{"id":15751,"date":"2013-06-03T07:00:26","date_gmt":"2013-06-03T11:00:26","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/?p=15751"},"modified":"2013-05-31T09:50:07","modified_gmt":"2013-05-31T13:50:07","slug":"digital-dualist-conservatism","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/2013\/06\/03\/digital-dualist-conservatism\/","title":{"rendered":"Digital Dualist Conservatism"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"<\/a>Over the past few months, a lot of theoretical work has been done to further develop the concept of \u201cdigital dualism.\u201d Following a provocation from Nicholas Carr<\/a>, a number of thoughtful people have chimed in to help both further explicate and defend the theory. Their responses have been enlightening and are worth reading in full. They have also clarified a few things for me about the topic that I\u2019d like to share here. Specifically, I\u2019d like to do a bit of reframing regarding the nature of digital dualism, drawing upon this post<\/a> by Nathan Jurgenson, then use this framework to situate digital dualism within a broader field of political disagreement and struggle.<\/p>\n

In his reply to Carr<\/a>, Jurgenson helpfully parses apart two distinct-but-related issues. (Technically he draws three distinctions, but I will only focus upon two here). First, Jurgenson identifies what he calls \u201contological digital dualism theory,\u201d a research project that he characterizes as focused upon that which exists. Such theory would seem to include all efforts that seek to explain (or call into question) the referents of commonly used terms such as \u201cdigital\u201d or \u201cvirtual,\u201d \u201cphysical\u201d or \u201creal.\u201d In contrast to this ontological theory, he then identifies what might be called normative<\/i> digital dualism theory\u2014a branch of analysis concerned with the comparative value<\/i> that is attributed to the categories established by one\u2019s ontological position. Such theory would thus analyze the use of value-laden modifiers such as \u201creal\u201d or \u201cauthentic\u201d in describing the \u201cdigital\u201d or the \u201cphysical.\u201d<\/p>\n

I posit that digital dualism, in fact, draws from both the ontological and the normative analyses. Specifically the digital dualist:<\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Establishes an ontological distinction that carves up the world into two mutually exclusive (and collectively exhaustive) categories\u2014at least one of which is somehow bound up with digital technology (e.g., that which is \u201cvirtual\u201d vs. that which is \u201creal\u201d.)<\/li>\n
  2. Posits some normative criteria that privileges one category over the other. (In most cases, it is the non-technological category that is deemed morally superior. However, charges of digital dualism would equally apply to views that favored the technological.)<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    Often the normative ranking of Step 2 is built into the very names of the categories posited in Step 1, as St\u00e9phane Vial has previously argued<\/a>. For example, the commonly-deployed term \u201creal\u201d suggests that what goes on in the opposing \u201cvirtual\u201d realm is somehow \u201cfake\u201d\u2014a term with strong negative connotations. Other times the dualist will rely upon additional description to suggest the inferiority of the technological. But regardless of how this normative evaluation is communicated, the basic claim of the digital dualist is (usually) the same: The activities and modes of existence falling within the technological category are morally inferior to their non-technological counterparts.<\/p>\n

    ***<\/p>\n

    This two-component view of digital dualism, whereby a normative hierarchy is superimposed onto (or, perhaps, built into) an ontological distinction, makes it possible to locate it within a broader constellation of conservative thought. Specifically, I will try to show that digital dualism\u2019s two steps are built into a variety of conservative views\u2014a recurrence that I argue is not a coincidence but a testament to the inherent conservatism of the dualist\u2019s two-step move. Then, I will use this observation to suggest that digital dualism, too, is a deeply conservative ideology.<\/p>\n

    First, though, it is necessary to clarify what exactly it would mean for a given view to be \u201cconservative.\u201d Such a view, I contend, is one that serves to either justify existing social hierarchies (and delegitimize efforts to subvert or undermine those hierarchies) or to establish new ones. In other words, it provides reason for privileging one group over the rest, typically by justifying\u2014sometimes tacitly or obliquely\u2014why one group should either power over its inferiors or a greater share of social goods.<\/p>\n

    Rather than defend the centrality of hierarchy to conservatism here, I\u2019ll instead gesture towards the work of other theorists who have sought to expose how a taste for hierarchy is common to otherwise-diverse conservative thinkers and movements. Corey Robin, for instance, has devoted an entire book to the subject, arguing that the \u201ccapitalists, Christians, and warriors\u201d who comprise the conservative block are united in their \u201copposition to the liberation of men and women from the fetters of their superiors, particularly in the private sphere,\u201d in the belief that an emancipated world would \u201clack the excellence of a world where the better man commands the worse.\u201d1<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Admittedly, including the positing of novel<\/i> hierarchies within the scope of \u201cconservatism\u201d seems to push at the boundaries of the concept. However, the inclusion is both useful for political analysis\u2014any critique of traditional hierarchies would likely apply to novel ones as well\u2014and seems necessary for capturing conservative ideological defenses against new modes of existence (transphobia, for example, can be considered a reactionary defense of traditional ways of being built upon a newly-developed<\/i> social hierarchy). Given this definition of conservatism, my central claim is that conservative ideologies tend to rest on the same two elements that define digital dualism\u2014an ontological division that is then imbued with normative weight.<\/p>\n

    Consider a few suggestive examples.<\/p>\n

    In \u201cThe Aristocracy of Culture,\u201d sociologist Pierre Bourdieu seeks to show how aesthetic and cultural preferences are deployed to establish hierarchy dividing the elites from the masses. He theorizes that cultural elites establish an ontological distinction between \u201cpure taste\u201d and \u201cbarbarous taste\u201d to support the hierarchical notion of \u201ca radical difference which seems to be inscribed in \u2018persons\u2019.\u201d2<\/sup><\/a> As an example, he quotes the philosopher Ortega y Gasset at length, noting in particular the latter\u2019s assertions \u201cthat some possess an organ of understanding which others have been denied; that these are two distinct varieties of the human species,\u201d3<\/sup><\/a> and that:<\/p>\n

