{"id":1155,"date":"2016-11-21T15:29:20","date_gmt":"2016-11-21T21:29:20","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/trot\/?p=1155"},"modified":"2016-11-22T07:57:22","modified_gmt":"2016-11-22T13:57:22","slug":"juries-and-racial-bias","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/trot\/2016\/11\/21\/juries-and-racial-bias\/","title":{"rendered":"Juries and Racial Bias"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Photo by Robert Couse-Baker, Flickr CC<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The U.S. Supreme Court is currently hearing arguments for <\/span>Pe\u00f1a-Rodriguez<\/span><\/i> v. Colorado<\/span><\/i><\/a>, a case concerning allegations of racial bias in jury deliberations. Many states prohibit hearing juror testimony following the conclusion of a trial; however, following the deliberations of Pe\u00f1a-Rodriguez\u2019s case, two jurors signed affidavits attesting to racial bias by a fellow juror. They allege that the juror\u00a0referred to an alibi witness as discreditable because he was \u201can illegal,\u201d and asserted that the defendant was guilty \u201cbecause he\u2019s Mexican.\u201d After initially being struck down by both the trial judge and the Colorado Supreme Court, Pe\u00f1a-Rodriguez is now making his case to the highest court, a task which research suggests may prove extremely challenging. <\/span><\/p>\n

In her book <\/span>The New Jim Crow<\/span><\/i>, <\/span>Michelle Alexander<\/span><\/a> illustrates why challenging racial bias in juries is so difficult. Despite the passage of laws such as <\/span>Batson v. Kentucky,<\/span><\/i> which prohibits prosecutors from discriminating on the basis of race when selecting juries, both prosecutors and defense attorneys are allowed peremptory strikes, or the ability to strike potential jurors for just about any reason they choose. Challenging instances of racial bias is even more difficult following the Supreme Court decision in <\/span>Purkett v. Elm<\/span><\/i>, which ruled that even if there is a pattern of striking a particular racial group by a prosecutor, providing any race-neutral reason (the prosecutor in this case used hair length) is enough to justify that the decision is not based on race. <\/span><\/h5>\n