If you missed the Council on Contemporary Families’ “Families in Perilous Times: A Policy and Public Scholarship Workshop” this October in Baltimore, here’s a recap of the event.

The day began with opening remarks from CCF Chair Arielle Kuperberg, setting the stage for the discussions ahead. The first panel delved into abortion in the post-Dobbs era. Sameera Nayak shared compelling research on abortion access and family planning for immigrants amidst the current legal challenges. Aubrey Jackson Soller followed with an in-depth exploration of contested personhood in abortion legislation. Wrapping up the panel, Carole McCann examined the ways information about abortion circulates online.

The conversation continued with a panel addressing anti-LGBTQ legislation. Barbara Risman opened with a discussion of emerging trends in public policy affecting LGBTQ individuals. Jessica Fish shared her impactful research on LGBTQ youth health. stef shuster offered a thought-provoking analysis of how regret is weaponized against trans people. Finally, Kate Drabinski highlighted their community-based work on LGBTQ+ intergenerational storytelling as a justice practice.

The next panel tackled the pressing issue of student loans. Dan Collier explored how loan balances and payment plans impact the well-being of individuals enrolled in Public Service Loan Forgiveness programs. Fenaba Addo provided critical insights into the intersection of student debt and the value of higher education for Black borrowers. Joan Maya Mazelis and Arielle Kuperberg co-presented their findings on how residential independence and financial dependence after graduation are shaped by student loans. Kuperberg concluded the panel with her research on the implications of the student debt payment pause and its end on families.

The focus then shifted to immigration and families. Bethany Letiecq opened the panel by examining the impact of policy on Central American immigrant families’ daily lives. Zohra Ansari-Thomas presented her research on immigration and aging, while Vanessa Delgado offered insights into the stratified private safety nets of Latino/a immigrant families.

Two of the CCF Early Scholars also showcased their research. Mia Brantley discussed how Black women’s motherhood-related stress intersects with religion as a coping mechanism. Jamie O’Quinn shared her work on early marriage as a response to violence within families of origin.

The afternoon shifted toward practical workshops. Cameron Farrar introduced strategies for using TikTok and social media to make academic research accessible to the public. Elena van Stee provided a hands-on workshop on podcasting, and Alicia M. Walker, Editor in Chief of the CCF Blog, offered valuable advice on crafting blog posts. The session concluded with Joshua Coleman sharing expert tips on writing for mainstream audiences.

Attendees then collaborated on projects such as essays, blog posts, and op-eds or used the opportunity to network. The day concluded with a celebratory reception, where the 2024 CCF Awards were announced. Elena van Stee received the Graduate Student Public Scholar Award. Jessica Calarco earned the Public Scholarship Award. Barbara Risman was honored with the Lifetime Achievement Award, and Laurel Westbrook and stef shuster received the Research Translation Award for their blog post, “Finding Trans Joy in Families We Choose.”

Videos of the panels are available on the CCF YouTube Channel, while workshop recordings are accessible to CCF members.

Alicia M. Walker is Associate Professor of Sociology at Missouri State University and the author of two previous books on infidelity. She is the current Editor in Chief of the Council of Contemporary Families blog, serves as Senior Fellow with CCF, and serves as Co-Chair of CCF alongside Arielle Kuperberg. Learn more about her on her website. Follow her on Twitter or Bluesky at @AliciaMWalker1 and Instagram @aliciamwalkerphd

Reprinted from Council on Contemporary Families Press Release

AUSTIN, TX – MAY 31, 2023

Major health and medical organizations universally recommend six months or more of exclusive breastfeeding to promote children’s development. But meeting this ideal is tough for many mothers. Breastfeeding is time-consuming, labor-intensive, and requires a lot of support from partners and others. Thus, it is not surprising that only 25% of U.S. infants are exclusively breastfed for the recommended six months, and breastfeeding rates are lower among mothers with fewer economic and social resources. Public health initiatives consider increasing rates of breastfeeding in these populations of mothers imperative to improving children’s health and wellbeing.

However, recent research indicates that the benefits of breastfeeding have been overstated, leading some to call into question the assumption that “breast is best.”

A briefing paper released today from the Council on Contemporary Families, “Best for Whom? Breastfeeding and Child Development”, summarizes new research on the relationship between breastfeeding and a comprehensive set of longer-term child development outcomes.

In an article published today online in Social Forces, professors Jessica Houston Su (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), Kerri Raissian (University of Connecticut), and doctoral student Jiyeon Kim (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), used longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample of children aged 4-14 to evaluate the relationship between breastfeeding and children’s body mass index (BMI), behavioral development, and cognitive skills. They used cutting-edge statistical techniques to compare children who were breastfed to children who were never breastfed but had very similar characteristics. They also grouped children based on their likelihood of being breastfed and compared the effects of breastfeeding on child development across these different groups.

Su and colleagues found that the benefits of breastfeeding are modest and distributed unequally. They report that breastfeeding provides small benefits for children’s behavioral development, math scores, and academic ability, but only among children who were highly likely to breastfeed. In contrast, among children least likely to breastfeed, breastfeeding appeared to provide small benefits for children’s reading comprehension and vocabulary.

