

Dealing with Diversity: Mapping Multiculturalism in Sociological Terms*

DOUGLAS HARTMANN AND JOSEPH GERTEIS

University of Minnesota

Since the 1960s, a variety of new ways of addressing the challenges of diversity in American society have coalesced around the term "multiculturalism." In this article, we impose some clarity on the theoretical debates that surround divergent visions of difference. Rethinking multiculturalism from a sociological point of view, we propose a model that distinguishes between the social (associational) and cultural (moral) bases for social cohesion in the context of diversity. The framework allows us to identify three distinct types of multiculturalism and situate them in relation to assimilationism, the traditional American response to difference. We discuss the sociological parameters and characteristics of each of these forms, attending to the strength of social boundaries as well as to the source of social ties. We then use our model to clarify a number of conceptual tensions in the existing scholarly literature and offer some observations about the politics of recognition and redistribution, and the recent revival of assimilationist thought.

"We are all multiculturalists now," Nathan Glazer declared with characteristic bluntness and authority in 1997. Informed by his participation on a panel charged with designing a new history curriculum for high school students in New York State, this well-known Harvard social scientist meant to call attention to the ways in which all Americans—regardless of race, religion, political affiliation, lifestyle, or moral orientation—have come to speak the language of tolerance and respect for cultural diversity in the contemporary, post-civil-rights era.

Is Glazer correct? Is multiculturalism as pervasive as he says? If so, is it a deeply held commitment or an empty language? What is multiculturalism anyway? What forms of social distinction and collective identification does it apply to? What does it suggest about how solidarity might emerge amid difference? Such questions are no trivial academic matter. Our answers to them have very real implications for politics and public policy. We need look no further than the recent debate and Supreme Court ruling on affirmative action at the University of Michigan where Sandra Day O'Connor—to the surprise of many erstwhile supporters—wrote a majority decision that held diversity to be central to the dream of the nation and the legitimacy of the ruling class. In contrast, Glazer himself suggests that the discourse of multiculturalism

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has diverted attention away from more fundamental structural problems of racism and social inequality that have landed disproportionately and unjustly on African Americans. In his view, multiculturalism “is the price America is paying for its inability or unwillingness to incorporate into its society African Americans” (Glazer 1997:147).

Despite their obvious social significance, answers to the questions raised by what the anthropologist Richard Shweder and his colleagues (Shweder, Minow, and Marcus 2002) have called the “multicultural challenge” have proven difficult to come by. A number of obstacles stand in the way. Conflicting political and ideological agendas inevitably and almost immediately get caught up in any discussion of the term. There is also a lamentable absence of appropriate data to provide for common empirical grounding. But perhaps the first and most fundamental problem is the lack of theoretical clarity about what we mean by multiculturalism. A number of important theoretical discussions of multiculturalism have appeared in recent years, many in the form of edited collections of representative scholarly articles (cf. Kivisto and Rundblad 2000; Parekh 2000; Joppke and Lukes 1999; Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman 1998; Willett 1998; Gordon and Newfield 1996; Goldberg 1994). But the many different definitions and opinions have proven difficult to disentangle or synthesize theoretically, much less operationalize for empirical testing and evaluation. This article is an attempt to address this confusion and thus to clear the way for a more systematic analysis of difference, incorporation, and solidarity in contemporary American culture.

Drawing on classical social theory and insights about multiculturalism in the recent work of Taylor (2001) and Alexander (2001a), we propose a theoretical framework that specifies the sociological dimensions of order embedded in alternative responses to difference in the scholarly literature. More specifically, this model will distinguish between the social and cultural bases for social cohesion in the context of diversity—where the “social” dimension refers to the interactions among and between individuals, groups, and the nation (what Durkheim called “social integration,” or Tocqueville termed “association”), and the “cultural” aspect has to do with the more normative basis for social order (“moral regulation” in Durkheim’s terms; “mores” for de Tocqueville). We use these two dimensions to produce a two-by-two table specifying three distinct types of multiculturalism (cosmopolitanism, fragmented pluralism, and interactive pluralism) situated in relationship to the classic liberal response to difference and assimilation. We use this framework to define and clarify four distinct visions of difference, focusing in particular on the basis of order and solidarity implied in each as well as on the strength and orientation of corresponding social boundaries. Arranging these four types on a two-by-two grid highlights some of the features that distinguish each of the types, but it also reveals certain unexpected or at least previously unrealized commonalities between the resulting pairs—relationships that help shed light on a number of key issues at stake in current scholarly debates. We conclude by discussing some of the implications of this conceptual model for concrete empirical analyses of multiculturalism, diversity, and related issues in contemporary American culture.

BASIC DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

The most common conception of multiculturalism in both scholarly circles and popular discourse is a negative one, having to do with what multiculturalism is not or what it stands in opposition to. Multiculturalism in this usage represents heterogeneity as opposed to homogeneity, diversity as a counterpoint to unity. This implicit

opposition between social cohesion and multiculturalism is neatly captured in questions about diversity that typically appear on public opinion polls—one place where popular and scholarly ways of thinking often come together. Consider this key question for a multiculturalism module on the 1994 General Social Survey:

Some people say that it is better for America if different racial and ethnic groups maintain their distinct cultures. Others say that it is better if groups change so that they blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot. Where do you place yourself on the following scale, from (1) race and ethnic groups should maintain their distinct cultures to (7) groups should change so that they blend into the larger society? (Davis, Smith, and Marsden 2002)

Here, the responses are formulated specifically so that one has to situate oneself with respect to the presumed unity of the social whole (the “melting pot”) as against an alternative conception of society as a collection of discrete and presumably divided ethnic and racial communities. The graphic equivalent of this claim would place unity on one end of a continuum with diversity or fragmentation on the other. In the same spirit, Schlesinger’s (1991) famous critique characterized multiculturalism as the “disuniting of America” (see also Miller 1998; Hughes 1993).

There are, in our view, a number of connected problems with this negative, one-dimensional conception of multiculturalism (Figure 1). One issue is the static and narrow conception of social order that it implies. At the same time, it becomes difficult (if not impossible) to appreciate the value, benefit, and even functional necessity of difference in modern societies. Social differences in this view may be tolerated, but they are always and inherently divisive and are therefore a threat to social unity. This is not necessarily the case; differences are often accommodated without tremendous social upheaval, and a fundamental claim of most contemporary multiculturalists is that differences should be valued in and of themselves.¹



Figure 1. The one-dimensional model.

