There is some remarkable new research out on the persuasive dynamics of Facebook. Stanford researcher BJ Fogg argues that a new form of persuasion has emerged in the structure of Facebook, namely, “mass interpersonal persuasion. . . . This phenomenon brings together the power of interpersonal persuasion with the reach of mass media.” In particular, Facebook has brought together six dynamics of persuasion for the first time in history, such as an automated structure, rapid cycle, and measured impact—in a way that goes far above and beyond what is often called “viral adoption” (www.bjfogg.com/mip.pdf). Weiksner, Fogg, and Liu also find another six patterns of persuasion in more specific Facebook applications, such as provoke and retaliate, reveal and compare, and expression (some of which are native to Facebook)—which invoke many persuasive norms such as “reciprocity,” “cognitive dissonance,” and “social proof” (www.springerlink.com/index/20652047j6801376.pdf).

I believe that mass interpersonal persuasion and the confluence of these influential techniques bear heavily upon the design and articulation of future public sphere activities. While there is much about Web 2.0 worth critiquing, we might remain critically hopeful about the possibilities for Facebook to create online cultures of trust and risk that perform valuable functions for deliberative democracy. Running through Facebook’s post-election newsfeeds, I noticed the remarkable degree to which many people engaged their online friends, of many political persuasions, in discussions over the results. Even when some of this communication was quite divisive, people still carved out an interactive space for engagement. Beyond my own experience, however, there are two connections I would like to make between Facebook and the public sphere.

First, in ideal public spheres individuals should be able to talk in an “unrestricted fashion” about matters of general interest—and these arenas are instantiated through conversation “in which private individuals assemble to form a public body” (Habermas). There are thus some bounded communicative conditions that individuals commit themselves to in order to democratically advance as much of the public interest as possible. In the same way, when Fogg mentions that Facebook makes it easy to build a “high-trust culture” due to a number of agreements and assumptions users make when joining and using the service, we can see that the structure of Facebook appears to lay the groundwork for communicating upon which much public sphere activity relies.

Second, what Fogg terms “automated structure” evidences how Facebook sets in motion persuasive experiences. As he puts it, “computer code doesn’t take a vacation or go on coffee breaks.” As such, this is one place where I see Facebook perhaps promoting civic engagement even more than, say, face-to-face communication. Facebook actually encourages members to further online interaction without their having to do anything. We’ve all been to public meetings where someone forgets to send out the minutes afterward, or follow up with an important e-mail to the group. Facebook has no such qualms, its computer codes make sure that we receive news of important events, and can even see public conversations occurring between others in ways unrestricted by the demands of time and space. If someone else joins a group protesting global human trafficking, they don’t need to tell others that they have joined, Facebook structures the experience in such a way that everyone will rapidly receive the message.