Su and colleagues suggest effects of breastfeeding are incredibly challenging to isolate from the costs and benefits associated with the practice. For example, breastfeeding is associated with prolonged earnings losses for mothers, and in families with fewer economic and social resources, those losses may swamp any benefits of breastfeeding for children. In contrast, mothers who have economic and social advantages are more likely to breastfeed, and this bundle of resources may already provide strong benefits for children’s development, washing out any additional benefits of breastfeeding.

Su and colleagues’ study suggests that the children most likely to benefit from breastfeeding are those with other social and economic advantages, that benefits of breastfeeding are modest, and that breastfeeding is only one of numerous biological and environmental factors that shape children’s development. As Su and colleagues summarize the takeaway: “Efforts to increase breastfeeding rates among populations that are least likely to breastfeed are unlikely to close disparities in child development…To level the playing field, rather than merely telling mothers that “breast is best,” policies should focus on reducing structural barriers and economic costs for mothers who want to breastfeed.”

FURTHER INFORMATION

To contact lead author Jessica Houston Su, email her at jhs@email.unc.edu.

LINKS

Brief report: https://sites.utexas.edu/contemporaryfamilies/2023/05/31/breastfeeding-and-child-development-brief-report/
Press release: https://sites.utexas.edu/contemporaryfamilies/2023/05/31/breastfeeding-and-child-development-press-release/

ABOUT CCF

The Council on Contemporary Families, based at the University of Texas-Austin, is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization of family researchers and practitioners that seeks to further a national understanding of how America’s families are changing and what is known about the strengths and weaknesses of different family forms and various family interventions.

The Council helps keep journalists informed of new and forthcoming research on gender and family-related issues via the CCF Network. To locate researchers or request copies of previous research briefs, please contact Stephanie Coontz, Director of Research and Public Education, at coontzs@msn.com, cell 360-556-9223.

Follow us! @CCF_Families and https://www.facebook.com/contemporaryfamilies

Reprinted from the Council on Contemporary Families Brief Reports

A briefing paper prepared by Jill E. Yavorsky, University of North Carolina Charlotte, Yue Qian, University of British Columbia, and Liana Christin Landivar, Women’s Bureau, U.S. Department of Labor, for the Council on Contemporary Families symposium The COVID-19 Pandemic and the Future of Gender Equality (PDF).

*Views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. Department of Labor.

Three years later, women’s careers have still not fully recovered from pandemic-related impacts.

From the beginning of the pandemic, women-dominated jobs were hit hardest with employment losses, and mothers were more likely to lose or quit their jobs because of the additional childcare that fell on their plates due to school and childcare closures.

In a set of new studies, we examine career outcomes using data spanning the start of the pandemic through 2023 and uncover critical ways in which mothers’ careers are still lagging behind all others.  We also find that a mothers’ education level is a key determinant for the type of career consequence they face.

In the beginning of 2023, the employment of mothers without a college degree – a group hit hardest in the early months of the pandemic – had still not recovered, as our recent research shows.  Their employment remained lower in February 2023 than what it was pre-pandemic. In contrast, employment for fathers with and without a college degree and college-educated mothers fully recovered in 2021.

These results align with our new research based on Current Population Survey data showing that among those without a college degree and who had quit, been fired, or laid off during the pandemic, partnered mothers with children under age 13 were significantly less likely than comparable fathers to find new employment.

Why has lower educated mothers’ employment not rebounded?

Certainly, the concentration of mothers without a college degree in job sectors that experienced large employment reductions, such as the service industry, contributed to their sharp losses in employment early in the pandemic, and greater losses compared to fathers. But even within job sectors, mothers lost or left jobs at higher rates than fathers in nearly all industries.

Two big reasons many mothers left the labor force early in the pandemic and some have not returned are worsening childcare challenges and a lack of access to family-friendly workplace benefits.

New research shows that mothers who could work from home sustained employment at higher rates throughout the pandemic than those who were in jobs requiring on-site work. Unfortunately, few low-income jobs provide the ability to work from home or access to paid leave, making it difficult to meet intense caregiving obligations that grew over the pandemic and for some remained persistent.

For example, our new research using the American Community Survey, Current Population Survey, and the Elementary School Operating Status database shows that the impact of school closures had a particularly lingering negative effect on lower educated mothers’ employment. About 24% of elementary students were in school districts that did not fully reopen for between a year to a year and a half, a very prolonged gap in care infrastructure for young kids who still need supervision.

Our research shows it is mothers who picked up this added care, for many at the expense of their jobs. School closures for elementary students were associated with a 5 percentage point increase in the employment gap between mothers and fathers without a college degree. And notably, this gap persisted even 6 months after schools reopened.

Moreover, many childcare providers raised their prices or closed during the pandemic, making it even more difficult to find nearby and affordable childcare for lower educated mothers – many of whom already lived in childcare deserts or strained to meet high childcare prices before the pandemic.

What about college-educated mothers’ jobs?

If long-term employment hits largely did not impact college-educated mothers, then one might surmise that this group of women did not suffer any long-term career consequences. However, our new research suggests otherwise.

We conducted two studies that provide insights into the potential repercussions for college-educated women who remained employed during the pandemic.

First, we find that college-educated mothers experienced the largest motherhood wage penalty since the early 2000s, reversing twenty years of progress for this group of women. The motherhood wage penalty captures wage differences between mothers and non-mothers who have similar characteristics.