The metaphor of musical harmony so frequently invoked by those who oppose multiculturalism is instructive. Harmony is not based on the homogeneity of musical pitches but in fact requires a variety of notes that fit together and complement one another. This is not to insist that all diversity is good, but only to suggest that not all diversity is bad and that some forms can be very good indeed.² On the flip side of this opposition, contemporary defenders of multiculturalism have too often argued “for” diversity without specifying what forms of difference they are defending or, more importantly, how order and stability can be maintained in the face of increasing diversity. This is where conservative critics of multiculturalism, despite their other shortcomings, have a point. They are correct to insist that social order cannot be

¹Classical theorists understood this well. Thinkers as different as Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Emile Durkheim took the division of labor as a central issue based on the understanding that a diversity of distinct and interdependent roles is crucial to modern societies. While these scholars typically focused on the material or instrumental dimensions of diversity, there are gestures toward the impact and value of diversity in the cultural realm as well.

²To extend the metaphor a little more, it is also worth noting that the appreciation of order in music is also something of a dialectical process. As with bebop and other forms of modern jazz, statements that were first perceived as chaotic and discordant could later be appreciated for the new kinds of musical order they embodied.

assumed (things can “fall apart,” as the title of Achebe’s (1995) well-known African novel has it) and that order and stability is almost always more difficult to achieve and maintain in the context of diversity.

Yet another problem with this one-dimensional view is that it is too easily conflated with a political opposition between right and left, conservative and progressive. For example, one does not need to know a great deal about the history of American race relations to realize that some of the most vibrant and distinctive cultures that compose the American mosaic have come at the cost of tremendous social injustices and inequalities.³ In recognition of this fact, many liberals and progressives have argued that a meaningful multiculturalism must be based on a politics of equity, economic redistribution, and social restructuring. The mutual necessity of both recognition and redistribution (Fraser 1997a) is the basis for what is sometimes termed “critical multiculturalism” (cf. Hamilton 1996; Kanpol and McLaren 1995; McLaren 1994; Chicago Cultural Studies Group 1994).⁴

Visions for redistribution are important and indicate very real fault lines within debates about multiculturalism. However, it is crucial to distinguish between the structural form and political implications of various conceptions of difference. The two do not correlate neatly or consistently, and conflating them can lead to more confusion than clarity. For example, in interviews with middle-class suburbanites, Wolfe (2000) found a “benign multiculturalism” wherein respondents expressed a preference for social and cultural diversity but opposed government policies designed to advance toward these objectives. Similarly, others have detected a market-based “boutique multiculturalism” (Fish 1998) that celebrates voluntary identity expressed through choice and consumption.⁵ On the other hand, a large number of liberal and progressive voices—Tomasky (1996), Gitlin (1995), Rorty (1989), Hobsbawm (1996), and Epstein (1991) among them—attacked multiculturalism and its variants as undermining the perceived common culture and agenda needed for a progressive, new-Left politics in America.⁶ In other words, recognition of the value of difference does not require a call for economic redistribution any more than a repudiation of diversity is necessarily a politically conservative position. There are supporters of multiculturalism who want nothing to do with a politics of redistribution and advocates of economic redistribution who have no sympathy for the politics of identity recognition.

In short, a fuller conception of multiculturalism must begin by breaking down the false opposition between unity and difference, between solidarity and diversity, or, as it is most frequently formulated in social and political theory, between universalism and particularism.⁷ With this in mind, we believe multiculturalism is best understood

³For a classic discussion, see the final chapter of Steinberg’s (1981) *The Ethnic Myth*.

⁴Walzer (1997:111) has gone so far as to claim that “multiculturalism as an ideology is a program for greater social and economic equality. No regime of toleration will work for long in an immigrant, pluralist, modern, and post-modern society without some combination of these two: a defense of group differences and an attack on class differences.” Glazer (1997), it is worth noting, rejects this definition of multiculturalism, restricting the term strictly to issues involving identity, culture, and difference alone. For a critique of this type of dual systems thought, see Young (1997); for a rejoinder, see Fraser (1997b).

⁵This is akin to Waters’s (1990) landmark study of white ethnic identity options. Here, it is also instructive to note that it was corporate America and the military establishment that filed many of the briefs on behalf of the University of Michigan’s affirmative action case referenced above.

⁶For critiques, see Kelley (1997:103–24) and Schusterman (1994).

⁷For an unusual and thought-provoking discussion of multiculturalism, see Parens (1994). Parens uses the work of a medieval Muslim scholar named Alfarabi to reconstruct Plato as a theorist who “denies moral universalism but acknowledges the possibility of some form of universalism.” This synthetic vision is presented as a corrective for extreme versions of multicultural particularism and Kantian universalism; “cultural universalists should temper their universalism,” Parens writes, while “multiculturalists should not abandon...[universal] moral foundations” (see also Gutmann 1994).

as a critical-theoretical project, an exercise in cultivating new conceptions of solidarity in the context of dealing with the realities of pervasive and increasing diversity in contemporary societies. Multiculturalism is a response—or a set of responses—to diversity that seeks to articulate the social conditions under which difference can be incorporated (Alexander 2001a) and order achieved from diversity.⁸ Our primary goal in this article is to generate a theoretical framework that moves beyond this one-dimensional conception by recognizing the claims about order that demarcate visions of difference and provide points of comparison between them.

A FRAMEWORK FOR VISIONS OF DIFFERENCE

We are now in a position to more formally specify a framework for organizing conceptions of difference and order in American culture. Our goal in this is to provide a theoretical grid that will not only recognize the important distinctions among recent theories, but will also place seemingly disparate claims into meaningful dialogue with each other. Before laying out the grid more explicitly, we should emphasize two important points about our task. The first is that this model is intended to make sense of theoretical visions of difference and not actual patterns of social relations. This distinction is crucial because of the tendency of many theoretical treatments of multiculturalism and difference to introduce typologies or distinctions about how societies deal with difference. Here, our model is oriented to the theories themselves, and the focus is on making sense of how different theories have conceived of difference. Our intention is not to advocate for one vision over the others but rather to place the otherwise discordant approaches into a productive tension with each other.

While part of our task will be to show the ways that influential theories of difference fit into our framework, we wish to also point out that the distinct visions that we discuss should be understood as ideal types rather than strict representations of particular theories. The framework is intended as a heuristic tool meant to highlight what we see as core elements that differentiate the types (Weber 1949).⁹ This framework is built from our own reading of the literature as well as a more formal analysis of the uses of the term “multiculturalism” in American academia.¹⁰ Moving away from the problematic one-dimensional view, the theoretical terrain that deals with what we call “visions of difference” can be mapped in two dimensions that reflect two core sociological domains for cohesion and order on which the visions differ: the cultural (the basis for social cohesion) and the relational (the basis for social association).

