{"id":804,"date":"2015-10-06T16:48:34","date_gmt":"2015-10-06T16:48:34","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/trot\/?p=804"},"modified":"2015-10-13T18:55:42","modified_gmt":"2015-10-13T18:55:42","slug":"corporate-deviance","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/trot\/2015\/10\/06\/corporate-deviance\/","title":{"rendered":"Corporate Deviance"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"spatz_2011,<\/a>
spatz_2011, Flickr CC<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Volkswagen\u2019s CEO, Martin Winterkorn, recently stepped down<\/a>\u00a0amid a scandal over manipulated emissions tests. Researchers at West Virginia University found that VW diesel models used \u201cdefeat devices\u201d that activated emission control systems only when being tested—that\u2019s how they dodged emissions standards<\/a> set by the Environmental Protection Agency. To what extent is Winterkorn responsible for this corporate skullduggery? And does the use of these devices constitute a \u201ccrime\u201d?<\/p>\n

Classic theories about corporate scandal stress \u201camoral calculus,\u201d where individual decision makers of an organization weigh the costs and benefits of their actions. One example is the Ford Pinto debacle, when the company failed to recall Pintos with defective gas tanks because its \u201cinternal \u2018cost-benefit analysis\u2019\u201d indicated the financial costs of a recall outweighed the potential cost of human lives (Dowie 1977). The media often responds to these corporate scandals by labeling white-collar criminals \u201cbad apples,\u201d shifting the public\u2019s attention to the guilt of individual decision makers while hiding the social context that shapes norms within organizations<\/h5>\n