Prior to the pandemic, the motherhood wage gap for college-educated women had been eliminated, such that mothers and non-mothers earned similar wages. However, three years into the pandemic, college-educated mothers experienced a 6% wage penalty, relative to non-mothers.

As the graph below shows, wages for both mothers and non-mothers with a college degree took a hit after the onset of the pandemic in 2020, but non-mothers’ wages rebounded, whereas mothers’ wages did not.

Predicted Hourly Wage for Women with a College Degree

Note. For analysis shown in graph, we used months March through December for each of the years to maintain consistency across time and to capture the dip of the pandemic which began in March 2020.

We find that about a quarter of the wage penalty can be explained by either mothers holding jobs that experienced smaller wage gains in 2021 than the jobs that non-mothers held, and/or mothers switched into lower paying jobs during the pandemic, in part due to heightened work-family conflict.

Increases in the motherhood wage penalty may have also been due to heightened employer discrimination against mothers who experienced productivity losses, as many highly educated mothers suffered temporary productivity declines during the pandemic due to the additional childcare and housework they absorbed.

In a new study, we find that managers particularly penalize mothers for temporary declines in job productivity that result from childcare issues.

Specifically, managers distribute 30% fewer career rewards to mothers, compared to fathers, when their productivity temporarily declines due to childcare issues outside their control. There are no gender gaps in rewards when the employee’s productivity increases or stays constant from previous productivity levels (before they had childcare issues). We find that this is due to managers perceiving mothers as being less committed to their jobs and less interested in advancing in their careers than fathers.

What our results mean for gender progress

Taken together, our new studies show that mothers are continuing to suffer losses in employment, wages, and career advancement due to the COVID-19 pandemic – but in varying ways across educational levels. Lower-educated mothers are less likely to be employed since the pandemic, whereas higher-educated mothers, likely because of their ability to work remotely and greater access to childcare, have been able to retain their jobs but may be experiencing wage and promotion losses along with other career penalties.

To achieve a gender-equitable post-pandemic recovery, organizational and public policies are particularly needed to support labor market re-entry, equitable wages, and fair chances of moving through the career ladder.

And, our findings make clear that to jumpstart gender progress for all women, it is critical to build a more reliable, accessible, and affordable care infrastructure.

About the Authors

Jill E. Yavorsky is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina – Charlotte.  She can be reached at jyavorsk@charlotte.edu.  You can follow her on Twitter @JillYavorsky1. 

Yue Qian is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of British Columbia. She can be reached at yue.qian@ubc.ca. You can follow her on Twitter at @yueqian_soc.

Liana Christin Landivar is a senior researcher at the Women’s Bureau in the U.S. Department of Labor and faculty affiliate at the Maryland Population Research Center. She can be reached at liana.c.landivar@gmail.com.

American caregivers want work-family policies.  Americans generally support work-family policies, like paid family leave and childcare subsidies, yet the United States fails to provide these policies to all families on a federal level.  Because of the popularity of these programs and the support they would bring to working families, lawmakers on both sides of the aisle have introduced bills with work-family policies. Yet these bills have not become enacted into law, whether they were introduced by Democrats or Republicans.  Policymakers must unravel the paradox of why these popular policies aren’t gaining enough political support. What drives Americans to support work-family policies, and what gives them pause?

Without work-family policies in place, American families were left largely to fend for themselves during the pandemic, when the government provided only temporary cash support for families.  Did the need for these policies became even more clear to American caregivers during that time?  

We asked American caregivers in 2022 about their opinions on five work-family policies: (1) paid family leave, (2) subsidized childcare, (3) universal preschool, (4) job protections for caregivers, and (5) access to remote work. 

              In interviews conducted over Zoom as the pandemic waned, more than 100 American caregivers told us their opinions on these policies, often explaining their reasoning and the extent to which the pandemic impacted their views.  Using their own words, we analyzed their explanations of their opinions on work-family policies. 

Overall, we found strong support for all of these policies from respondents of all genders and political ideologies, and that support grew higher during the pandemic.  We distilled their reasons for supporting these policies into four key themes.  First, respondents highlighted a governmental responsibility to help American families.  As Caroline, a conservative and mother of 2, stated, “I 100% support [these policies].  I feel like as a country, we need to take care of one another.”  Second, respondents felt that these policies should exist as a tradeoff to American workers for their labor.  Zariya, a moderate and mother of 1, explained: “If I am getting up and coming to a job every day to make sure that the needs of their job is being met, then that job should be making sure that I am secure in all aspects.”  Respondents also recognized that the federal government could organize the policies in a way to ensure that employers would comply.  Wilson, a conservative and father of 1, would have preferred to leave work-family policies to employers, but he had no confidence that the policies would reach the families in need: “In a perfect world, employers would offer such things. But I also think that, if they can get away with not doing it, they would.” Finally, respondents hoped to see federal work-family policies when making international (or national) comparisons.  Some respondents, like Ethan, a moderate and father of 2, made comparisons within the United States: “I made use of California’s paid family leave program, and I think it was great. So, I would support Congress doing the same.”  Joanna, a liberal and mother of 2, compared U.S. policies to those in other countries: “We’re the only … developed nation in the world that doesn’t offer anything to its citizens [for paid family leave], which is just mind blowing.  …It’s a tragedy.”