On the first dimension, theories of difference specify different cultural bases for cohesion, the legal or moral foundations for order and justice. Some insist that shared substantive bonds and practices are necessary for the maintenance of social cohesion.

⁸The conception of multiculturalism and its relation to diversity we are offering up here is not unlike the usage of democracy and equality often mobilized in Tocquevillian social theory—where “equality” is conceived as an accomplished social fact and “democracy” the political project by which equality is shaped and transformed into a more or less integrated and functional social order. Similarly for us, multiculturalism is the political response—or, more accurately, a set of responses—to pervasive and increasing social diversity in contemporary societies.

⁹This point has two important implications. The first is that any given theoretical framework will fit our framework as a matter of degree, and some accounts may fit into more than one of our classifications. It also bears noting that the central dimensions in our model are not the only important characteristics of the theories that we are attempting to make sense of. The theorists that cluster together on our model can and often do differ in other important ways.

¹⁰This was conducted with the help of a research assistant (see Morrison, Hartmann, and Gerteis 2003; see also Bryson n.d.; Morris 1996).

Others see this as impractical or undesirable and instead see shared norms or adherence to common legal codes as sufficient. This same distinction may also be cast in terms of “thick” and “thin” forces of cohesion. The more substantive conception of moral bonds provides for a thick form of solidarity, as order here would rest on deeply shared substantive commitments. Thick visions emphasize the need for commonality—shared lifestyles, values, mutual recognition, and understanding.

By contrast, the thinner visions accept that different values, commitments, and practices will remain but propose that shared procedural rules in the forms of norms or laws can provide a shell adequate to maintain social order even in the face of deep moral divisions. In highly differentiated societies, unitary values or moral commitments may be impossible or undesirable, yet social solidarity may be maintained by common adherence to procedural rules that guide interactions and facilitate broader collective endeavors. Here, individuals and groups remain orderly and respectful based less on what they concretely share in terms of lifestyles or values and more on respect for abstract legal and political process or on more immediate procedural norms of interaction.

The second dimension concerns the basis for association. This dimension indicates the social or relational basis for order in the visions of difference. Claims about difference and multiculturalism vary in their understanding of how interactions among and between individuals, groups, and the nation provide a basis for stability and social order in a diverse context. Here, the core distinction is between visions that propose that the basis for social association is individual interactions and those that suggest a more central role for groups. In the more liberal-individualist orientations, the individual human actor appears more or less directly in society. Other theories point to groups as occupying a key mediating position between the individual and society. In such claims, social groups—racial, religious, or other kinds—are a primary basis on which identities are formed and social order built. Order at the societal or national level is thus constituted in and through the relation of these groups. Membership in the social whole, to the extent that it is seen as important to an individual’s identity at all, is filtered through the particularizing lens of group membership.

Because the challenge of difference has always been at the center of the sociological enterprise, the dimensions actually have deep roots in sociological theory generally. The associational dimension points to Durkheim’s conception of social integration or Tocqueville’s emphasis on the role of associations. Perhaps, the most important connection with classical theory comes from Simmel’s (1971) understanding of “sociation” (*Vergesellschaftung*) as a basic process in the production of society and the tension between an individual’s social existence as an individual and as a member of social groups.¹¹ The cultural dimension indicating the basis for cohesion has its own deep sociological roots, indicating the degree of what Durkheim (1984) called “moral regulation,” varying from the thick mechanical solidarity to the thin organic form.

Combining these two dimensions of diversity in time-honored sociological tradition gives rise to a two-by-two table with four different cells marking distinct visions of difference (Figure 2). These visions describe separate ways in which social differences

¹¹This is particularly apparent in Simmel’s (1971:223) well-known articles “How is Society Possible?,” “Sociability,” and “Group Expansion and the Development of Individuality.” The discussion is extended in the posthumous article “Freedom and the Individual,” where Simmel traces the intellectual origins of the concept of individuality and its connection with the concepts of universality and freedom. In the strongest versions of individualism, “[a]ll relations with others are thus ultimately mere stations along the road by which the ego arrives at its self.”




Figure 2. Two-dimensional framework for visions of difference.

of many kinds may be incorporated into the fabric of the social whole.¹² Three of these—cosmopolitanism, interactive pluralism, and fragmented pluralism—can be considered different forms of multiculturalism. Assimilationism is not a form of multiculturalism, but its placement in this framework highlights its complex (and potentially evolving) relationship with multiculturalism in all of its forms. Following Alexander’s (2001a) and other recent discussions, it is clear that assimilation does represent a real response to difference and as such should be considered in tandem with other kinds of visions.

Defining the visions on these dimensions also highlights particular structural characteristics relating to the kind of social order that they indicate. Particularly important are the strength of internal or subnational group boundaries, the source

¹²Alexander’s (2001a) own attempt to provide an outline of such modes of incorporation led him to differentiate three visions (assimilation, hyphenation, and multiculturalism) similar to ones we also describe. See Habermans (1996) for an additional tripartite schema. Our discussion extends Alexander’s points in several ways. First, because we begin with this theoretical framework, we are able to compare the visions explicitly, where Alexander and others have been content to see them as either incommensurate or implicitly arrayed on the one-dimensional opposition we discussed. Second, we avoid the label “multiculturalism” and in doing so are able to recognize substantially different forms of multiculturalism. In our terms, multiculturalism includes not only the form that Alexander himself advocates but also forms that he rejects (as with “hyphenation,” or what we label “cosmopolitanism,” which is what most people mean by the term) or suppresses (as with our “fragmented pluralism,” which Alexander briefly recognizes and then drops).

of the “external” boundary encompassing the social whole, and the location of pressure to integrate or conform.¹³ These characteristics are depicted in Figure 3.

External or macro-social boundaries demarcate societies or nations from others. Strong external boundaries provide a shared identity that includes all of the members of the society. At the same time, they also exclude outsiders who culturally or legally do not belong. By contrast, a weak external boundary can involve a degree of identification without clear exclusive elements. For example, such a boundary might identify American citizens but be unable to pinpoint any substantive commitments that they share or a clear distinction between potential citizens. The strength and specificity of the national boundary is thus directly related to the first defining element of our framework. In the visions emphasizing substantive moral bonds as the basis for cohesion, the external boundary tends to be relatively strong and concretely defined. In the visions that emphasize procedural norms, it is relatively weak and inchoate.

