{"id":2767,"date":"2019-07-16T06:46:57","date_gmt":"2019-07-16T06:46:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/?page_id=2767"},"modified":"2019-08-02T22:30:04","modified_gmt":"2019-08-02T22:30:04","slug":"on-collective-memory-and-historical-responsibility-an-interview-with-jeffrey-olick-complete","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/on-collective-memory-and-historical-responsibility-an-interview-with-jeffrey-olick-complete\/","title":{"rendered":"On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility: An Interview with Jeffrey Olick (Complete)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n

In your talk at the University of Minnesot, you have said that \u201cmemory studies have established Halbwachs as a totem, and this came at a particular intellectual cost\u201d. You also mentioned that \u201cthe international exchange between Europe and the United States has left a huge gap in the foundation of memory or collective memory literature.\u201d Can you elaborate on this?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Sure, the intellectual cost is in two directions. So in one\ncase, singling out Halbwachs as the founding father who deserves all the\nattention, or most of the attention pushes out our memory of other possible\npredecessors, trajectories, sources, of contemporary work. So as I talked about\nin the lecture yesterday, there\u2019s a line of thought going back to studies of\norganic memory in the 19th century, writers who were looking for intellectual\nequivalents of genes in culture, and so on memory, especially memory that is\ntransmitted across generations, as functioning in a similar way. That origin of\ncontemporary thought about memory has been closed off in part by the\noverwhelming focus on Halbwachs. There are other traditions, for instance in\nexperimental psychology. Names like Hermann Ebbinghaus, Wilhelm Wundt, and\ncertainly Frederick Bartlett, who was commemorated in an interesting way in\nMary Douglas\u2019s work \u201cHow Institutions Think\u201d should be brought into the\ndiscourse of contemporary memory studies. Also, giving too much attention to\nHalbwachs, provides a misbalance to the other major strand of contemporary\nmemory studies which is cultural memory studies, which traces its origins to\nwriters like Freud and Jung, but also pays attention to the anthropological\ntradition, …art historian Aby Warburg, literary writers  and the works of Jan and Aleida Assmann. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

You referred in your\ntalk, to the fact that lack of or incomplete translations has been part of the\nproblem\u2026<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yes, of course. So, you know, we didn\u2019t have in English the\nworks of Jan and Aleida Assmann available to us, their major works, except for\na few very small fragments in English. The first we had of Jan Assmann was Moses\nthe Egyptian, which I believe was 1992 or 1993, but his big book Das kulturelle\nGed\u00e4chtnis wasn\u2019t translated into English until probably, 2008, 2009, I\u2019d have\nto check on the date, but a very late date. The other part of the translation\nissue is that we have only fragments of Halbwachs available to us in English.\nInterestingly, many of Halbwachs\u2019s works on topics other than memory are in\nfact or already were in fact, available in English. But, even though Halbwachs\nis most known for his work on memory, arguably that\u2019s a mistake\u2026 we really only\nhave about a 3rd of his writings on memory available to us in English. So,\nthere were the posthumous works of his essays The Collective Memory, published\nin 1980 by Frank Ditter, who was a student here in Minnesota in 1980, with a\nMary Douglas introduction. But that was based on the 1950 edition of The\nCollective Memory which subsequent research in France has shown, was quite\npartial and misleading and was then reconstructed and reissued in the 1980s in\nFrench. So you had that one version which is outdated in French. Halbwachs\u2019s\nmost famous work, The Social Frameworks of Memory, which was originally\npublished in 1925, we only have about forty percent of it and it\u2019s missing the\nphilosophical chapters. This forty percent was included in Lewis Coser\u2019s book,\nOn Collective Memory, which is not a title that Halbwachs ever used. And the\n3rd major book, The Legendary Topography and the Gospels of the Holy Land, we\nonly have the conclusion which Lewis Coser included in his collective volume,\nOn Collective Memory, we\u2019ve never had the complete translation of The Legendary\nTopography. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