Respondents also shared their concerns and hesitations about these policies, though these were not strong enough reservations for them to oppose the policies.  We distilled these into four themes as well.  First, many respondents were uncomfortable with any directive or mandate from the government, even for policies that they hoped to see enacted.  For example, John, a moderate and father of 2, supported remote work access “as long as it’s [the employer’s] decision—it shouldn’t be mandated that they change anything—but yeah, I think it’s great because a lot of jobs could be done remotely.”  Another major concern arose from the potential for others’ misuse of the policies.  Sam, a conservative and father of 3, suggested that job protections for caregivers should have a means of accountability to limit misuse: “I think that makes sense where if you’re taking it, I think probably they should make you verify that’s what you’re really doing versus ‘taking care of my sick aunt’ for three years.” Respondents also shared a concern that the policies might harm small businesses, misunderstanding how work-family policies would be financed. Suzy, a liberal and mother of 1, was concerned about the financial burden that paid family leave might have, without recognizing the role of government financing: “For the most part, I’d be for it, but the small businesses, I think it would be really rough on.”  Finally, some respondents wanted to avoid any increased taxes they might face as a result of work-family policies.  Respondents with this concern tended to oppose the policies altogether.  As Shirley, a moderate and mother of 2, explained: “Anything that government provides support for comes out of our paychecks at some point anyway, and we’re already paying enough.”

              American caregivers overwhelmingly support work-family policies: because they know well the challenges and expenses involved in raising children and working, respondents see how these supportive policies could help all American families face their costs and pressures.  But respondents also shared many reasons for distrust: in other individuals, in increased governmental taxes and regulations, and in the misperceived burden—but real concern—for small businesses.  Despite their concerns, especially after the challenges of the pandemic, our respondents sought carefully crafted policies to limit their concerns and provide better opportunities for American families.

As sociologists, we’re interested in how social context often shapes the meaning and implications of major life events like childbearing. In our recent study, we examine how the educational costs of teen births changed for cohorts of women who entered adolescence before, during, and after the major economic, demographic, and cultural changes of the 20^th century.

Teen births were “common and unremarkable” during the baby boom of the 1940s and 50s. A relatively large and diverse group of women had children as teenagers. This changed in the 1960s and 70s with women’s increased access to higher education and birth control. These midcentury changes disproportionately expanded socioeconomic opportunities among U.S. women as “women from more-advantaged backgrounds seized the new opportunities and moved ahead quickly.”

As a result, teen births became aligned with the U.S. stratification system as women from more privileged families disproportionately avoided young motherhood as a way to protect their various social advantages.By the end of the twentieth century, a clear socioeconomic bifurcation existed between women who had children in adolescence and women who delayed parenthood until their 20s and 30s.

How did the educational costs of adolescent childbearing change for women who entered adolescence in the latter half of the twentieth century? We hypothesized that differences in the effect of teen births on educational attainment increased as women’s individualized likelihood of adolescent childbearing (given their socioeconomic background) became a more powerful predictor of women’s underlying life chances.

To answer our question and test our hypothesis, we created a dataset with over 15,000 women born between 1922 and 1984 using publicly available data. These data allowed us to compare cohorts of women who grew up with different opportunities, constraints, and attitudes regarding women’s age at first birth and educational attainment.

The largest educational differences between teen mothers and other women were among Millennials (born 1980-84) from more advantaged backgrounds. The educational costs of a teen birth were largest among women with the lowest propensity of a teen birth because these women had the greatest educational potential based on their background. Their child-free counterparts were the highest achieving in terms of education; thus, we suggest that having a teen birth represented a growing opportunity cost for women with the greatest costs among the most recent cohorts.

Our findings support expectations based on the assumption that higher SES families have the material and psychosocial resources to identify and adapt their children’s life course ideals to facilitate upward mobility and the intergenerational transfer of social class. This likely includes prioritizing education through avoiding early childbearing, facilitated through greater resources that allow, for example, easier access to contraception. These dynamics occur within a broader social context reinforcing these messages and goals (e.g., peer groups, teachers and counselors at school, health care providers). These processes may also occur among low-income parents but within a structural environment with fewer supports for continuing education, e.g., fewer economic or educational opportunities, and perhaps even less contraception access.

Traditional discussions of teen births see them as a “social problem” to be avoided because it disrupts education and career advancement. However, our research shows that the meaning of teen births depends on historical context specific within cohorts (e.g., expanding educational opportunities for women) and socioeconomic context specific to individuals (e.g., social class of parents). Rather than focusing only on avoiding teen pregnancy as a way to increase people’s success in higher education, we suggest that our findings point to the change in structural factors that have facilitated certain groups of women being more able to go to college and avoid pregnancy in adolescence.

Joseph D. Wolfe is an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham. Learn more about him at his website and follow him on Twitter at @WolfeSociology and BlueSky @jdwolfe.bsky.social for updates about ongoing research.

Mieke Beth Thomeer, PhD is Professor of Sociology at the University of Alabama at Birmingham, and a Deputy Editor at the Journal of Marriage and Family. Follow her @miekebeth

Wealth supports individuals and families in innumerable ways. In the form of homeownership, wealth facilitates school and neighborhood choice. In the form of financial assets, wealth is essential for managing financial emergencies such as sudden medical expenses. Wealth also begets wealth as financial assets may also facilitate higher education, homeownership, retirement, and the possibility of offering an inheritance to future generations.