Internal or group boundaries demarcate groups within the social whole from each other. Theoretically, members of a social whole might be divided by any salient categorical boundaries, but race, ethnicity, and religion are typically the ones that receive the most attention in scholarly accounts. The stronger the internal boundaries in a particular vision of difference, the more clearly groups within a society are seen as




Figure 3. Structural images of social order.

¹³Following the work of Taylor (2001) (see also Alexander 2001b:372–73), we call attention to this distinction between “internal” and “external” boundaries and the way that both kinds of boundaries relate to inclusion and exclusion (see also Tilly 2003; Lamont and Molnár 2002).

separate from one another in terms of identities, practices, and values. Similar to the external boundaries, internal boundaries both include and exclude. The strength of the internal boundaries is directly related to the second defining element of our framework.

The models also differ in the strength and location of conformity pressure. Strong conformity pressure comes from strong boundaries, but the visions differ on the source of such pressure. Pressure imposed on members of a social entity to retain or adopt identities, practices, or values may come from internal, mediating communities or the social whole and may be directed toward all members of the social whole, within group boundaries only, or between social groups.

ASSIMILATIONISM

Although assimilationism is the one vision of difference in our model that is not usually termed “multicultural,” we begin with it because it is the easiest vision to portray and because this is the baseline from which most authors measure their own models of difference. After all, assimilation is often claimed to be the traditional vision of incorporation in America. Because of this status, it has been lauded by some authors and denounced by others. Indeed, in recent years, there has been a rather radical rethinking of the concept (as we discuss more extensively in the conclusion). What is important here is that all sides agree on the basic outline of the traditional concept of assimilation that has roots in work on race and ethnicity, particularly with Park (1939) and the Chicago School. The concept has its classic expression in the work of Gordon (1964).¹⁴

On the first dimension, this vision rests on the importance of substantive moral bonds as the basis for moral cohesion. In particular, the emphasis is on *mutual responsibilities* that are implied by the core values and cultural commitments. On the second dimension, assimilationism strongly denies the mediating role of groups. The connection between the individual and the social whole is seen as more or less direct. The assimilationist vision is unique in that there is no strong distinction between internal and external boundaries.¹⁵ Instead, the social whole takes on “group” characteristics; functionally speaking, the group and the nation are the same. The boundaries of the social whole thus tend to be strong, while internal group boundaries are weak or nonexistent, subsumed within the whole. Conformity pressures that support incorporation in this model pressure individuals to lose the characteristics of prior outsider identities and to adopt the society’s core values.

This vision deals with difference by removing it. Difference is understood as something dangerous, to be rid of or at least minimized. The emphasis is instead on cultural homogeneity and conformity. Rather than impose a strict social closure for a society, Alexander (2001a) notes that this vision removes difference by transforming out-group members to in-group members in a distinctive way, by “separating persons from qualities.” Outsider identities and the cultural traits that sustain those identities must be shed, at least publicly, before full incorporation into the social whole can

¹⁴For further discussion, see Cornell and Hartmann (1998:39–47). See Alba (1995), Alba and Nee (2003), and Kivisto (2004) for additional views.

¹⁵This does not necessarily mean that membership is entirely universal. For example, Taylor (2001) notes that in nations organized around the assimilationist vision, women have historically obtained the vote much later. As feminist authors have pointed out, cultural understandings of putatively universal categories such as “citizen” have been derived in fact from particular social locations (e.g., that of men). What is important for this vision is that values are universally shared, even if these values undermine universal rights.

occur. That is, it is not groups that are expected to assimilate. Rather, individuals are expected to shed their previous markers of group identity and adopt those of the social whole.

As Alexander also points out, private difference may be tolerated under this vision as long as it is not pushed into the public sphere. For example, privately observed religious or ethnic practices may be overlooked, so long as they go along with public conformity to the codes and practices of the society. This shared core of values is what Shils (1982:93) and later sociologists have termed the "center." As Shils put it: "Society has a center . . . It is the center of the order of symbols, of values and beliefs, which govern society. It is the center because it is the ultimate and irreducible, and it is felt to be such by many who cannot give explicit articulation to its irreducibility."¹⁶

Adherence to the center is a key feature of this vision. As such, pressure to conform is extremely strong, and members are made over in a "rigid and uncompromising way" (Taylor 2001:185), so that there is a common understanding about the nature of the social whole, and so that this becomes the most salient, if not the only, identity of members. At least in America, the central metaphor for assimilation is that of the "melting pot"—new elements take on the characteristics of the whole, thereby losing their distinctiveness.¹⁷ By minimizing distinctiveness, particularly with regard to cultural value systems, the bonds of mutual understanding as well as mutual responsibility are maximized.

As a result of the strong nature of the macro-social boundary, there is a strong defense of the center against the incursion of outsiders and the distinctive cultures they may bring. Thus, the outlines of the national culture tend not to be subject to change. In practice, this often means that assimilationists would prefer to minimize immigration, as many authors have recognized. Yet it is important to recognize that the assimilationist vision is at least theoretically compatible with even high rates of immigration. As long as the immigrants are willing to give up group identities, practices, and values in favor of the core culture of the receiving society, they do not pose such a problem.¹⁸

On the basis of this insistence on homogeneous public commitment to the core, assimilationism has often been painted as a conservative vision; however, the conservation of common morality or values is not necessarily incompatible with the politics of social justice or redistribution any more than it is incompatible with receiving immigrants as long as they adapt to the established mainstream culture. The vision is actually compatible with a range of political positions, as reflected in the work of thinkers as diverse as Arthur Schlesinger, Rogers Brubaker, and Christian Joppke. Schlesinger (1991) provides one of the best-known defenses of the assimilationist vision. For this author, the model becomes a way to defend the promise of traditional Western political and intellectual values. While anyone is welcome in

¹⁶Shils (1982) proposed that a society's central value system was "central" in the sense of being the cultural and moral core that defines a system and in the sense of being the milieu of the society's elites.

¹⁷It should be noted that the metaphor, taken strictly, suggests something more similar to "amalgamation" than "assimilation" and thus points to what we have called interactive pluralism. The popular meaning suggests that the new elements take on the characteristics of the already existing elements, but not vice versa.