    The music of Stravinsky or the plays of Pirandello have the sociological power of obliging [the masses] to see themselves as they are, as the \u2018common people\u2019, a mere ingredient among others in the social structure, the inert material of the historical process, a secondary factor in the spiritual cosmos. By contrast, the young art helps the \u2018best\u2019 to know and recognize one another in the greyness of the multitude and to learn their mission, which is to be few in number and to have to fight against the multitude.4<\/sup><\/a><\/p><\/blockquote>\n

    Through these quotes, Bourdieu reveals how the ontological distinction between high and low art comes to be imbued with normative weight, with the enjoyment of the former coming to serve as an \u201caffirmation of the superiority of those who can be satisfied with [high culture].\u201d5<\/sup><\/a> In this way, he concludes, \u201chigh\u201d vs. \u201clow\u201d art is distinction predisposed \u201cto fulfill a social function of legitimating social differences.\u201d6<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Nietzsche, too\u2014at least by one reading\u2014legitimates inequality via the normative weighting of ontological categories. In On the Genealogy of Morals<\/i>, <\/i>Nietzsche posits (and seemingly endorses) a \u201cnoble\u201d normative framework that privileges the \u201cnoble ones, we good, beautiful, happy ones\u201d7<\/sup><\/a> over the low, the common, and the bad. To clarify this distinction, he reframes the divide as one between the \u201cblond beast<\/i> prowling about avidly in search of spoil\u201d8<\/sup><\/a> and \u201cthe ill-constituted, sickly, weary and exhausted people of which Europe is beginning to stink,\u201d9<\/sup><\/a> and again as \u201cRome against Judea,\u201d and \u201chigher man\u201d versus the \u201c\u2018tame man,\u2019 the hopelessly mediocre and insipid man,\u201d10<\/sup><\/a> among others . Through such descriptions, Nietzsche seeks to establish a clear ontological caste system\u2014a framework from which he might call into question egalitarian ethical principles and normative positions. For why would one structure society around the needs of the pathetic? In this respect, Nietzsche\u2019s position seems to both qualify as deeply conservative while also clearly mirroring the two moves of the digital dualist.<\/p>\n

    Finally, white supremacism (among other forms of racial chauvinism) also seems to be characterized by an ontological insistence upon carving up the social world upon racial lines<\/a>, a move that is then followed by a normative ranking of the groups. (Though white supremacists try to obfuscate this second move so as to make their ideology seem more palatable, such maneuvering doesn\u2019t change the reality of their ideology).<\/p>\n

    ***<\/p>\n

    In each of these cases, the same basic pattern of the two-step move reemerges. In a sense, this should be expected, as the normative ranking of Step 2 seems to be the only way to establish some sort of normative or justificatory underpinnings for affirming a conservative hierarchy. Yet to see this normative ranking embodied in actual conservative ideologies really clarifies the point, I think.<\/p>\n

    More importantly, these examples also make apparent the way in which digital dualism is also a conservative ideology. Though dualists tend to focus upon digital activities rather than people, it seems that such judgment inevitably expands so as to include those who engage in digital activities as well. If \u201cvirtual\u201d friendships are shallower than \u201creal\u201d ones, what does that say about those who are drawn to the former? Indeed, just as the privileging of \u201chigh\u201d over \u201clow\u201d art isn\u2019t so much a judgment about the works themselves as it is their enthusiasts, digital dualism is a way of developing a new hierarchy to separate those with a taste for the \u201cphysical\u201d and the \u201creal\u201d from the digitally-inclined masses. And, in this way, it becomes the latest manifestation of a long tradition of developing social schemas that caste a particular group as inferior for the benefit of the privileged group. And though digital dualism is certainly not as extreme or seemingly oppressive as Nietzscheanism or white supremacism, the difference appears to be one of degree rather than kind.<\/p>\n

    By thus locating digital dualism within a broader field of conservative ideologies, it becomes possible to both understand why the view strikes so many as problematic or even borderline-offensive. At least for those with egalitarian sensibilities, digital dualism could\u2014and should\u2014trigger the same alarm bells as Ortega y Gasset, Nietzsche, and David Duke, albeit at a lower volume.<\/p>\n

    Finally, recognizing the conservatism of digital dualism opens up new strategies for critique. For anti-dualists, in addition to formulating novel criticisms, might also bring to bear a broad array of egalitarian and anti-conservative thought and arguments to the issue at hand. Likewise, many of the arguments that have appeared on this blog might be usefully repurposed to aid in broader disputes between egalitarians and hierarchs. In this way, understanding digital dualism as a conservative ideology might serve to unify otherwise-diverse thinkers, bringing together and amplifying their theoretical work in the struggle against the ideologies of the right.<\/p>\n

    Jesse Elias Spafford enjoys reading the Internet and writing about power, politics, and pop culture.\u00a0@jessespafford<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

    Drawing on Nietzsche and others, Jesse Elias Spafford locates digital dualism as a conservative ideology, one that is offensive to egalitarian sensibilities.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":559,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":false,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2}},"categories":[9967,10006],"tags":[2324,2603,10447,39,2954,3998,3196,19971],"class_list":["post-15751","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-commentary","category-guest-author","tag-augmented-reality","tag-digital","tag-digital-dualism","tag-ethics","tag-jurgenson","tag-nietzsche","tag-ontology","tag-vial"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15751","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/559"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=15751"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15751\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15809,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/15751\/revisions\/15809"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=15751"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=15751"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/thesocietypages.org\/cyborgology\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=15751"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}