Among policymakers and the general public alike, there has been a growing awareness of the persistent Black-White wealth gap. From 1983 to 2019, the average White households held 5 to 7 times the amount of net wealth of Black households; this gap has remained fairly constant over time. The average wealth gap between Hispanic and White households has received less attention, but is also persistent. Over the same period (1983-2019), average White households held between 5 to 6 times the amount of net wealth of Hispanic households. The median gaps are even more stark given how many Black and Hispanic households have no wealth. In 2019, the median White household had nearly 17 times as much net wealth as the median Black household and 11 times as much net wealth as the median Hispanic household.

What about the different components that comprise wealth? Research on racial wealth gaps often address “net worth”, meaning assets minus debts. But even in the examples discussed earlier, we can see that different forms of wealth are important for different reasons. Different forms of wealth may have different patterns over the life course as young adults experience the financial changes that come with finishing schooling, starting full-time work, or growing families. While homeownership has been the primary pathway to wealth building in the US, declining homeownership rates and a changing economy suggest that financial assets are increasingly important.

How have current millennial young adults accumulated wealth amid the many economic changes and challenges of the past few decades? Many, if not all, of the hallmark transitions in young adulthood involve financial changes: pursuing education, transitioning into work, or starting a family. Research has shown how racial disparities in student debt accumulation emerge and widen among young adults who ever enrolled in higher education. However, we know less about how young adults build wealth at this life stage and whether racial wealth gaps start to emerge in young adulthood. Because of the compounding nature of interest, racial disparities in wealth (and debt) accumulation at this stage of life set the course of racial disparities in middle- and later- life. 

Our recent research sought answers to these questions about how racial wealth gaps emerge in young adulthood. We analyzed survey data that measured various types of assets of debts for millennial young adults at ages 20, 25, 30, and 35.

We found that substantial Black-White and Hispanic-White gaps in net worth, financial assets, and home equity emerge by age 35. Overall, there is slow growth in young adults’ assets between ages 20 and 25. However, by age 35, White young adults have seen exponential growth in their assets, Hispanic young adults have seen modest growth, and Black young adults have seen minimal growth. At the median (as opposed to the mean), these racial wealth gaps are much smaller, suggesting that some extremely advantaged White young adults may exacerbate racial wealth gaps on average.

Racial gaps in financial assets widen faster than corresponding gaps in other components of net worth. Even though many people think about homeownership as the most important piece of wealth building, our analysis showed that financial assets contribute more than home equity to exacerbating net worth disparities. Among this recent millennial cohort, diverging financial assets play an important part in expanding racial wealth gaps in young adulthood.

Compared to the racial gaps in positive assets, the racial gaps in debt are not as wide. This suggests that debt—student debt, among other types of debt—erodes the minimal positive assets that Black young adults accumulate. Other research has suggested that for Black young adults, debt signals financial exclusion while for White adults, debt facilitates wealth accumulation.

Young adulthood is a time when racial disparities in wealth emerge and begin to widen dramatically. In particular, a minority of very advantaged white young adults are responsible for widening racial wealth gaps in young adulthood. Given all the recent changes in young adulthood milestones and transitions in the Covid-19 pandemic, it will be important to continue to revisit these questions in the future.

As different forms of wealth are governed by distinct social and economic processes, no single policy may be sufficient to expunge them in their entirety. Accordingly, addressing racial wealth disparities will take a multi-pronged effort.

1. Student debt cancellation – In recent years, researchers, policymakers, and everyday Americans have advocated for the total (or substantial) cancellation of student debt. This policy decision may have the largest effect on savings accounts as the reoccurring student debt payments have inhibited many Americans from saving for the future. As Black college graduates are the most burdened by student debt, this decision may provide the most relief for their savings accounts.
2. Raising the minimum wage – Research has shown that raising the minimum wage substantially narrows the Black-White wage gap. While debt cancellation would eliminate debt but keep wages the same, raising the minimum wage would increase people’s income. The increase could increase savings, especially when coupled with debt cancellation.
3. Baby bonds – This idea entails providing every newborn with a government-funded savings account that is managed by the government until the newborns reach adulthood. The amount of money initially dispersed into this account would be dependent on income, whereby lower-income families receive the highest dispersals. These funds are then invested and managed by the state until the child is old enough to access them. The amount amassed in these accounts could then be used to pay for college or make large investments such as buying a home or starting a business.

Ellen Bryer is a Postdoctoral Research Associate in the Annenberg Institute at Brown University. She can be reached at ellen_bryer@brown.edu.

Alexander Adames is a Presidential Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the Department of Sociology at Princeton University. He can be reached at adames@princeton.edu.

Across rural America, communities are grappling with a silent yet deadly crisis: fentanyl contamination in the drug supply.  In 2022 -2023 over 100,000 people in the US died from overdose.  With an unregulated drug supply, fentanyl has become the primary driver of overdose deaths across the United States. The risk is particularly acute in rural areas where resources are scarce, the drug market is unpredictable, and the stigma surrounding drug use creates additional barriers to healthcare and other protections from overdose.