But you have taken up\nthe mission to address this issue and make those works available to scholars in\nthe Anglo-American world, correct?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I\u2019m very much looking forward to and am proud to be involved\nin the reissue, and in some cases first issue, of the complete translations of\nThe Social Frameworks of Memory, The Legendary Topography of the Holy Land, and\nthe retranslation based on the 1980\u2019s G\u00e9rard Namer edition of the posthumous\nThe Collective Memory, which will come out in 2019 from Oxford University\nPress. The damage to Halbwachs\u2019s reputation, however, in treating Halbwachs as\nthe singular founding father of collective memory is it reifies collective\nmemory as a special topic, and it, therefore, encourages us to see Halbwachs as\na particular kind of sociologist, namely a sociologist of culture and memory as\na part of culture. These are not the reasons Halbwachs had for his\ninvestigations of memory. His work on memory was very much part and parcel of\nhis general sociology. This is an argument that has been made very clearly in a\nrecent article in the Journal of Classical Sociology by the French sociologist,\nSarah Gensburger, where she attempts to show how Halbwachs\u2019s work on memory was\nconnected to another piece with his work on other topics, which for memory\nscholars may seem very far field; namely standard of living, household budgets,\nsuicide, and the studies of what Durkheim called social morphology. So by\ntreating Halbwachs as the founding father of memory studies, we lose the ways\nin which Halbwachs\u2019s interest in and work on memory was organically connected\nto these more general sociological concerns. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