¹⁸This phenomenon may be clearer to American readers in the case of subnational examples. Christian Smith, for example, finds that evangelical Christians adopt what amounts to an assimilationist model of difference. Evangelicals are powerfully motivated by an "us-against-them" mentality. But Smith finds that unlike fundamentalists who prefer to withdraw from the world, evangelicals engage with it. On the whole, evangelicals profess that they do not discriminate and they welcome anyone to join them—so long as it is understood that in doing so, they adopt the moral culture of the religious community as it stands (Emerson and Smith 2000; Smith 1998).

Schlesinger's vision, the core values must not be compromised. For example, nations with imperial histories tend to have a great deal of contact with the colonized, either as colonial citizens or, later, as immigrants. France provides probably the best example here (cf. Brubaker 1996, 1992; Weber 1979). French citizenship has been far more open to immigrants, particularly compared with German citizenship. Yet France, no less than Germany, has continued to insist on the contours of its national heritage as fixed. Recent discussions of citizenship in liberal Western democracies have emphasized the importance of the adoption of the national culture with the explicit intent of reinvigorating theories of assimilation (Brubaker 2001; Joppke 1999).¹⁹

COSMOPOLITANISM

In its most elemental form, the cosmopolitan approach recognizes the social value of diversity, but it is skeptical about the obligations and constraints that group membership and societal cohesion can place on individuals. As a result, this vision defends diversity only insofar as it allows and expands individual rights and freedoms. In contrast to the assimilationist vision, the most striking features of cosmopolitanism are its lack of cultural specificity and the resulting vagueness of its external boundary. While the assimilationist vision sees a strong macro-boundary and a thick, substantive understanding of moral solidarity on our first dimension, cosmopolitanism relies on a thinner, more procedural understanding of the macro-culture. Compared to the two other multicultural visions that we will present below, however, what also stands out here is the corresponding weakness and public salience of subnational, mediating communities.

The emphasis in this vision is on *tolerance* and *individual choice* rather than mutual obligations. In many respects, this suggests that the cosmopolitan vision is more inclusive than assimilation, because it does not insist that all members share the same core traits. It also means that those adopting this vision are agnostic as to what members share beyond a minimal commitment to mutual belonging. For the individuals involved, membership in the social whole is one among many sources of identity, and it is not necessarily the most salient.

Group differences may well be important, but group identities are not to be totalizing or the source of public rights or obligations. They may often be cross-cutting as well. In short, this is a largely individualized, voluntaristic vision. It is individualized in Simmel's sense, as members are internally differentiated by multiple and cross-cutting boundaries. It is individualistic in a more pedestrian sense as well, as group membership becomes a choice and a source of individual identity. The model for this weak group identification is perhaps best illustrated by white ethnic identity in America (Alba 1990; Waters 1990). Identifying as "German American" in the contemporary United States does not imply adopting a strong or separatist identity, for example, because there is nothing about "German" that is particularly in tension with "American," and because there is no significant pressure to choose between this and other ethnic identifications, such as "Irish." A cosmopolitan vision would move all group differences into such safe contexts (see, e.g., Anderson 2004).

¹⁹These discussions as well as our own formulation of the problem are substantially complicated by the emergence of transnational forms of identification and belonging. For discussion of this, see Kivisto (2003), Morawska (2003), and Schiller, Basch, and Blanc-Szanton (1995). For a more critical view, see Foner (1997).

Cosmopolitanism thus tends to be the thinnest of the visions, but it is at least one in which difference can exist without significant conflict. The weak external and internal boundaries mean that the inclusive elements of identification are never very strong, but neither are the exclusive pressures that maintain social conflict. This vision is substantially similar to what Alexander terms “ethnic hyphenation,” where group qualities are neutralized rather than negated. Alexander (2001a:245) suggests that under such a vision, we get “the possibility of forming stronger and deeper cross-group bonds that bridge . . . particularity” while it also provides “opportunities for dialogue, understanding, and emotional bonding that lead to increasing rates of friendship and intermarriage.” Alexander has relatively little to say about this model, however, and by implication, treats it as something of a transitional point between assimilation and true multiculturalism.²⁰ This is the case for Taylor (2001), too, who terms this “neutral liberalism.”

It is likely the lack of actual or concrete constraint in this model makes it problematic for many observers who wish for a stronger vision of community. Yet it is also the lack of constraint in this model that has made it attractive to some scholars. This was the predominant vision of a number of earlier liberal critiques of intolerance (e.g., Lipset and Raab 1978), but it is also one that holds a great deal of attraction for lay American audiences because of its emphasis on choice and voluntarism, as well as its insistence on the permeability of internal membership and group boundaries. This position is best articulated and defended by David Hollinger (1995) in his book *Postethnic America* (see also Appiah 1997). Hollinger recognizes the cultural value of social diversity but insists that individual rights and freedoms should not be compromised to ensure the reproduction of any specific group or cultural category within the aggregate whole. His vision is perhaps best summarized in his story of Arthur Haley’s “choice.” Haley felt compelled to tell one side of his family’s story in the bestselling *Roots*, while the Irish side of his lineage was suppressed. For Hollinger, a model society is one in which either side of the story could have had equal power and authenticity for a public audience. It is one in which every individual is free to choose her or his place in the ethnic mosaic.

FRAGMENTED PLURALISM

Fragmented pluralism focuses on the existence of a variety of distinctive and relatively self-contained mediating communities as a social reality, but also as a necessity and strength. Structurally, this vision is the closest to being the opposite of assimilation. On the first dimension, this model rests on procedural norms rather than common moral bonds. On the second dimension, the model places heavy emphasis on the role of groups. As a result, the structural content of the vision tends toward a weaker macro-social boundary but very strong internal groups and boundaries.

Under assimilationism, the social groups are absorbed into the social whole. Under fragmented pluralism, the social whole is dissolved into its component collective units. The individual, in short, gets subsumed by the group rather than the nation. For cosmopolitanism, group membership was a matter of individual choice. Here, group membership is seen as essential rather than partial and voluntaristic. It is presumed on

²⁰For Alexander, this model emerged from assimilation and may fold back into it. Particularly, he states that distinctions between “core” and “outsider” identities remain and that “outsider” identities are stigmatized (Alexander 2001a:245). We disagree—while cosmopolitanism may well be not completely separated from assimilation in public discourse, we see the ideal type as being quite distinct, having an integrity and potential practical stability all its own.

the basis of strong preexisting group boundaries rather than chosen freely. This vision thus implies social units that are more or less autonomous and discrete, and group self-determination is seen as crucial for identity. Maintenance of distinctive group cultures is one of the chief points of emphasis for proponents of this view. Consequently, conformity pressure is strong here, but it is group-specific rather than conformity to a common “center” that matters. Individuals are bound mainly to mediating, subnational communities, but national order is ensured by the respect for group rights and collective self-determination.