We recently conducted a study exploring the strategies of people who use drugs in rural areas of the US to reduce the harms associated with unintentional fentanyl exposure. Our findings, drawn from over 349 semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted across ten states and 58 rural counties between 2018 and 2020, provide a critical look at how these individuals are navigating the dangers of fentanyl. Here’s what we learned.

Awareness and Fear: The Reality of Fentanyl in Rural America

One of the most striking findings from our research is the pervasive awareness of fentanyl contamination among people who use drugs in rural areas. Almost every participant in our study recognized that fentanyl had saturated the drug market, affecting both opioid and stimulant supplies. This awareness, however, is not just a passive understanding. It is coupled with an overwhelming fear of fatal overdose. For many, this fear drives the adoption of various harm reduction strategies aimed at avoiding the lethal consequences of ingesting fentanyl unknowingly. Of note, fentanyl is currently dominating the drug supply and  for the most part fentanyl exposure is unavoidable.

Harm Reduction: A Multifaceted Approach

In response to the fentanyl crisis, people who use drugs in rural areas have developed a range of strategies to protect themselves. Here are some of the key approaches we identified:

1. Avoiding Certain Drugs: Many participants reported deliberately avoiding drugs they believed were more likely to contain fentanyl, such as heroin. For some, this meant switching to other substances perceived to be safer. The decision to avoid heroin, in particular, often stemmed from personal experiences or witnessing the overdose of friends and family members.
2. Buying from Trusted Sources: Participants emphasized the importance of purchasing drugs only from dealers they knew and trusted. This relationship often goes beyond a simple transaction. Dealers would sometimes warn participants about dangerous batches of drugs or even refuse to sell certain products they knew contained fentanyl.
3. Using Fentanyl Test Strips: Some participants reported using fentanyl test strips to check their drugs before use. These strips, although limited in their ability as they do not provide information on the amount of fentanyl present, provide a critical first line of defense, alerting people to the presence of fentanyl.
4. Adjusting Drug Use Practices: To mitigate the risk of overdose, many participants altered their drug use practices. This included taking smaller doses, avoiding injection and choosing to smoke or snort their drug instead, and using drugs in the company of others who can assist in case of an overdose.
5. Carrying and Using Naloxone: Naloxone, a medication that can reverse opioid overdoses, is a vital tool in preventing fatal overdose. However, access to naloxone was uneven, with some participants reporting that it was more readily available in urban settings. Those who had access to naloxone often carried it with them.

The Role of Community and Social Networks

Our study highlights the significant role that social networks play in harm reduction and overall well-being of rural people who use drugs. In rural communities, where formal support services are often lacking, people who use drugs rely heavily on their social circles for information and assistance. Trusted dealers, friends, and even family members become critical allies to prevent fatal overdose. This informal network of support underscores the gap in formal health services that are desperately needed in these areas.

The Need for Enhanced Harm Reduction Services

The strategies we observed are not without limitations. For one, the availability of fentanyl test strips and naloxone is inconsistent, leaving many rural users without the tools they need to protect themselves. Moreover, while social networks can provide support, they are no substitute for comprehensive harm reduction services such as syringe exchange programs, overdose prevention centers, and accessible drug checking facilities.

We believe that expanding access to these services in rural areas should be a top public health priority. This could include increasing the distribution of fentanyl test strips and naloxone, particularly through community-based organizations that are already trusted by local populations, funding additional harm reduction organizations, and expanding healthcare services. Additionally, implementing more advanced drug checking services, like spectrometry, could provide people who use drugs with more detailed information about their drugs, potentially saving lives.

Conclusion: A Call to Action

As the overdose crisis continues to evolve, so too must our approaches to harm reduction. The strategies that people who use drugs in rural areas employ to protect themselves are both innovative and necessary, but not sufficient. It is imperative that public health efforts adapt to meet the needs of these communities by providing the resources and support required to prevent overdoses and save lives. Crucially, we must also work to dismantle the stigma that surrounds drug use, which only serves to deepen the crisis and isolate those who most need help.

We hope that our research will not only shed light on the challenges faced by rural communities but also inspire action to enhance harm reduction services in these underserved areas. The time to act is now. Lives depend on it.

Bio
Dr. Suzan Walters is an Assistant Professor in the Center of Opioid Epidemiology and Policy at NYU’s Grossman School of Medicine. Dr. Walters’ research focuses on the intersection of stigma, drug use, and harm reduction, working to understand and address the complex issues facing people who use drugs. You can follow our work on Twitter/X at @suzanmwalters

Can you to imagine a world without care, a world without teachers, nurses or childcare workers? Caring for others is a crucial part of society, and care workers are in fact essential for its functioning. At the same time, the devaluation of care work pervades our society. Care work carries little prestige and economic rewards, and tends to be dismissed as not really work. Women and women of color have long been the ones providing care to others, in and out of the workforce. However, past research has shown that women experience major declines in their wages after having children, the so-called ‘motherhood penalty’. This is especially the case in highly skilled/high paid jobs and in professional occupations, such as among doctors or lawyers or business professionals. Researchers often explain this phenomenon by pointing to the expectations that employers have about who makes the most ideal worker. In their eyes, this ideal worker is typically a man with no outside responsibilities such as caretaking. Men, in fact, tend to experience a ‘daddy bonus’, with higher wages for fathers compared to men with no kids. Furthermore, the wage penalties are less harsh for women of color, though they typically start with lower wages than white women do. Fathers of color do not experience the same boost to their wages as white fathers do.We wanted to explore whether this penalty existed in other fields. Specifically, we wanted to look at care work, a field that both employs great numbers of women and mothers, but also typically expects the same traits from workers that society expects in mothers. In previous research, researchers found that even though caring work requires similar levels of education and skill as professional occupations, is underappreciated and devalued because it is done by women. Employers believe that since women are naturally good at care work, work that value traits such as caring, love, and selflessness, don’t need to be paid as much. However, we were interested in seeing whether this devaluation has held true, even with advancements in gender equality. We thought that since care work employers value the same skills valued in mothers, one’s parental identity might lead a worker to receiving a wage boost. We also expected that mothers of color would receive even greater boosts as employers expect them to possess caring traits in more abundance.

