and Mexico, with the unintended consequence of more Mexican immigrants settling in the U.S rather than migrating back and forth.

• Patricia Fernández-Kelly and Douglas S. Massey. 2007. “Borders for Whom? The Role of NAFTA in Mexico-U.S. Migration.” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610(1): 98–118.

According to scholars, free trade has weakened the power of workers and their unions in both the U.S. and developing countries, which has contributed to lower wages and worse working conditions for all workers. Research on the apparel industry in particular has shown how NAFTA contributed to declines in wages, employment, and unionization in the U.S., while outsourced production in Mexico has poor working conditions and low pay. In particular, female workers in the global South endure exploitation in low-skilled manufacturing.

• Gary Gereffi, David Spencer, and Jennifer Bair. 2002. Free Trade and Uneven Development: The North American Apparel Industry After NAFTA. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
• Melissa W. Wright. 2006. Disposable Women and Other Myths of Global Capitalism. New York, NY: Routledge.
• Jennifer Bickham Méndez. 2005. From the Revolustion to the Maquiladoras: Gender, Labor, and Globalization in Nicaragua. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 

Free-trade agreements have largely had negative consequences for countries and companies in the global south, while larger, transnational, and more technically-advanced companies have benefited. Countries like the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica became dependent on export production and agriculture, which exposed them to fierce competition and downward pressures on wages with little broader economic development and a loss of internal domestic suppliers and markets. In Mexico, most of the new factories in the free-trade border zones are controlled by U.S. companies.

• Raúl Delgado Wise and James M. Cypher. 2007. “The Strategic Role of Mexican Labor Under NAFTA: Critical Perspectives on Current Economic Integration.” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 610(1): 119–42.
• Saskia Sassen. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

However, free trade also creates opportunities for new labor transnationalism. NAFTA led to cooperation among workers in the U.S., Canada, and Mexico by sparking joint efforts to improve labor protections in free trade agreements and creating legal mechanisms to bring complaints against corporations.

• Tamara Kay. 2011. NAFTA and the Politics of Labor Transnationalism. New York: Cambridge University Press.
• Jamie K. McCallum. 2013. Global Unions, Local Power: The New Spirit of Transnational Labor Organizing. Cornell University Press.

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments for Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, a case concerning allegations of racial bias in jury deliberations. Many states prohibit hearing juror testimony following the conclusion of a trial; however, following the deliberations of Peña-Rodriguez’s case, two jurors signed affidavits attesting to racial bias by a fellow juror. They allege that the juror referred to an alibi witness as discreditable because he was “an illegal,” and asserted that the defendant was guilty “because he’s Mexican.” After initially being struck down by both the trial judge and the Colorado Supreme Court, Peña-Rodriguez is now making his case to the highest court, a task which research suggests may prove extremely challenging.

In her book The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander illustrates why challenging racial bias in juries is so difficult. Despite the passage of laws such as Batson v. Kentucky, which prohibits prosecutors from discriminating on the basis of race when selecting juries, both prosecutors and defense attorneys are allowed peremptory strikes, or the ability to strike potential jurors for just about any reason they choose. Challenging instances of racial bias is even more difficult following the Supreme Court decision in Purkett v. Elm, which ruled that even if there is a pattern of striking a particular racial group by a prosecutor, providing any race-neutral reason (the prosecutor in this case used hair length) is enough to justify that the decision is not based on race.

• Nijole V. Benokaritis. 1982. Racial Exclusion in Juries. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 18(1), 29-47.
• Hiroshi Fukurai. Edgar W. Butler, & Richard Krooth. 1991. Where Did Black Jurors Go? A Theoretical Synthesis of Racial Disenfranchisement in the Jury System and Jury Selection. Journal of Black Studies, 22(2), 196-215.

Moreover, it is not just legal precedents that solidify racial bias, but also the initial selection process itself that is discriminatory. Potential jurors are drawn from registered voters or Department of Motor Vehicle lists, which contain fewer minorities. Forty-seven states also restrict the rights of felons to serve on juries, which disproportionately limits the presence people of color. Most states and the federal government place a lifetime exclusion for felonies, which automatically bans nearly 30 percent of adult black men from jury service.

• Brian C. Kalt. 2003. Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service. American University Law Review, 53, 1-149.
• Darren Wheelock. 2005. Collateral Consequences and Racial Inequality: Felon Status Restrictions as a System of Disadvantage. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 21(1), 82-90.

In short, jury selection is not only inherently racially biased, but many Supreme Court decisions appear to support a system of racial discrimination rather than dismantle it. As a result, legal precedents such as the rules of evidence may bolster, or at the very least shield, racial bias within jury deliberations.

Following successful shows like Daredevil and Jessica Jones, Netflix recently added Luke Cage to their TV Marvel universe. Cage portrays a black super-strong superhero whose skin is bulletproof. Set in contemporary Harlem, New York, the show portrays various black and Latino characters in prominent roles. Despite praiseworthy reviews and mainstream popularity, some critics expressed their disapproval of the predominantly non-white cast, claiming that the show is racist and that Cage’s portrayal is “too black.” While the increase in minority characters has been a major stride for equal on-air representation, previous sociological research suggests other problems and pitfalls remain.

From 1978 to 1989, the number of black characters on prime time television doubled. Yet, minority presence was more likely to be found in comedic roles, such as the Cosby Show, rather than dramas. While there were more depictions of black and white relationships, these relationships were featured in more formalized settings such as the workplace, whereas relationships among whites took place within informal settings such as the home.

• Russell H. Weigel, Eleanor L. Kim, and Jill L. Frost. 1995. “Race Relations on Prime Time Television Reconsidered: Patterns of Continuity and Change.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 25(3): 223-236.

Ethnic minority representation in the media has not suppressed the perpetuation of racist myths and stereotypes that further stigmatize these groups. While greater demand for blacks on TV were rooted in demands for social justice, subsequent television programs often over-depicted black criminality or problematized black culture. Latinos are also underrepresented in television, and when they are depicted, these portrayals are more likely to be more negative than portrayals of other racial groups. As a result, under-representation may lead audiences to believe that there are fewer minorities in the actual population.

• Herman Gray. 2013. “Subjected to Recognition” American Quarterly 65(4). 771-798.
• Valerie Adams-Bass. 2014. “Measuring the Meaning of Black Media Stereotypes and Their Relationship to the Racial Identity, Black History Knowledge, and Racial Socialization of African American Youth.” Journal of Black Studies 45(5): 367-395.
• Jake Harwood and Karen Anderson. 2002. “The Presence and the Portrayal of Social Groups on Prime-Time Television.” Communication Reports 15(2): 81-97.

Even programs like The Cosby Show that featured predominantly positive images of middle-class blacks can produce unintended consequences. Interviews with middle-class black families suggested that many viewed the doctor-lawyer duo between the Huxtable parents as a role model for the black community. On the other hand, many middle-class blacks criticized the show for depicting an unrealistic characterization of a black family that seemingly never endured any racial problems. Furthermore, these depictions of black middle-class families may have suggested to white audiences that blacks could make social and economic strides if they worked as hard as the Huxtables.

• Leslie B. Inniss and Joe R. Feagin. 1995. “The Cosby Show: The View from the Black Middle Class.” Journal of Black Studies 25(6): 692-711.