This orientation to diversity is perhaps closest to the standard definition of multiculturalism as standing in stark opposition to social homogeneity. As a result, this vision has been the target of cultural critics, particularly on the political right, who fear the disuniting and moral relativism they see as inherent in it. In large part, it was the emergence of such strong claims about difference that led to the debates over a loss of “center” in the 1980s and afterward. The American academic debates over Afrocentrism stand as a good example of this (see Binder 2004; Gutmann 1994). The insistence on the preservation of group differences—whether in religious, racial, ethnic, or other forms—is the basis of what proponents see as its advantage and detractors see as the danger of this model.

Across groups, the value systems under fragmented pluralism may be divergent or in some cases directly opposed. Substantive moral bonds at the macro-social level thus no longer form the basis for social cohesion. As in the case of cosmopolitanism, the emphasis is on procedural norms. The focus tends to be less on rules of interaction than on *group rights*, however, such as legal rights to maintain separate institutions or practices. The state and its legal structures thus become particularly important for cohesion as a force mediating between group claims. The state is seen as largely content-empty, however, managing the discrepant rights-claims of groups without imposing any substantive moral claims of its own. In a sense, the importance of the state as an arbiter of common rights grows in proportion with the decline of the society as an enforcer of common values.

Although this vision represents the opposite of the assimilationist vision in one sense, it is important to emphasize that in another sense, it is not so different after all. This vision can be considered a version of assimilationism in which groups are substituted for nations. If the assimilationist vision approaches what Durkheim would have called “mechanical solidarity,” fragmented pluralism amounts to the same thing with the exception that each unit acts as its own solidaristic community. Because it is the internal and not the external boundaries that carry the cohesive weight in this model, group boundaries are policed in the way that social boundaries are in assimilationism. Groups have a clear idea of who fits in and who does not. For the social whole, there is no such clear-cut division between insiders and outsiders. In the absence of a meaningful shared value consensus, there is simply no cultural basis on which such distinctions could be made and no way of saying where the limits of the social body may lie.

A number of works could be used to illustrate the core ideas about incorporation and solidarity that we have described here as fragmented pluralism, ranging from the work of political theorist Iris Young (2000, 1990) to the ethnic and immigrant histories of the post-civil-rights era, which intentionally or unintentionally revived Horace Kallen’s progressive era ideas about a cultural pluralism (see Kazal 1995; Gleason 1980).²¹ But we

²¹ Iris Young, work is perhaps the most well known and important, but because her ideas about difference are so intertwined with her political vision and emphasis on domination, it presents some complexities that we cannot go into here.

believe one of the clearest exemplars of this approach is the work of Alejandro Portes, Ruben Rumbaut, and their colleagues on what they call the “segmented assimilation” of new immigrants into American society.

Portes and Zhou (1993:77), for example, claim that “[i]nstead of a relatively uniform mainstream [culture] whose mores and prejudices dictate a common path of integration, we observe today several distinct forms of adaptation.” They actually specify three different types of integration or sectors of American society into which immigrants are incorporated: one that replicates acculturation and integration in the white middle class; a second that involves incorporation into the African-American-dominated, urban underclass (what Anderson (2000) might call “oppositional culture”); and a third, multifaceted form that involves both rapid economic advancement combined with preservation of the immigrant community’s transported values and tight solidarity. This notion has prompted a great deal of debate about the relationships among and between race, ethnic identity, and ethnic enclaves, including Portes and Rumbaut’s (2001) own award-winning book (see also Neckerman, Carter, and Lee 1999; Aleinikoff and Rumbaut 1998; Portes 1995; Kazal 1995). But the broader implication of the concept and why it is so useful here is that it indicates a distinctive vision of multidimensional difference. Even more to the point, American society itself is not composed of a single, homogeneous culture but is rather a collection of distinct cultures and groups. Assimilation involves not losing these differences but having them constructed—it is assimilation *into* group difference.²²

INTERACTIVE PLURALISM

While the term “multiculturalism” has sometimes been used to label any vision that provides a defense of difference, it has recently been used in a more specific sense by Alexander (2001a) and Taylor (2001, 1994) among others. This distinctive version, which we term interactive pluralism, realizes the existence of distinct groups and cultures. But in contrast to its fragmented cousin, it posits the need to cultivate common understanding across these differences through their mutual recognition and ongoing interaction. Indeed, for many of its adherents, cross-cultural dialogue and exchange becomes the defining feature and value to be cultivated.

Alexander and Taylor both tend to depict this, their preferred form of multiculturalism, as furthest away from assimilationism. This seems to us right in one regard—multiculturalism is based on the recognition and acceptance of difference rather than its disavowal—but certainly inadequate overall. The distinction is usually expressed in terms of acceptance (assimilationism does not accept difference, while multiculturalism does), and this is a fair point. The placement of this vision in our framework indicates its complex connections to the other visions. Similar to assimilationism, this vision rests on a relatively “thick,” substantive form of cohesion. For assimilationism, the focus of these bonds was on mutual responsibilities to each other based on a common set of values, while for interactive pluralism the emphasis is on *mutual recognition and respect* of differences. Similar to fragmented pluralism, then, it points to the importance of groups as the primary basis for association in society. Yet, here too there is a difference in emphasis. While both visions prioritize the role of groups, interactive pluralism stresses *groups in interaction* with each other mutually

²²There is more at stake here than segmented assimilationist scholars may recognize. One crucial question is the source of cultural cohesion and order at the societal or national level, which may be too easily taken for granted in the American context.

constituting a substantive moral whole. As a result, the important location of interaction is between rather than within groups.

In this interactive model, group difference is celebrated in and of itself, and group identity claims are regarded as legitimate points of entry into public life. In all of this, there is a “decentered” vision of the national culture, meaning that it is made plural and no longer simply an emanation of the cultural vision of one group. But this emphasis does not mean that there is no coherent macro-culture as in segmented assimilation. Rather, a crucial feature of this vision is that a new and constantly redefined macro-culture emerges from the interaction between groups, a complex social whole that is recognized and valued.