In our study, we drew on data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey, which collects work and family related information from a nationally representative sample of the U.S. population. We analyzed data on over 805,786 care workers between the ages of 18 and 37, collected in the years 1980, 1990, and then yearly from 2000 through 2018 . We looked at jobs such as nursing, health care aides, K-12 teachers, social workers, childcare workers, and religious clergy members. Our findings are straightforward and reflect how gendered work and society is today. We show that wages for mothers are more than 12% lower than wages for women without children, accounting for factors like education, region, and work experience. This confirms that the motherhood wage penalty found for professional occupations also holds for care workers. We find that, within care work, this penalty is strongest for white women, although women of all races experience a decline in their wages after parenthood. However, we need to keep in mind that women of color tend to have lower starting wages compared to white women and men. We also find higher wages for fathers compared to men without children; however, that is not the case when accounting for work and personal variables—such as education level, marital status, and race—and actually Black fathers see a slight decline in wages compared to men without children. This may suggest that fathers of color continue to be seen as unfit or not appropriate for caring occupations, despite their fatherhood identity.

Overall, our research shows that in care work being seen as appropriate often doesn’t result in wage advantages. Instead, organizational practices and culture perpetrate disadvantage for mothers and people of color. Work and society today are still deeply gendered. The belief that mothers are better at caring and the fact that caring labor is devalued continue to disadvantage mothers and mothers of color alike, reinforcing gender inequality.

Overall, we think that these findings indicate that the beliefs that mothers are better at caring and that caring labor is devalued are pervasive and continue to disadvantage mothers and mothers of color alike. As Anne-Marie Slaughter, in her book Unfinished Business: Women Men Work Family said, “If we’re going to get to real equality between men and women, we have to focus less on women and more on elevating the value of care.” As it would seem, motherhood is rife with more than just one type of labor pain.

Alyssa Alexander is a lecturer in sociology at the University of British Columbia.

Anna Manzoni is a professor at North Carolina State University. You can follow Anna on Twitter @theitalianna

The COVID-19 pandemic was a period of immense change. We all remember the fear and uncertainty of the early stages of the pandemic, and how we adapted to handle new domestic tasks such as disinfecting every surface and helping children with remote schooling. After the abrupt and sweeping changes of the early lockdown period, we faced more disruptions. Through cyclical spikes in COVID cases, we dealt with the uneven reopening, and periodic closing, of schools, workplaces, and social gatherings, leading not only to new challenges managing work and family obligations, but also the stress of uncertainty. 

Research highlights lasting impacts of these fluctuating conditions, such as the increased prevalence of remote work and continued learning losses among children due to educational disruptions. Yet, despite an emphasis on the increased burdens of domestic work and subsequent stress placed on mothers early in the pandemic, there has been relatively little discussion about whether the pandemic has had a lasting effect on parents’ divisions of housework and childcare. Has greater access to remote work helped fathers to remain more involved in domestic labor as they were during pandemic lockdowns? Or did the increased burdens on mothers during the pandemic exacerbate gender gaps in domestic labor?

In a recent study published in Demographic Research, we sought to understand how parents’ divisions of housework and childcare changed throughout the pandemic. Using novel data from the Survey on U.S. Parents’ Divisions of Labor During COVID-19, we examined trends in parents’ divisions of domestic labor from prior to the pandemic (March 2020) to post-pandemic (October 2023). In doing so, we are the first to examine patterns throughout the duration of the pandemic in the U.S., enabling us to assess the extent to which the pandemic had lasting changes on domestic divisions of domestic labor.

Surprisingly, we find that most U.S. parents maintained the same division of housework and childcare throughout the entire observed period from pre- to post-pandemic. Despite all of the changes that occurred throughout the pandemic, gendered patterns of domestic labor remain remarkably stable. Among parents who did experience changes, we observed that parents were much more likely to shift to fathers taking on equal or greater shares of childcare than to shift toward a more traditional division where mothers perform more childcare than they previously did. However, parents were equally likely to shift to a more traditional division of housework as a nontraditional division (i.e., equal sharing or fathers doing more). We find that fathers’ remote work and mothers’ employment were key factors in promoting a shift to a more nontraditional division of domestic labor.

The relative stability of parents’ divisions of housework and childcare illustrates how embedded these gendered norms and practices are within American culture. However, results from our study suggest that some changes have occurred, particularly in regard to long-term shifts toward more nontraditional divisions of childcare. Fathers increasingly want to be more involved in their children’s lives, and the pandemic provided an opportunity for fathers to be more fully engaged dads due in large part to more flexible work options. The continuation of flexible work combined with increased employment opportunities for mothers moving forward present opportunities for continued (albeit slow) progress toward greater gender equality in housework and childcare.