You mentioned that\n\u201cindividual\u201d should be a disclaimer for memory, not \u201ccollective,\u201d as memory is\nalways collective. What do you mean by this?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, as a Neo-Durkheimian, I believe fundamentally that the\nindividual is the product not the source of society. One of my favorite\nreadings that I always assign in \u201cIntroduction to Sociology\u201d is from Norbert\nElias\u2019s Society of Individuals. And in that work, Elias takes issue with the\npolitical theory of the 18th century, namely contract theory, which, in various\nversions, always sees the isolated individual wandering around the forest until\nhe accidentally bumps into another individual and then they have to work out a\nsocial contract between them. In contrast, Elias says, \u201cWell, if you need a\nmyth to underwrite your view of the world, this myth is the wrong one. What we\nhave to start with is the fact that human beings are born out of other human\nbeings, connected to them by a cord, into a set of circumstances which\npre-exists them. So we are not primarily individuals, we are first and foremost\nmembers of a group and we, in fact, then develop our sense of individuality\nfrom that group context.\u201d So I\u2019m very much a sociologist in this vein that we\nstart with groups, we start with our groupness and our individuality is a\nproduct rather than a source of our groupness. So when I talk about memory, and\nthis is one of the lessons I take from Halbwachs, who was very much involved in\nthe expansion and institutionalization of Durkheim\u2019s legacy. So, Halbwachs\u2019s\nfundamental insight is that even though we think of memory as a fundamentally\nprivate matter, (we do it in the dark with our eyes closed, by ourselves, and,\nunless we tell somebody about it, they don\u2019t know about it. So it\u2019s private,\nit\u2019s closed off to us), except Halbwachs makes the point that when we\u2019re doing\nthat remembering, we\u2019re doing it as social persons. We\u2019re doing it with a\nspecific set of identities. We\u2019re doing it in a language, and with concepts,\nand with structures, that are not of our own making. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Is this what Halbwachs calls \u201cthe social frameworks of memory?\u201d<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Precisely. Our identities, the notion of calendars, and\ntimes, and names, and obligations, and symbols, and meanings, with which we\nunderstand ourselves and our existence. These are social frameworks and there\u2019s\nno remembering without them. Halbwachs also points out that much of what we\nthink of as individual or private memory is a response to cues and\ncircumstances which originate outside of ourselves. For instance, if I ask you\n\u201cTell me about your childhood,\u201d you may not have thought about your childhood\ntoday. Or if I say, \u201cWhat was the name of your high school principal?\u201d You may\nnot have thought of that in 5, or 10, or 20 years, depending on how old you\nare. But I\u2019m spurring you to that, it\u2019s a cue. Our groups also do that. They\ntell us what things are worthy of remembering. Our groups give us the tools\nwith which to think about them. Another important thing that happens is we get\nsocial reminders over time. So even though we experience an event, and we think\nwe\u2019re remembering in an unmediated fashion what happened to us, first of all,\nwe don\u2019t really know the meaning of the event until afterwards and that meaning\nis continually revised by future inputs, our memories are reactivated in social\ninteractions, so\u2026 you can tell me my new phone number, but if I don\u2019t have\noccasion to dial that phone number again and again, or give it to other people,\nor write it down on forms repeatedly, I\u2019m going to forget that number. And so\neven this originary memory, we were told a number once, only remains active and\npresent in our minds through repetition. One of the things that memory studies\nhave shown is that kind of repetition, those kinds of new cues, also include\ncontaminating elements. That is, things come into the memory and the originary\nmemory gets transformed beyond recognition. Halbwachs also gives the example of\nremembering our childhood, and that we may think that we have\u2026 \u201cwhat is your\nearliest memory?\u201d \u2026 but even something as personal as your earliest memory is\nmediated by familial retellings, by photographs, by other kinds of frameworks\nof memory. Halbwachs also shows how we remember together as a social act. That\nis, we sit around the dinner table, \u201chey remember that time we went to that\nbaseball game and you got lost\u201d or \u201cyou dropped your hotdog\u201d or whatever it\nwas. We\u2019re reminded, we\u2019re shaped, sometimes we forgot something: \u201cNo, no, no,\nit wasn\u2019t a hotdog. You had a hamburger.\u201d \u201cOh, yes, yes, yes.\u201d And you\nincorporate that in, and you remember together. Cognitive psychology has shown\nthat that\u2019s the case. If you give somebody a list of words to memorize, and\nthen at a later date, under different conditions, ask them to reproduce those\nwords; they\u2019re only going to be able to come up with a certain number of them.\nBut if you were to give a group of people words to remember, there are two\ndifferent ways. Either they can divide and conquer and if there are 30 words,\neach of three memorize 10, and they\u2019re going to come up with more words\ntogether, or they can all study the same 30 words and some will remember some\nwords and some will remember others, but together they can help each other to\nreconstruct a larger list. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In your work, you introduce concepts that disentangle the often mystified term \u00a8collective memory.\u00a8 Can you<\/g> elaborate on those? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Collective\nmemory tends to imply that there\u2019s one collective memory that everyone shares\nor that collective memory is this mystical group mind. And I don\u2019t think of it\nthat way. So in my own work, I refer to what I call \u201cmnemonic practices\u201d\npractices and also \u201cmnemonic products\u201d and \u201cmnemonic processes.\u201d And there are\nwide numbers of different mnemonic practices, and products, and processes. So\nfor instance, remembering your phone number is a particular kind of mnemonic\npractice. Remembering who the president is is another one. Remembering that\ntime we went on a hike is yet a different one. Remembering that America had a\ncivil war is yet a different one. So is giving a speech or painting a painting\nabout the past, or telling a story, or recalling a set of numbers and facts.\nThese are all different mnemonic practices. The question from memory studies is\nhow they relate to each other or don\u2019t. There\u2019s also a variety of mnemonic\nproducts. You know, a statue is a mnemonic product. A historical movie is a\nmnemonic product. An essay is a mnemonic product; so is a story I might tell at\na dinner table. These are different mnemonic products. The question is, how are\nthey, in the words of media scholars, how are they intermedial? How does the\ntelling of the story at the dinner table, affect people\u2019s experiences and the\nway in which a museum is constructed? So the question is how do all of these\ndifferent mnemonic products, practices, and processes relate to each other?\nWhich is, I think, a more differentiated way of speaking about the many things\nthat constitute what we label with the term collective memory. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

So, I have a \u201cpersonal interest\u201d\nwhere do you see emotions in all this? Like where do you see and how do you\nthink we can theorize in emotions into this interaction between individual and\ncollective memory or mnemonic practices? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