Under cosmopolitanism or fragmented pluralism, the macro-culture tends to be thinner and essentially procedural in nature. Under assimilation, the moral center provided by the macro-culture is seen as substantive and foundational. That is, its claim to legitimacy is rooted in tradition, and it is thus always prior to the social interaction that it shapes. With interactive pluralism, however, the substantive moral order is understood to be *emergent*—not something that “is” but something in a constant state of becoming. Social boundaries and moral order are produced in a more or less democratic manner through the interaction of groups. This is crucial. As the formations of the groups change, the nature of the macro-culture itself changes. There are always substantive commitments, but these are always being regenerated and they may take very different formations at different points in time. While new groups and new forms of difference might continually present themselves, at any given moment, a relatively strong national or social identity is present.

Taylor (2001:187), for example, has asserted that assimilationism has waned with increased immigration, while at the same time, immigrants and other internal “others” have demanded that the “reigning formula be modified to accommodate them, rather than the other way around.” The outcome, Taylor suggests, will be a constant pressure for democratic “self-reinvention” of the macro-culture. He suggests that this should not happen on the basis of an empty liberalism as with cosmopolitanism. Rather, it should necessarily involve a sort of democratic hermeneutics in which understanding the “other” involves a new understanding of the self. “The attempt to understand leads, if successful, to a ‘fusion of horizons,’” Taylor suggests (2001:192). In Alexander’s framework, incorporation means that it is not the persons but the qualities of outsiders that change. That is, acceptance of groups does not hinge on their distancing themselves from their own cultures; rather, acceptance of others involves acceptance of their cultures as well. The meaning of incorporation changes from “inclusion” of outsiders into a predefined cultural sphere to an “achievement of diversity” in the sphere itself (Alexander 2001a:246).²³

DISCUSSION

In this article, we have presented a two-by-two model that allows us to distinguish distinct visions for incorporating difference in diverse societies. We believe that this framework can assist us and others in more carefully specifying, analyzing, and understanding the complex terrain of the theoretical discussion of difference. There are at least two different sets of theoretical issues that flow out of our analytic

²³One underappreciated implication of this is that the constituent groups themselves are always changing. As interaction draws them together, the pressure toward mutual recognition also changes the individuals and also the group cultures themselves. This transformation is speeded with the entry of additional groups.

scheme—one having to do with the conceptual relationships between the different models and the other with the relationships between difference and inequality, or between recognition and redistribution, that we introduced and then bracketed in our initial definitional discussion.

We will begin with the relationships between the four distinct visions of incorporation our ideal typical arrangement reveals. Here, it is important to recall our initial starting point: the need to move away from a one-dimensional conception of difference that simply places multiculturalism in opposition to homogeneity or unity. By mapping the theoretical terrain on two core dimensions, we are able to suggest that conceptions of multiculturalism are distinguished not so much by the degree of difference they celebrate or allow but rather by the ways in which they believe difference can be incorporated. This not only reveals four different ways of dealing with difference; it helps us see more clearly some of the structural relationships between these four types. In other words, this framework allows a way for different claims about difference to speak to one another.

We have used Jeffrey Alexander's recent work on "modes of incorporation" as one important guidepost in this endeavor. While Alexander, and to a lesser degree Charles Taylor, outline several visions of difference, implicitly they are arrayed on the same underlying one-dimensional framework, with their preferred strong version of multiculturalism (what we have called "interactive pluralism") at the opposite end of the spectrum from assimilation. By way of our reconfiguration, we have been able to point out not only the ways that assimilationism works as a response to difference, but also the ways that different models of multiculturalism share important elements with this vision. In a sense, the opposition implicit in many conceptions of multiculturalism bends back on itself in our framework (see Figure 4). The end of the journey takes us to a place that is clearly different from the beginning but also much closer than the traveler may realize.

The flip side of this point is that the different multicultural visions are also related to assimilation in nontrivial ways. Most important here may be the connection between assimilationism and interactive pluralism that is revealed by our mapping. In contrast with the unidimensional configuration, this configuration shows that they both insist on the importance of the macro-social boundary, thick, substantive understandings of the social whole. While the origin of this collective solidarity differs, the importance of the common culture defines both. This point may be underscored if we think about the body of work often labeled "communitarianism." As a whole, communitarian theory is clearly on the "substantive" side of our model, but it is less clear where it lies on our associational dimension. On the one hand, self-avowed communitarians such as Amitai Etzioni (2001) claim to recognize and value group difference, yet many detractors see this body of work as a thinly veiled form of assimilationism that insists on unity rather than difference, compromising the distinctive cultures of component groups. We do not mean to take a position on this debate here; the point is simply that our framework helps to capture the tension that the debate turns on, showing it as the product of an important conceptual ambiguity over the salience and strength of mediating communities and how much the "center" can or should change in response to them.

A similar point can be made about theoretical debates on the procedural side of the model. Can there be a liberal defense of group rights? This question highlights why the work of a theorist such as Will Kymlicka has proved so controversial. On the one hand, his work appears unabashedly of the liberal cosmopolitan persuasion. Kymlicka (1995:75) argues that individual freedom is a basic principle of liberalism




Figure 4. Bending the one-dimensional framework.

and that “liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom and autonomy of individuals” (see also Kymlicka and Norman 2001). On the other hand, his emphasis on collective identities and his commitment to the right of “self-determination” for “national” minorities, linguistic communities, or indigenous peoples would seem to place him in the “fragmented pluralism” cell. Indeed, it seems to us that Kymlicka is right in the middle of the distinctions we have drawn, which has made his position, important though it is, so hard for other scholars to grasp.²⁴

There is a great deal more that could be said about the structural relationships and distinctions that our scheme reveals than we have space to elaborate here. For example, we have said very little about the structural relationships across the diagonals of our typology that might usefully be explored. We also want to say more about the recent revitalization of assimilation thinking. To set that up, we want to raise the second set of issues raised by our discussion, specifically the relationship between visions of difference and inequality.

²⁴It is precisely this position that accounts for Benhabib’s (2002:199) critique of Kymlicka. Benhabib is bothered by Kymlicka’s “astonishing confession” that “in cases where the national minority is illiberal, this means that the majority will be unable to prevent the violation of individual rights within the minority community. Liberals in the majority group have to learn to live with this, just as they must live with illiberal laws in other countries” (Kymlicka 1995:168). Kymlicka acknowledges that “gross and systematic violations of human rights such as slavery or genocide or mass torture and expulsions” (1995:169) may require some sort of intervention; however, he is not clear what this intervention would be or, more importantly, what criteria it would be based on. Benhabib attributes this to deep flaws in his concept of culture; alternatively, it could be seen as an attempt to work through the limitations of liberal conceptions of justice. Our point is simply that this debate turns on an ambiguity over Kymlicka’s placement on our associational dimension.