Daniel L. Carlson is an Associate Professor and Chair of the Department of Family and Consumer Studies at the University of Utah. He is a sociologist and family demographer studying the gendered division of labor. He serves on the board of directors for the Council on Contemporary Families. You can follow him on X @DanielCarlson_1.

Richard J. Petts is a Professor of Sociology and Associate Dean of the College of Sciences and Humanities at Ball State University. He also serves on the board of directors for the Council on Contemporary Families. You can read more about his research at www.richardpetts.com and can follow him on X @pettsric.

Take a moment to imagine the kinds of people who live in a mixed-income neighborhood.

In your mind, do you envision kids of all backgrounds playing together in the local park? Rich and poor neighbors working together to throw block parties? Low-income and wealthy people chatting casually in the local coffee shop?

Sadly, many mixed-income neighborhoods do not work like this.

Rich and poor residents of mixed-income neighborhoods often avoid each other in local parks, schools, and eateries, and these lines of separation may be drawn more thickly when residents are doubly diverse in terms of race, sexuality, or recency in the neighborhood.

Even more, many privileged residents surveil their neighbors through the use of apps like Nextdoor, and they work to hasten gentrification so that their poorer neighbors are forced to leave.

In an article I recently published in Socius with co-authors Chris Hess, Ian Kennedy, and Kyle Crowder, I show how members of the real estate industry can contribute to this process.

Landlords, realtors, and others who advertise rental properties in mixed-income neighborhoods are disproportionately likely to mention that the advertised unit comes with a home security device. This finding is driven by mentions of home security methods such as door attendants, access control systems, and concierges—all of which are commonly found in upscale apartment buildings in gentrifying areas. To demonstrate our finding, we applied a combination of computational text analyses and regression-based methods to over one million Craigslist rental listings posted in the 100 largest U.S. metropolitan areas in July and August of 2019.

By emphasizing home security when advertising rentals in income-diverse areas, real estate actors reinforce a message that mixed-income neighborhoods are places to be feared rather than embraced.

People frequently assume that someone is a criminal if they are in poverty. And in many of the neighborhoods we studied, income diversity continued to be associated with mentions of home security even after accounting for the local crime rate. Therefore, members of the real estate industry may have the capacity to shape home seekers’ perceptions of safety in mixed-income neighborhoods regardless of whether crimes are actually happening on the ground.

Even more, given that home security was mentioned in many ads for upscale apartment buildings, our findings suggest that members of the real estate industry may use home security as a signal to potential gentrifiers that they will be safe if they move into a neighborhood where poor people live.

The emphasis on home security, in fact, may be a key ingredient in how neighborhoods become gentrified. In mixed-income neighborhoods, a landlord may bring in a wealthy renter with the promise of home security, after which more wealthy renters move in until the neighborhood becomes homogeneously wealthy rather than income-diverse.

Our study was cross-sectional, meaning it was conducted at one point in time and unable to track trends in neighborhoods over time. The link between our findings and the gentrification of neighborhoods is consequently speculative. Our study also could not causally establish that potential renters take into consideration how frequently they see mentions of home security in ads in mixed-income neighborhoods.

Nevertheless, a growing number of studies highlight ways in which residents of diverse neighborhoods use home security to segregate themselves and police their poorer neighbors. Coupled with other actions taken by wealthy residents of mixed-income neighborhoods, such as marginalizing low-income parents’ concerns in schools and alienating low-income members of local civic groups, the emphasis that real estate advertisers place on home security in income-diverse neighborhoods can further divide rich and poor neighbors and facilitate neighborhood change.

There are lessons from my study for academics looking to connect the dots between income diversity, home security, and local communities. There are also lessons for practitioners looking to build stably mixed-income neighborhoods.

For academics, it is common to examine how members of the real estate industry use practices such as racial steering or the sorting of poor tenants into substandard housing to discourage diversity in neighborhoods. It is far rarer for academics to investigate the techniques that real estate actors use to persuade people to move into diverse neighborhoods. I hope my study inspires others to think through the dynamics that attract home seekers to move into rather than avoid diverse neighborhoods.

For practitioners, members of the real estate industry should reflect on the marketing strategies they use when selling or renting homes in mixed-income neighborhoods. Some real estate actors deliberately coopt local community organizations to encourage divisions within the community and undermine resistance to gentrification. Practices such as these may help turn an economic profit, but in terms of social costs, there is a heavy price to pay.

As suggested by scholars who examine stably racially integrated neighborhoods, income diversity can be maintained in communities that are willing to earmark funds to encourage it. Places that invest in homes of diverse sizes and densities are much more likely to attain stably income-diverse communities than are those places that use the heavy hand of zoning to keep poor people away.

As income inequality grows worse in cities and towns across the United States—not to mention the rest of the world—it is necessary to understand how neighborhoods become diverse and stay diverse.

Life’s no fun if the kids avoid each other at the park, the block party excludes many neighbors, and the patrons of the local coffee shop sip in silence. That’s not the way our communities should be.

Mahesh Somashekhar is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at the University of Illinois at Chicago. You can follow Mahesh on Twitter @msomashe