So I would\nsay, first of all, that memories preserve emotions and can call up emotions in\ninteresting and complex ways. So that, for instance, remembering something that\nangered you in the past, can make you angry again. Emotion also feeds into the\nways in which we decide something is worth remembering. The notion of the trope\nin politics, particularly the politics of genocide, \u201cNever Forget.\u201d That\nimplores us, it demands us, it demands something of us, it riles us up, it\ncreates a strong sense of obligation. So emotions feed into both what we\nremember and memory feeds into and creates emotions when we do remember. One of\nthe interesting things though is the ways in which both memory and emotion can\nbe separate. So I can remember that I was really angry at my partner or my kid\nor something like that, but I\u2019m not angry anymore about it. I can remember that\nI was, but it\u2019s gone away. I remember what caused it, and isn\u2019t it strange that\nI was so angry at the time, but I don\u2019t feel that anger anymore. By the same\ntoken, I can remember the feeling of anger sometimes. I wake up (this is a\nterrible thing to say about myself), sometimes I wake up angry and I can\u2019t put\nmy finger on what it is I\u2019m angry about… So these work in complex ways, but I\nshould also point out that so much of the discussion in memory studies is about\ntrauma, and negative memories, and outrage, and things like that. There\u2019s also\nmemories of joy and happiness. It\u2019s very important in certain circumstances to\nhold onto positive memories; that something actually worked really well or was\nreally nice. Of course, the one lesson of a long life is that it\u2019s very hard,\nyou can\u2019t step in the same river twice, that even something you remember as\ngreat, may not have been all that great in fact. So this is one of the\ndistortions of nostalgia, which is an emotional distortion. You venerate a past\nand you load extra emotions onto a past that may or may not have been actually\na part of the process in the first place. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In your book \u201cThe Sins of the\nFathers\u201d you develop a new concept, legitimation profiles. Can you explain it\nfor us, and talk about its applicability to different cases? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The Sins of the Fathers is organized on two analytical principles: profile and genre. Profile<\/g> is meant to understand the relational structure of memories within cultures at particular moments or in a particular epoch; whereas genres are meant to understand the ways in which every version of the past is in dialogue, not only with the past itself but with previous memories or versions of the past. So the genres are the connective structure through time; profiles are the non-reductive structure or totality of a system of meanings in the present. So from French structuralism<\/g> we know that there is a discursive structure where tall and short, fat and skinny, high and low, and lots of other kinds of concepts are in a paired relational structure at a particular moment. So a particular version of the past may fit with a particular legitimacy claim. So in the book, I argue for instance, that in the 1980s when German politicians are trying to legitimate Germany by saying it\u2019s a normal nation, the idea of Germany as a normal nation entails a particular view of the past. And so they produce a particular form of public memory that relativizes the Nazi past; whereas, in contrast, in earlier periods, for instance, in the 1960s, in what I call the moral nation, which is the legitimate profile, Germany wants to appear to the world as a moral entity with authority. And a key part of being a moral nation is to have a deep acknowledgment of the guilt of the past, and this is captured, for instance, when the German Chancellor, Willy Brandt, goes to Warsaw and goes down on his knees in a gesture of repentance. This is something that the later Chancellor of Germany, Helmut Kohl, would never have done because he\u2019s trying to claim that Germany is normal. In Sins of the Fathers, I talk about 3 legitimation profiles: the reliable nation of the 1950s and early 60s, the moral nation of the mid-1960s to early 1970s, and then the normal nation of the 1980s up through unification. To capture the ways in which images of the past fit within a wider political-cultural system of meanings; some of which concern the past, some of which concern the present. So in other words, not to treat memory as something separable, something that can be pried out of a deeper cultural nexus intact. Memory works together with other meanings and symbols in what I think of as an irreducible profile. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In your talk, you\nmentioned how during your formative years as a PhD student, one of your tasks\nwas to establish collective memory as a legitimate sociological pursuit. How do\nyou think the field has evolved in the past 25 years since you have gotten your\nPhD? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

