A common evolutionary theory of religion views the brain as composed of modules and explains religion by a module for supernatural beings. But, as The Guardian reports, Robert Bellah’s new book takes evolution seriously while challenging this common view as showing a lack of insight into religion as it’s actually lived.
Go back deep into evolutionary time, long before hominids, Bellah invites his readers, because here can be found the basic capacity required for religion to emerge. It is mimesis or imitative action, when animals communicate their intentions, often sexual or aggressive, by standard behaviours. Often such signals seem to be genetically determined, though some animals, like mammals, are freer and more creative. It can then be called play, meant in a straightforward sense of “not work,” work being activity that is necessary for survival.
Such liberated play was found among creatures that didn’t need to work all of the time to survive, and the evolutionary changes that occurred during it weren’t driven by survival pressures.
Mimesis and play are integral pieces of this story of religion because they are precursors to ritual.
…that embodied way of being in the world that enacts, not thinks, understanding. If you have ever played peekaboo with a child, you were together learning about presence and absence. At a more sophisticated level, religions nurture the complex gestures of ritual and practice. Christians perform liturgies, Muslims prostrate themselves in prayer, Buddhists focus attention on breathing. This is the bread and butter of religion. Man can embody truth, reflected WB Yeats, when he cannot rationally know it.
Theoretical exploration and theological propositions accompany the ritual, but they are less fundamental modes of religious understanding. Indeed, when Plato used the word “theoria,” he was referring to a ritual practice to make a journey to witness a life-changing event rather than theory.
Comments 1
John — November 24, 2011
"Theoretical exploration and theological propositions accompany the ritual, but they are less fundamental modes of religious understanding."
This sounds a little broad to me given the necessary reductions of the approach. Would the theoretical/theological necessarily appear "less fundamental" to research that privileges behaviour as evidentiary?