Attorney General Eric Holder has reduced the ability of law enforcement agencies to seize assets without a criminal conviction, an “informal measure” of policing known as civil forfeiture. The program had been expanded by the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act in an effort to curtail the sale and distribution of illegal drugs, and it has since allowed law enforcement agencies to divide and keep the majority of proceeds seized from forfeitures.

Proponents argue that civil forfeiture makes certain crimes less profitable and redistributes resources for socially beneficial programs. Critics say it might be part of a “hidden economic agenda” behind “tough on crime” initiatives and can lead to due process infringements

• Eric L. Jensen and Jurg Gerber. 1996. “The Civil Forfeiture of Assets and the War on Drugs: Expanding Criminal Sanctions while Reducing Due Process Protections,” Crime and Delinquency, 42.
• Eric Blumenson and Eva Nilsen. 1998. “Policing for Profit: The Drug War’s Hidden Economic Agenda,” University of Chicago Law Review, 65.

Institutional contexts are important: 40% of law enforcement agencies report dependence on the revenue produced from civil forfeitures. Agencies in states with strict forfeiture policies tend to use federal “equitable sharing” policies more often, even after accounting for factors such as official crime rates and drug arrests. This suggests agencies try to maximize their returns on civil forfeiture seizures.

• John L. Worrall. 2001. “Addicted to the Drug War: The Role of Civil Asset Forfeiture as a Budgetary Necessity in Contemporary Law Enforcement,” Journal of Criminal Justice, 29(3).
• John L. Worrall and Tomislav V Kovandzic. 2008. “Is Policing for Profit? Answers from Asset Forfeiture,” Criminology & Public Policy 7(2).
• Jefferson E. Holcomb, Tomislav V Kovandzic, and Marian R. Williams. 2011. “Civil Asset Forfeiture,            Equitable Sharing, and Policing for Profit in the United States,” Journal of Criminal Justice 39(3).

Law enforcement agencies operating in high inequality areas and more conservative voting districts seize more value per drug arrest. This ratio also increases with agency complexity but drops in districts with higher black populations. Agencies may use more formal measures, such as arrests, in majority minority areas.

• Ronald Helms and S. E. Costanza. 2009. “Race, Politics, and Drug Law Enforcement: An Analysis of Civil Asset Forfeiture Patters across US Counties,” Policing & Society 19(1).