We mentioned early on that one of the most complicated aspects of defining multiculturalism has to do with the fact that it is difficult for citizens and theorists alike to distinguish conceptions of difference from questions of inequality. Indeed, as we discussed in the introduction, there is a common assumption that any form of recognition of difference is a progressive force in American society. The assumption flows too easily from the standard, one-dimensional continuum of American politics, intensified if not determined by public-private splits and the two-party system. This neat correspondence between politics and visions of difference—between recognition and redistribution—breaks down, particularly over issues of social equality. Thus, we deliberately bracketed questions of political orientation and alliance from our conceptual discussion of multiculturalism as a response to difference. In doing so, we have opened up the possibility that political views and orientations will be distributed widely across the grid. In other words, we turned the relationship between redistribution and recognition as an empirical matter instead of an ideological or conceptual one.

We are now in a position to speculate about how our framework helps to frame some contemporary issues. Let us take, for example, debates over the politics of race and inequality. Okin (1999) has posed the question: "Is multiculturalism bad for women?" (see also Takaki 2000; West 1990). In a similar spirit, we think it is worthwhile asking not which visions are the most or least progressive, but what the practical tradeoffs might be for each. One typical assumption would be that assimilationism is the most conservative orientation with respect to redistribution efforts, such as affirmative action. With its emphasis on rights and freedoms, cosmopolitanism would seem to be more inclined toward a progressive stance. The segmented assimilation model seemingly offers an even better position from which to address group-based class and race inequalities. Certainly, this is where most of the critical theorizing has concentrated.

The question here is whether, for purposes of equity and redistribution, to focus on individual rights and freedoms or group-based structures and constraints. Or, is an altogether different political language needed—one that emphasizes common culture and belonging? The problem is that segmented assimilation may really miss the cultural reasons why Americans have been unwilling to extend rights and resources to certain groups. A great deal of opposition to welfare state provisions and redistribution efforts stems from a lack of trust across racial lines (cf. Brown 1999; Gilens 1999; Lieberman 1998; Quadagno 1994). Advocates of interactive pluralism and assimilation would suggest that support for redistribution efforts requires a larger sense of community, commonality, and trust that currently is not in place. With an emphasis on common identities and mutual responsibilities (rather than simply rights and redistribution of resources), interactive pluralism and assimilation present in some ways a more promising approach. "Recognition," advocates suggest, involves not only an understanding of difference, but an understanding of and sympathy for addressing structural inequalities. Such recognition can help to build a sense of mutual cultural and moral commitments that can provide a basis for addressing structural disparities.

But this is not always or necessarily the case, and indeed the argument has been made that strong "communitarian" multiculturalism may actually impede or dismiss structural change. This is precisely Nathan Glazer's (1997:ch. 8) critique of multicultural curricula: that it can diminish, obscure, or mystify deep structural inequalities, especially with respect to race, by putting all its emphasis on a self-satisfied accomplishment of cultural recognition. In practice, structural parity may

be sacrificed to cultural equality. Privileged groups may downplay or dismiss structural inequalities, because they feel they have granted equal cultural recognition.

A more concrete example of how recognizing and valuing cultural diversity may actually contribute to the reproduction of inequality has to do with language. On the one hand, bilingualism might be seen as a good thing for the communitarian-minded multiculturalist to celebrate and to defend. Yet at the same time, this maintenance of linguistic diversity might well put non-English speakers at a competitive disadvantage, especially as they begin to move out of their particular cultural and market enclaves and into the mainstream of employment and education. In fact, this helps explain why in many situations it is immigrant groups and nonnative English speakers who are ambivalent or reluctant to support bilingualism in schools: they realize that as much as they may value their language and culture, it can be a barrier to upward mobility and economic success in a society where dominant cultural forms involve the English language.²⁵

These points also bring us back to assimilationism, albeit in a somewhat more ambivalent, pragmatic form. It is quite possible that assimilation is seen by many racial and ethnic minorities as less morally desirable than structurally necessary. Indeed, as Glazer has argued, there is some reason to believe that the assimilationist vision may provide a strong platform for addressing racial inequality, especially if it is genuinely open to all persons that adopt the dominant culture and language. This is precisely because its bonds of solidarity and feelings of commonality are the richest, deepest, and most widely shared. This is one reason why assimilation is being seriously reconsidered by many scholars (Huntington 2004; Brubaker 2001; Rumbaut n.d., Barkan 1995; Morawska 1994; Glazer 1993).²⁶ In its various guises, this work has brought back issues of cultural inclusion and common ground as well as appreciation for the remarkable socioeconomic opportunities available for new immigrants to the United States (see Alba and Nee 2003). The open question is how new dynamics of assimilation relate to persistent challenges of inequality how widely distributed opportunities for inclusion really have been across lines of class, culture, and especially race. Here, it is important to keep in mind that the making of Americans has always been marked both by liberty and coercion and by opportunity and constraint (Gerstle 1997, see also 2002).

Clearly, the implications of our model are not just theoretical. We have offered our framework not only because we have found it useful for ordering a messy theoretical terrain, but also because it provides a purchase on messy public debates. Sketching out some of these political tensions reveals once again the limits and unrealized complexities undercutting conventional categories of liberal and conservative, of diversity and solidarity, and of multiculturalism and homogeneity. In addition to revealing the wider range of multicultural visions that are present in contemporary theoretical discourse, we are now in a position to ask a set of more typical sociological questions about where Americans in general stand on these issues. When Americans talk about difference, how do they do so? Which visions and which forms of order are most attractive or most appreciated? What social and demographic factors will determine one's general way of thinking and talking about issues of incorporation, diversity, and solidarity? How do specific social contexts and experiences shape visions of difference? Are multicultural positions consistent or do they vary by issue

²⁵For a more extensive discussion of this point, see Alba and Nee (2003:217–30).

²⁶Some good collected volumes on this have recently emerged as well. See Jacoby (2004) and Joppke and Morawska (2003).

and type of social difference? Of course, we are not in a position yet to answer these questions, but we are at least in a position to frame them. And in breaking from conventional one-dimensional models, we hope to have made clear that the crucial question for multicultural theory and practice is not whether or not difference is acceptable, but rather how difference will be dealt with in increasingly diverse, contemporary societies.

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