The chronology is a little bit different. When I started\nworking on my dissertation I didn\u2019t actually have the concept of collective\nmemory; so in part, when one of my advisors said, \u201cWell, there\u2019s this student\nof Durkheim\u2019s named Maurice Halbwachs, and he wrote a book called The\nCollective Memory and you should go read it,\u201d this was a great discovery for me\nbecause, as someone interested in narratives, story-telling, symbolism,\nlanguage, I felt very marginal to American sociology. You know, I\u2019d just\nfinished a year of statistics and methods and sociology looked very different\nfrom the kind of work that I wanted to do and I was feeling very marginalized\nand alienated from sociology. And then I went and I read this guy who was the\nmajor prot\u00e9g\u00e9 of the field\u2019s founding father and he was writing about exactly\nwhat I wanted to write about and so I felt vindication. Right, you see! You\nsee, I\u2019m the real sociology, I haven\u2019t left sociology, sociology has left me!\nThe problem is, that at that point in time, this was the late 1980s, early\n1990s; there was very little in the way of work on collective memory. So we\nused to go, in those days, when we didn\u2019t have the internet, we had to go to\nthe reference librarian who would give us a CD-ROM which you would stick in the\ncomputer and it would have last year\u2019s social science citation index. So you\nfound articles that way and I typed in the keyword \u201ccollective memory\u201d and the\nonly one that came up was Barry Schwartz and so I went off and did my research\nand wrote my dissertation and I used the concept of collective memory; at the\ntime Michael Schudson\u2019s book on Watergate had just come out, there were a few\nother things, and I used them as best I could, but when I finished the\ndissertation, before turning it into a book, I really wanted to theorize what\nexactly it is it I\u2019m talking about and how exactly it works. And I was making\nup concepts like \u201cgenre\u201d and \u201cprofile\u201d on the fly with the resources that I had\navailable to me. And so I set to work on, first of all, reviewing every piece\nof reading and writing I could find that seemed to me to be talking about these\nthings. So I read across an enormous array of fields, looking for people who\nused the term \u201cmemory\u201d or \u201ccollective memory\u201d or \u201cpublic memory\u201d or \u201cnational\nmemory,\u201d but also for people who were talking about those things but perhaps\nusing different terms like political myth or tradition or heritage. So my first\nmajor contribution, I think, was trying to synthesize all of those different\nendeavors into something that I thought of as one field; and I did that in a\n1998 Annual Review of Sociology piece. It\u2019s been sort of funny to me when\npeople refer back to the things I talked about as being relevant to memory\nstudies in that article. \u201cWell everybody knows there\u2019s this work, and this\nwork, and this work,\u201d when really that was really more of a description of the\npiles of books and papers that were spread out on my dining room table for a\nyear and that I was making into piles, and so it\u2019s really funny to see the\ncategories, the distinctions, the things that I included, sort of reified to a\npre-existing field when some of them were fairly arbitrary choices and I\u2019m sure\nI missed an awful lot. So this is what I did for the first 10 years of my\ncareer – which was in many ways a mistake, it\u2019s better if you have a\npre-existing theoretical apparatus, that you don\u2019t need to build it from the\nground up yourself – but as I did this, I discovered more and more people were\ncoming around and starting to write about these things. I\u2019ve often said that\nwhen I started as a graduate student and as a new assistant professor, every\ntime I went to the bookstore or read a journal if there was something that used\nthe term \u201ccollective memory,\u201d I\u2019d buy the book or I\u2019d photocopy the article. By\nthe mid-1990s, of course, that was financially unfeasible. More and more, every\ntime it\u2019d be an exponential increase in the use of the term \u201ccollective\nmemory.\u201d So it\u2019s a literature that, in many ways, grew beyond control; beyond\nthe ability of any one person to master it. At the same time, lots and lots of\npeople were also coming to recognize this, and there were more and more\nconferences and workshops.<\/p>\n\n\n\n

When does the Journal\ncome into the scene?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

I believe it was 2008, a number of colleagues starting talking\nabout \u201cwell, we really need a journal\u201d and the Journal of Memory Studies was\nformed. I would go from conference to conference to conference, usually small\nworkshops, some of which were other memory scholars who knew the literatures\nand I was always happy to find people who knew the same things I had, but many\nof them were using memory in a sort of lay fashion and we ended up sort of\nputting the program on hold and having a sort of didactic seminar: \u201coh there\nwas this guy named Halbwachs and he used this term but don\u2019t forget the other\nstuff.\u201d But through the period of about 2005 to 2015 or so, it really seemed as\nif a field known as memory studies was really coming into existence and I tried\nto be a multiplier of this as an institution builder and so it was really\ngratifying in 2006 when we declared the existence of the Memory Studies\nAssociation, built on the successes of the Journal of Memory Studies and over\nthe past – Sorry, 2016 that that happened – and now we seem to be on pretty\nsolid organizational footing and we\u2019re hoping that the Memory Studies\nAssociation will continue – establish itself as a major scholar organization\nand a reliable piece of the scholarly apparatus; which will be sort of an\nin-gathering of people who have been working on memory and memory-related\nissues and all sorts of cognate and related disciplines like archive studies\nand heritage studies and oral history and museology and transitional justice,\nand the traditional disciplines of sociology and literary studies and art history\nand all the others, and political science and philosophy. So we\u2019re trying to\nmake an in-gathering. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where do you think\nthe field is going? <\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n

Where do we go from here? It\u2019s obviously an open question.\nAstrid Erll, the literary critic from Frankfurt, has a wonderful article in\nwhich she identifies three waves of literary memory? studies. The first being\nthe pre-World War II wave of Halbwachs and Warburg and others, the second being\nthe 1980s and 1990s, the crucible in which my ideas were formed which focused\nmostly on national memory and the nation-state as a carrier or container of\nmemory, the third wave of memory studies, which has been led by Astrid Erll\nherself, but also Ann Rigney and Aleida Assmann (15:50), but perhaps most\nimportantly Michael Rothberg, has been a trans-national memory studies which\ntries to overcome the idea that the nation-state is the sole or most important\ncontainer of memories with concepts like \u201ctraveling memory,\u201d \u201centangled\nmemory,\u201d and \u201cmulti-directional memory.\u201d So, for instance, viewing immigrants\nas vectors of complex, multi-directional memory: they have their memory of the\nplace of origin, they adopt the collective memories of the destination country,\nbut then they also travel and trade and exchange memories across these artificial\nboundaries and borders and through complex media flows that are not described\nbest by the member nations of the United Nations. So that, I would say, is the\nmost promising avenue. This tracing out the flows and the conduits through\nwhich memory travels and the different ways in which memory forms into clusters\nor nodes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n

In recent talks, you have introduced the concept of \u201cregions of memory\u201d. How does it fit within the overall trend of transnationalization?<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n

There\u2019s been an argument about, with the mass media and the worldwide knowledge about certain historical events, there\u2019s been a globalization or universalization of memory. So in a way, global memory has replaced national memory as the point of reference. What I want to show is also that there are entities or clusters between the level of the nation-state and the global, which I call regional. So there are regional constellations of memory like Central and East-Central Europe, where different nation-states, and different groups are remembering the past in complex ways which are not global, but nor are they constituted particularly by the nation-states that can be found on a map in this geographical arena. A good example of work in this field is the impact of Timothy Snyder\u2019s Bloodlands; where he shows that there is a territory and a broad period of destruction from the late 1920s through the 1950s, which cannot be delimited by the declaration of war in 1939 or 1941 and the declaration of the end of war in 1945, nor can it be defined solely by what happened in Germany or what happened in Poland, but these issues spread out and there are complicated geographical and cultural clusters; which I try to capture with the notion of regions of memory. There are ways in which, for instance\u2026 countries in the Southern continent of Latin America are dealing with similar kinds of issues. There are ways in which Canada and, to some extent, the United States, but also Australia and New Zealand are a region of memory, dealing with the treatment of indigenous peoples. There is a cluster of issues which define Northeast Asia as a region of memory; South Korea with the comfort women issue and Japanese imperialism and the Rape of Nanjing all form a sort of cluster of issues that come about from a century of Japanese imperialism resulting in the Pacific War, but what can\u2019t be defined solely as Japanese memory or Chinese memory or South Korean memory. <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In your talk at the University of Minnesot, you have said that \u201cmemory studies have established Halbwachs as a totem, and this came at a particular intellectual cost\u201d. You also mentioned that \u201cthe international exchange between Europe and the United States has left a huge gap in the foundation of memory or collective memory literature.\u201d […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2081,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-2767","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2767","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2081"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2767"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2767\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2778,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/2767\/revisions\/2778"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/holocaust-genocide\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2767"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}